上市公司超法人治理边界、高管超额激励与企业价值

发布时间：2018-10-14 18:29

【摘要】：实际经济活动中,公司的治理范围已超越了其法人边界,但传统的公司治理研究却局限在法人边界之内,鲜有文献探讨公司治理边界扩大后的特征对公司自身治理的影响。本文搜集了上市公司子公司、合营公司与联营公司的数据,并以此作为公司超法人治理边界的替代,探讨了上市公司超法人治理边界的扩大与高管超额激励之间的关系及其对企业价值的影响。本文发现上市公司超法人治理边界越大,其高管的超额货币性收益和非货币性收益越高,上市公司高管由超法人治理边界的扩大而获取的超额收益对企业价值有着显著的正向影响。进一步检验发现,上市公司超法人治理边界与高管超额激励之间的关系在不同产权性质的公司和不同两权分离状况的公司中并无显著差异。但上市公司超法人治理边界对高管超额激励的影响程度在欠发达地区的上市公司中更大。本文的结论支持了有效契约理论在中国上市公司高管薪酬制定中的适用性,为上市公司的高管治理提供了一个新的视角。
[Abstract]:In the actual economic activities, the scope of corporate governance has exceeded its legal person boundary, but the traditional study of corporate governance is confined to the legal person boundary. There are few documents to discuss the influence of the extended corporate governance boundary on corporate governance. This paper collects the data of subsidiary companies, joint ventures and associated companies of listed companies, and uses this data as an alternative to the corporate governance boundary. This paper probes into the relationship between the expansion of the super-corporate governance boundary of listed companies and the excess incentive of executives and its influence on the enterprise value. This paper finds that the larger the boundaries of corporate governance of listed companies, the higher the excess monetary and non-monetary returns of their executives. The excess income obtained by the executives of listed companies from the expansion of the super-corporate governance boundary has a significant positive impact on the enterprise value. Further tests show that there is no significant difference between the relationship between the super-corporate governance boundary and the executive excess incentive of listed companies in the companies with different property rights and in the companies with different separation of rights. However, the influence of super corporate governance boundary on executive excess incentive is greater than that of listed companies in less developed areas. The conclusion of this paper supports the applicability of the effective contract theory in the formulation of executive compensation of listed companies in China, and provides a new perspective for the executive governance of listed companies.
【作者单位】：华南理工大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71602059) 教育部人文社科基金资助项目(15YJC630051) 广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2015A030310223;2016A030313482)
【分类号】：F271;F275

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