金字塔股权结构终极控制、董事会特征与公司绩效关系研究
发布时间：2018-10-26 11:59
【摘要】：20世纪90年代末,以La porta为代表的一些学者首次提出了终极控股股东的概念,他们发现在大多数国家所有权集中的现象更为普遍,所以对这些国家来说,在公司治理的过程中,其主要矛盾不仅体现在管理者和所有者之间,还体现在控股股东和中小股东之间。我国上市公司主要是集中持股的所有权形式,在这样的结构下,公司内部通常有一个终极控制人,该终极控制人对公司所具有的控制权可能会大于其股票持有比例所赋予的权力,终极控制人大多构建了金字塔结构。董事会作为重要的公司内控手段在公司治理起到非常重要的作用,与金字塔结构紧密相关。本文从终极控制人的视角,使用我国2010-2014年家族上市公司的面板数据进行实证研究,研究了终极控制人所拥有的控制权、现金流权、控制权与现金流权之间的偏离对公司绩效的影响,并在此基础上考察了董事会对终极控制人侵占行为的约束作用。研究结果表明:在金字塔股权结构的家族上市公司中,终极控制人的控制权与公司绩效没有显著相关关系;终极控制人的现金流权与公司绩效呈显著正相关关系;终极控制人的两权分离与公司绩效呈显著负相关关系,存在着堑壕效应;独立董事比例有效约束终极控制人因两权分离引起的侵占行为,说明了独立董事会加强对终极控制人行为的监督,提高了侵占行为成本,从而降低了终极控制人的侵占行为的意愿;董事会规模有效调增终极控制人因两权分离引起的侵占行为,董事会规模的增加降低了监督效率,难以对终极控制人的行为实施有效监督,更加剧了董事会内党派的形成,使得终极控制人的侵害行为得以纵容。
[Abstract]:In the late 1990s, some scholars represented by La porta put forward the concept of ultimate controlling shareholder for the first time. They found that the phenomenon of ownership concentration is more common in most countries, so for these countries, in the process of corporate governance, The main contradiction is not only between manager and owner, but also between controlling shareholder and minority shareholder. The main form of ownership of listed companies in China is centralized ownership. Under such a structure, there is usually an ultimate controller within the company. The ultimate controller may have more control over the company than its share holding ratio, and most of the ultimate controllers have built a pyramid structure. As an important internal control method, board of directors plays a very important role in corporate governance and is closely related to pyramid structure. In this paper, from the perspective of ultimate controller, we use the panel data of family listed companies from 2010 to 2014 to study the control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate controllers. The deviation between control power and cash flow right has an impact on corporate performance, and on the basis of this, the constraint of board of directors on the ultimate controller's encroachment behavior is investigated. The results show that there is no significant correlation between the control of ultimate controller and corporate performance in the family listed companies with pyramid ownership structure, while the cash flow right of ultimate controller has a significant positive correlation with corporate performance. There is a significant negative correlation between the separation of two rights of ultimate controller and corporate performance, and there is trench effect. The proportion of independent directors effectively constrains the encroachment behavior of the ultimate controller caused by the separation of the two powers, which shows that the independent board of directors strengthens the supervision of the ultimate controller's behavior and increases the cost of the encroachment. Thus it reduces the will of the ultimate controller. The scale of the board of directors effectively increases the encroachment behavior of the ultimate controller caused by the separation of the two powers, the increase of the size of the board of directors reduces the efficiency of supervision, it is difficult to carry out effective supervision on the behavior of the ultimate controller, and the formation of parties in the board of directors is aggravated. So that the ultimate control of the violations can be condoned.
【学位授予单位】：浙江理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F271
本文编号：2295641
[Abstract]:In the late 1990s, some scholars represented by La porta put forward the concept of ultimate controlling shareholder for the first time. They found that the phenomenon of ownership concentration is more common in most countries, so for these countries, in the process of corporate governance, The main contradiction is not only between manager and owner, but also between controlling shareholder and minority shareholder. The main form of ownership of listed companies in China is centralized ownership. Under such a structure, there is usually an ultimate controller within the company. The ultimate controller may have more control over the company than its share holding ratio, and most of the ultimate controllers have built a pyramid structure. As an important internal control method, board of directors plays a very important role in corporate governance and is closely related to pyramid structure. In this paper, from the perspective of ultimate controller, we use the panel data of family listed companies from 2010 to 2014 to study the control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate controllers. The deviation between control power and cash flow right has an impact on corporate performance, and on the basis of this, the constraint of board of directors on the ultimate controller's encroachment behavior is investigated. The results show that there is no significant correlation between the control of ultimate controller and corporate performance in the family listed companies with pyramid ownership structure, while the cash flow right of ultimate controller has a significant positive correlation with corporate performance. There is a significant negative correlation between the separation of two rights of ultimate controller and corporate performance, and there is trench effect. The proportion of independent directors effectively constrains the encroachment behavior of the ultimate controller caused by the separation of the two powers, which shows that the independent board of directors strengthens the supervision of the ultimate controller's behavior and increases the cost of the encroachment. Thus it reduces the will of the ultimate controller. The scale of the board of directors effectively increases the encroachment behavior of the ultimate controller caused by the separation of the two powers, the increase of the size of the board of directors reduces the efficiency of supervision, it is difficult to carry out effective supervision on the behavior of the ultimate controller, and the formation of parties in the board of directors is aggravated. So that the ultimate control of the violations can be condoned.
【学位授予单位】：浙江理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F271
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