授权理论的文献综述
发布时间：2018-10-30 07:37
【摘要】：当经济中的参与者之间存在信息不对称的问题时,信息的有效传递就会成为一个重要的问题。经典的合约理论框架下,委托人可以对代理人进行转移支付,这样,基于不同信息的奖励和惩罚使得信息能够完全传递。如果不能够使用转移支付,要想获得有效的信息传递,委托人倾向于使用授权:将决策的权力交给委托人,同时限制委托人的选择范围。本文对最优授权的理论进行概括和评述,并提出未来可能的研究方向。
[Abstract]:When there is asymmetric information among the participants in the economy, the effective transmission of information becomes an important problem. Under the framework of the classical contract theory, the principal can transfer payment to the agent, so the reward and punishment based on different information can make the information completely transmitted. If the transfer payment cannot be used, in order to obtain the effective transmission of information, the principal tends to use authorization: to give the power of decision to the client, and to limit the scope of the client's choice at the same time. In this paper, the theory of optimal delegation is summarized and reviewed, and the possible research directions in the future are proposed.
【作者单位】： 合肥师范学院经济与管理学院;复旦大学经济学院;
【基金】：安徽省教育厅人文社科研究重大项目(SK2016SD49)阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：C934;F272
，
本文编号：2299364
[Abstract]:When there is asymmetric information among the participants in the economy, the effective transmission of information becomes an important problem. Under the framework of the classical contract theory, the principal can transfer payment to the agent, so the reward and punishment based on different information can make the information completely transmitted. If the transfer payment cannot be used, in order to obtain the effective transmission of information, the principal tends to use authorization: to give the power of decision to the client, and to limit the scope of the client's choice at the same time. In this paper, the theory of optimal delegation is summarized and reviewed, and the possible research directions in the future are proposed.
【作者单位】： 合肥师范学院经济与管理学院;复旦大学经济学院;
【基金】：安徽省教育厅人文社科研究重大项目(SK2016SD49)阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：C934;F272
，
本文编号：2299364
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