盈余管理和高管薪酬相互作用的制度与契约机制:一个评述

发布时间：2018-11-06 14:11

【摘要】：现代高管薪酬激励和盈余管理间作用机制研究以最优薪酬契约理论为核心,以管理层权力理论和机会主义盈余管理理论为支柱,结合公司治理、公司财务、企业理论、产业经济学、微观金融学和计量经济学的最新成果,不断拓展边界并且推进研究深度。本文基于制度和契约机制视角对两者相互作用动因、机理和经济后果进行了分析和评述。经验研究大多基于企业利益与管理者利益相一致的前提下来进行探讨,而聚焦于管理者出于自利动机而实施盈余管理的研究却不多。尽管文献都集中于盈余管理的报酬契约动因,但是在新的制度背景下对于高管人员的业绩报酬安排是如何诱发盈余管理行为产生,出于薪酬动因的盈余管理是否会对高管业绩薪酬产生具体作用的经验证据还比较缺乏,有待进一步探讨。
[Abstract]:The Research on the Mechanism between incentive and earnings Management of Modern executives is based on the theory of optimal compensation contract, the theory of management power and the theory of opportunistic earnings management, combined with corporate governance, corporate finance, and enterprise theory. The latest achievements in industrial economics, microfinance and econometrics continue to expand boundaries and advance research depth. Based on the perspective of institution and contract mechanism, this paper analyzes and comments on the drivers, mechanisms and economic consequences of their interaction. Empirical studies are mostly based on the premise that the interests of enterprises and managers are consistent, but there are few researches focusing on the self-interest motivation of managers to implement earnings management. Although the literature focuses on the motivation of earnings management, but under the new system, how to induce earnings management behavior is induced by the performance compensation arrangement for senior managers. The empirical evidence of whether earnings management will play a specific role in executive performance compensation is still lacking, which needs to be further explored.
【作者单位】：华南师范大学经济行为科学广东省重点实验室;华南师范大学华南市场经济研究中心;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“高管业绩薪酬激励计划影响盈余管理的机理及其经济后果:基于跨期动态契约的视角”(71572062)
【分类号】：F275;F272.92

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