浙江龙盛定增式股权激励的经济后果研究
发布时间：2018-11-27 14:19
【摘要】：股权激励作为一种长期激励机制,在国外已得到广泛运用,它有助于解决委托代理问题所产生的利益不一致问题,即股东通过向经理人授予股权或期权,将经理人与股东利益长期捆绑,同时实现企业价值最大化和股东财富最大化。企业实施股权激励动机有很多,它能够激励员工努力工作,为企业创造更多的财富,又能提高企业的业绩,留住核心员工。同时,企业实施股权激励的方式也有所区别,如股票期权、限制性股票等等。由于不同激励方式的适用条件限制及上市公司股权结构和治理结构等方面的原因,不同的股权激励方式可能会产生不同的经济后果。任何制度都有其双面性,股权激励也一样,它犹如一把双刃剑,使用恰当可以使管理层与股东的利益实现最大化,而使用不当则有可能使股东遭受巨大损失。定增式股权激励是近年来新出现的一种股权激励方式,深入研究其所产生的经济后果,即其对股价和企业业绩的正面效应,以及可能带来的利益输送等不良影响,可以为我国企业采用定增式股权激励提供参考,同时对上市公司激励方案的优化具有借鉴意义。本文以浙江龙盛实施股权激励的动机为背景,结合股权激励的相关理论和浙江龙盛的实际情况,通过财务会计指标来分析股权激励对企业业绩及股价的影响,并结合定增式股权激励的优缺点对其所产生的利益输送的后果进行分析,针对研究结论提出建议。通过研究,得出以下研究结论:浙江龙盛实施定增式股权激励提高了企业的经营业绩,并使股价在短时期内得到快速的提高;但是由于我国股权激励相关的制度和政策的不完善,导致浙江龙盛实施定增式股权激励产生了利益输送的经济后果,主要体现在企业实施定向增发方案之后高额的股利分红以及经营业绩短暂上升后的下降,为大股东谋取利益提供了方便,最终侵害的是中小股东的利益。基于以上分析,本文提出如下建议:对非公开发行股票的目的进行审核、完善上市公司的信息披露机制、完善监督机制维护中小股东利益、健全资本市场的市场约束机制。
[Abstract]:As a long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive has been widely used in foreign countries. It helps to solve the problem of inconsistent interests arising from the principal-agent problem, that is, shareholders grant equity or options to managers. The interests of managers and shareholders are tied together for a long time, and the maximization of enterprise value and shareholder wealth is realized at the same time. There are many motivations for enterprises to implement equity incentives, which can encourage employees to work hard, create more wealth for enterprises, improve the performance of enterprises, and retain core staff. At the same time, there are some differences in the way of equity incentive, such as stock option, restricted stock and so on. Due to the limitation of the applicable conditions of different incentive modes and the reasons of equity structure and governance structure of listed companies, different ways of equity incentive may have different economic consequences. Any system has its dual character, and so is the equity incentive. It is like a double-edged sword, which can maximize the benefits of management and shareholders, while improper use may make shareholders suffer huge losses. The fixed increase equity incentive is a new kind of equity incentive in recent years. The economic consequences of it are studied in depth, that is, the positive effect on the stock price and enterprise performance, and the possible adverse effects, such as the transmission of benefits, etc. It can be used as a reference for Chinese enterprises to adopt fixed increase equity incentive scheme and to optimize the incentive scheme of listed companies. Based on the motivation of equity incentive in Longsheng, Zhejiang, combining the relevant theory of equity incentive and the actual situation of stock right incentive in Zhejiang, this paper analyzes the influence of equity incentive on enterprise performance and stock price through financial accounting indicators. Combined with the advantages and disadvantages of fixed increase equity incentive, this paper analyzes the consequences of interest transmission, and puts forward some suggestions on the research conclusions. Through the research, the following conclusions are drawn: Zhejiang Longsheng implementation of fixed increase equity incentive to improve the business performance, and the stock price in a short period of time to get a rapid increase; However, due to the imperfect systems and policies related to equity incentive in China, the implementation of fixed increase equity incentive in Longsheng, Zhejiang Province, has resulted in the economic consequences of interest transmission. It is mainly reflected in the high dividends after the implementation of the targeted issuance scheme and the decline after the brief increase in the operating performance, which provides convenience for the large shareholders to seek benefits, and ultimately infringes the interests of the minority shareholders. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: to audit the purpose of non-public issuance of stocks, to perfect the information disclosure mechanism of listed companies, to improve the supervision mechanism to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders, and to perfect the market restraint mechanism of the capital market.
【学位授予单位】：河北经贸大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92
[Abstract]:As a long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive has been widely used in foreign countries. It helps to solve the problem of inconsistent interests arising from the principal-agent problem, that is, shareholders grant equity or options to managers. The interests of managers and shareholders are tied together for a long time, and the maximization of enterprise value and shareholder wealth is realized at the same time. There are many motivations for enterprises to implement equity incentives, which can encourage employees to work hard, create more wealth for enterprises, improve the performance of enterprises, and retain core staff. At the same time, there are some differences in the way of equity incentive, such as stock option, restricted stock and so on. Due to the limitation of the applicable conditions of different incentive modes and the reasons of equity structure and governance structure of listed companies, different ways of equity incentive may have different economic consequences. Any system has its dual character, and so is the equity incentive. It is like a double-edged sword, which can maximize the benefits of management and shareholders, while improper use may make shareholders suffer huge losses. The fixed increase equity incentive is a new kind of equity incentive in recent years. The economic consequences of it are studied in depth, that is, the positive effect on the stock price and enterprise performance, and the possible adverse effects, such as the transmission of benefits, etc. It can be used as a reference for Chinese enterprises to adopt fixed increase equity incentive scheme and to optimize the incentive scheme of listed companies. Based on the motivation of equity incentive in Longsheng, Zhejiang, combining the relevant theory of equity incentive and the actual situation of stock right incentive in Zhejiang, this paper analyzes the influence of equity incentive on enterprise performance and stock price through financial accounting indicators. Combined with the advantages and disadvantages of fixed increase equity incentive, this paper analyzes the consequences of interest transmission, and puts forward some suggestions on the research conclusions. Through the research, the following conclusions are drawn: Zhejiang Longsheng implementation of fixed increase equity incentive to improve the business performance, and the stock price in a short period of time to get a rapid increase; However, due to the imperfect systems and policies related to equity incentive in China, the implementation of fixed increase equity incentive in Longsheng, Zhejiang Province, has resulted in the economic consequences of interest transmission. It is mainly reflected in the high dividends after the implementation of the targeted issuance scheme and the decline after the brief increase in the operating performance, which provides convenience for the large shareholders to seek benefits, and ultimately infringes the interests of the minority shareholders. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: to audit the purpose of non-public issuance of stocks, to perfect the information disclosure mechanism of listed companies, to improve the supervision mechanism to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders, and to perfect the market restraint mechanism of the capital market.
【学位授予单位】：河北经贸大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92
【相似文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 陆宇建;;股权集中度与公司业绩的相关性——评林长泉“股权集中度的决定、变动及不同股权结构的业绩相关性”一文[J];中国会计评论;2004年02期
2 刘志远;毛淑珍;乐国林;;控股股东对上市公司股权集中度影响的实证分析[J];财贸研究;2008年01期
3 韩葱慧;胡国柳;;股权集中度与会计信息质量相关性的实证研究[J];琼州学院学报;2009年05期
4 刘华;郑军;;高新技术上市公司股权激励与公司业绩——基于自主创新的视角[J];会计之友(上旬刊);2010年12期
5 李垣;郭海;弋亚群;刘益;;股权集中度影响产品创新与学习导向[J];新财经;2011年08期
6 石劲磊;中外券商股权结构比较研究[J];贵州商专学报;2001年04期
7 张华,鄢华;企业股权集中度的决定因素[J];西南民族学院学报(哲学社会科学版);2002年03期
8 郑德s，
本文编号：2361093
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/xmjj/2361093.html
