基于公平偏好理论的国企高管薪酬管制研究

发布时间：2018-12-20 11:29

【摘要】：高管薪酬管制是伴随我国国企改革进程产生的制度设计,激励理论引入公平偏好理论又为薪酬管制提供了进一步的学理支撑。基于公平偏好的政府薪酬管制在我国国企高管薪酬确定过程中实际存在,这有利于政府部门提升社会公众公平认知、降低自身代理成本。与此同时,外生的薪酬管制又在一定程度上影响了国企业绩型报酬方案的实施空间和激励效率,可能导致更多在职消费,增加企业代理成本。国企高管薪酬管制可作为提升政府部门公平感知的一项措施,但归根结底,深化国企改革,加强国企监管,从制度层面上为合理的国企高管薪酬提供保障才是根本之举、治本之策。
[Abstract]:Executive compensation regulation is a system design that comes into being along with the reform process of state-owned enterprises in our country. The introduction of fair preference theory in incentive theory provides further theoretical support for compensation regulation. Government compensation regulation based on fair preference actually exists in the process of determining executive compensation of state-owned enterprises in China, which is beneficial to the government to enhance the public's understanding of fairness and reduce its agency cost. At the same time, the exogenous salary control affects the implementation space and incentive efficiency of the performance compensation scheme of state-owned enterprises to a certain extent, which may lead to more in-service consumption and increase the agency cost of enterprises. The regulation of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises can be taken as a measure to enhance the sense of fairness in government departments, but in the final analysis, it is essential to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises, strengthen the supervision of state-owned enterprises, and provide a guarantee for the reasonable executive compensation of state-owned enterprises from the system level. A cure to the root of the disease.
【作者单位】：四川大学商学院;郑州航空工业管理学院会计学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金一般项目“上市公司员工收入与资本回报财务公平测度研究”(13BJY015)阶段性成果
【分类号】：F272.92;F276.1

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