营销渠道中的权威治理策略与渠道投机行为:非线性关系的实证检验
发布时间：2019-01-05 16:53
【摘要】：文章基于交易成本理论、资源依赖理论与社会交换理论,利用问卷调查得到的制造商数据,探索了权威治理策略与投机行为之间的非线性关系。研究发现,企业不同程度地使用不同类型的权威治理策略会带来差异性的投机行为治理结果。具体表现为:企业使用权威治理策略中的强制性权力,对渠道伙伴投机行为的影响呈现出先加重后减轻的倒U型关系;企业使用权威治理策略中的非强制性权力,对渠道伙伴投机行为的影响则呈现出先减轻后加重的U型关系。企业只有高强度地使用强制性权力或低强度地使用非强制性权力才能有效控制渠道投机行为。文章结论在明晰权威治理策略与渠道投机行为之间的具体关系以及统一现有研究矛盾结论的同时,对渠道成员合理选择并使用权威治理策略制定渠道决策,规范渠道中的投机行为具有重要的意义。
[Abstract]:Based on transaction cost theory, resource dependence theory and social exchange theory, this paper explores the nonlinear relationship between authoritative governance strategies and speculative behavior by using the manufacturer data obtained by questionnaire survey. It is found that different types of authoritative governance strategies will lead to different governance results of speculative behavior. The concrete manifestation is: the enterprise uses the mandatory power in the authority governance strategy, the influence to the channel partner speculative behavior presents the inverted U-type relation which first intensifies then reduces; By using the non-mandatory power in the authoritative governance strategy, the influence on the speculative behavior of the channel partners shows a U-type relationship, which is first mitigated and then aggravated. In order to control channel speculation, enterprises can control channel speculation only by using high-intensity or low-intensity non-coercive power. The paper concludes that while clarifying the specific relationship between the authoritative governance strategy and channel speculation and unifying the existing contradictory conclusions, the channel members should be reasonably selected and used to make channel decisions with authoritative governance strategies. It is of great significance to regulate speculation in channels.
【作者单位】： 长安大学经济与管理学院;西安交通大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71502018);国家自然科学基金项目(71132005) 陕西省自然科学基金青年项目(2015JQ7276)
【分类号】：F274
本文编号：2402045
[Abstract]:Based on transaction cost theory, resource dependence theory and social exchange theory, this paper explores the nonlinear relationship between authoritative governance strategies and speculative behavior by using the manufacturer data obtained by questionnaire survey. It is found that different types of authoritative governance strategies will lead to different governance results of speculative behavior. The concrete manifestation is: the enterprise uses the mandatory power in the authority governance strategy, the influence to the channel partner speculative behavior presents the inverted U-type relation which first intensifies then reduces; By using the non-mandatory power in the authoritative governance strategy, the influence on the speculative behavior of the channel partners shows a U-type relationship, which is first mitigated and then aggravated. In order to control channel speculation, enterprises can control channel speculation only by using high-intensity or low-intensity non-coercive power. The paper concludes that while clarifying the specific relationship between the authoritative governance strategy and channel speculation and unifying the existing contradictory conclusions, the channel members should be reasonably selected and used to make channel decisions with authoritative governance strategies. It is of great significance to regulate speculation in channels.
【作者单位】： 长安大学经济与管理学院;西安交通大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71502018);国家自然科学基金项目(71132005) 陕西省自然科学基金青年项目(2015JQ7276)
【分类号】：F274
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