管理层权力与公司现金持有竞争效应
发布时间：2019-02-13 20:57
【摘要】：本文以中国A股上市公司2006—2015年数据为样本,结合产品市场竞争实证研究公司管理层权力对现金持有竞争效应的影响。研究发现,管理层权力弱化了公司现金持有竞争效应,而产品市场竞争对管理层权力之于现金持有竞争效应的负向作用有一定的抑制效果。进一步研究管理层权力弱化公司现金持有竞争效应的渠道发现,管理层权力在加剧公司高额持有现金导致发生在职消费和过度投资行为的同时,降低了研发投入,而产品市场竞争能够抑制这种在职消费和过度投资行为。上述结论不仅补充和丰富了现金持有竞争效应的相关研究,也为鼓励市场竞争以监督管理层行为和提高公司现金持有的战略价值提供了参考。
[Abstract]:Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2015, this paper studies the effect of management power on cash holding competition in combination with product market competition. It is found that the power of management weakens the competitive effect of cash holding, while the competition of product market has a certain inhibitory effect on the negative effect of management power on the competition effect of cash holding. Further study on the channels through which management power weakens the competitive effect of corporate cash holding finds that management power not only increases the high level of cash holding in the company, but also reduces R & D investment while leading to on-the-job consumption and overinvestment. And product market competition can restrain this kind of on-the-job consumption and excessive investment behavior. This conclusion not only complements and enriches the research on the competitive effect of cash holding, but also provides a reference for encouraging market competition to supervise management behavior and improve the strategic value of cash holding.
【作者单位】： 石河子大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“制度背景、行业特征与公司现金持有竞争效应”(71362004)
【分类号】：F272.91;F275;F832.51
[Abstract]:Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2015, this paper studies the effect of management power on cash holding competition in combination with product market competition. It is found that the power of management weakens the competitive effect of cash holding, while the competition of product market has a certain inhibitory effect on the negative effect of management power on the competition effect of cash holding. Further study on the channels through which management power weakens the competitive effect of corporate cash holding finds that management power not only increases the high level of cash holding in the company, but also reduces R & D investment while leading to on-the-job consumption and overinvestment. And product market competition can restrain this kind of on-the-job consumption and excessive investment behavior. This conclusion not only complements and enriches the research on the competitive effect of cash holding, but also provides a reference for encouraging market competition to supervise management behavior and improve the strategic value of cash holding.
【作者单位】： 石河子大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“制度背景、行业特征与公司现金持有竞争效应”(71362004)
【分类号】：F272.91;F275;F832.51
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