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企业低碳生产路径选择引导模型及应用研究

发布时间:2019-02-19 19:23
【摘要】:在我国,政府为引导企业低碳制造,建立和营造了技术创新的机制与环境,在提供资金、监管责任、税收制度和产业政策等方面发挥作用,政府为了引导企业向低碳生产转型制定了一系列相关的政策法规。但是,进行低碳技术创新短期内的高成本、低收益让企业望而却步,而地方政府在保增长目标下,监管上存在放松。政府通过惩罚手段,企业在政府的强令下只有被动的消极应对;政府通过项目激励手段,企业有时仅仅为了获得政府优惠政策和财政补贴,无法激发其低碳技术创新热情。此外,不同企业由于所属行业特征、产品制造过程制造工艺、领导意识、市场对低碳产品需求、低碳技术创新成本等的不同,其低碳技术创新的热情也不同。企业是低碳技术创新的主体,在激励企业进行技术创新时,奖赏和惩罚是经常被使用的手段。政府在对企业进行奖惩时通常以企业碳排放量作为主要标准,这种奖惩依据是否合理?对引导企业低碳生产的同时,是否会对企业发展产生不良的影响?政府如何根据社会低碳需求与企业实情制定合理有效的策略引导不同行业领域的企业实行低碳生产一直是困扰政府的关键问题。文章首先通过分析影响企业低碳意愿的内外部因素及相关性,明确政府如何通过监控和监管企业内外部环境影响企业低碳生产意愿,并利用四项分析法对我国工业企业分类,深入剖析政府规制对企业低碳生产意愿和对企业健康发展的影响,得到政府不应以企业碳排放量作为奖惩指标的唯一指标,还应该根据企业经济发展水平和企业低碳技术成熟度为评判依据的结论。通过分析影响企业行为决策的主要参数因素,明确企业参数对政府制定企业低碳技术创新梯阶培育机理的影响。为此,建立政企双方两阶段动态演化博弈模型:第一阶段,通过建立演化博弈模型分析决定政企双方在博弈过程中最优决策选择的关键参数。第二阶段,针对企业在演化博弈过程中以往数据做出企业行为决策的关键参数预估值并据此筛选低碳创新能力较强的企业进行财政低碳补贴。然后,针对低碳技术创新复杂系统进行分析,根据政企双方在不同时期、不同阶段的博弈状态和博弈形成机理,建立了动态赋时博弈模型,分析了政府的决策做出对企业低碳技术创新系统性能指标的时间量特性影响。政企在低碳技术创新行为决策博弈中,某一时段的目标函数取决于当前双方的博弈状态和前一时段演进过程中博弈结果。分别建立了动态博弈下的企业目标决策模型和动态博弈下政府目标决策模型,以利润最大化来组织生产的企业,政府的低碳规制会直接影响企业低碳技术创新决策行为,政府的低碳经济与环境保护责任目标要求企业单位排放量的销售额是稳定增加的,或者单位销售额的排放量的稳定下降,这就要求不断地进行低碳技术创新。基于此,以企业经济发展水平和低碳技术成熟度的阶段指标为依据判断企业低碳生产的积极性,并根据判断结果给出政府政策规制导向建议。最后,提出双重集成引导低碳规制的路径选择方法,以安徽省部分调研企业数据为例进行了仿真应用验证,验证结果表明所设计的低碳规制路径的合理性,为低碳环境下政府制定合适的引导企业低碳技术创新政策规制提供了科学的参考依据。根据准备投入的低碳监管资金、变动的低碳指标和企业实际发展情况制定基于演化博弈过程参数预估值的低碳技术创新梯阶培育机理能够为低碳环境下政府更合理的引导企业低碳技术创新提供了依据,为政府引导企业寻找一条适合的绿色健康发展的道路提供帮助,为政府合理有效的选择、调控并引导企业执行低碳生产提供了依据,加速企业低碳生产转化路径的进程,对我国低碳生产、走可持续发展道路有一定参考意义。
[Abstract]:In our country, the government has played a role in guiding the low-carbon manufacturing of enterprises, setting up and creating the mechanism and environment of technological innovation, and providing financial, regulatory responsibility, tax system and industrial policy. The government has developed a series of related policies and regulations in order to guide enterprises to transition to low-carbon production. However, low-carbon technology innovation is a short-term high-cost, low-income enterprise is prohibitive, and the local government has relaxed in the regulation of the growth target. The government, through the means of punishment, has only a passive negative response under the government's strong order; the government, through the means of project incentives, is sometimes unable to stimulate the enthusiasm of its low-carbon technology innovation in order to obtain government preferential policies and financial subsidies. In addition, due to the characteristics of the industry, the manufacturing process of the product manufacturing process, the leadership consciousness, the market's demand for low-carbon products, the low-carbon technology innovation cost and so on, the enthusiasm of the low-carbon technology innovation is different. The enterprise is the main body of the low-carbon technology innovation, and the reward and punishment are often used in the process of stimulating the enterprise to carry on the technological innovation. When the government rewards and rewards the enterprise, the carbon emission of the enterprise is usually used as the main standard, and the reward and punishment basis is reasonable? Will the low-carbon production of the leading enterprise have a bad influence on the development of the enterprise? It is a key problem that how the government can lead different industries to carry out low-carbon production on the basis of the society's low-carbon demand and the fact that the enterprise has a reasonable and effective strategy to guide the enterprises in different industries. Firstly, through the analysis of the internal and external factors and the correlation of the low-carbon will of the enterprise, it is clear how the government can monitor and regulate the internal and external environment impact enterprise's low-carbon production will, and use the four analysis methods to classify the industrial enterprises in China. In-depth analysis of the influence of the government regulation on the enterprise's low-carbon production will and the development of the enterprise's health, the government should not only measure the carbon emission of the enterprise as the only index of the reward and punishment index, but also should be based on the enterprise's economic development level and the low-carbon technology maturity of the enterprise. Through the analysis of the main parameters affecting the enterprise's behavior decision-making, the effect of the enterprise's parameters on the formation mechanism of the low-carbon technology innovation in the government is clarified. To this end, a game model of two-stage dynamic evolution of the government-enterprise is set up: the first stage, through the establishment of the evolutionary game model, the key parameters of the optimal decision-making choice between the government and the enterprise in the game process are determined. In the second stage, the key parameter estimate of the enterprise's behavior decision is made for the past data of the enterprise in the course of the evolutionary game, and the low-carbon innovation ability of the enterprise is selected to carry out the financial low-carbon subsidy. Then, based on the analysis of the complex system of the low-carbon technology innovation, the game model is established based on the game state and the game forming mechanism between the government and the enterprise in different periods, different stages, The influence of the government's decision making on the performance index of the low-carbon technology innovation system in the enterprise is analyzed. In the decision-making game of the low-carbon technology innovation behavior, the objective function of a time segment depends on the game state of the current two parties and the game result in the evolution of the previous period. The decision-making model of the enterprise target under the dynamic game and the decision-making model of the government target under the dynamic game are respectively established, and the enterprise with the maximum profit is used to organize the production. The low-carbon regulation of the government can directly influence the decision-making behavior of the low-carbon technology innovation of the enterprise. The government's low-carbon economy and environmental protection responsibility target requires a steady increase in the amount of sales of an enterprise, or a steady decline in emissions from unit sales, which requires continuous low-carbon technology innovation. On the basis of this, the initiative of the low-carbon production of the enterprise is judged based on the stage index of the economic development level of the enterprise and the maturity of the low-carbon technology, and the guidance of the government policy rules is given according to the judgment result. In the end, the method for selecting the path of low-carbon regulation by double integration is put forward, and the simulation and application verification is carried out in the data of some research enterprise in Anhui province, and the result shows that the designed low-carbon regulation path is reasonable, It provides a scientific reference for the government to set the appropriate guidance for the low-carbon technology innovation in the low-carbon environment. the low-carbon technological innovation step-step cultivation mechanism based on the evolutionary game process parameter estimation value is developed according to the prepared low-carbon regulatory capital, the low-carbon index of the change and the actual development situation of the enterprise, which can provide the basis for the more reasonable guidance of the low-carbon technology innovation of the government in the low-carbon environment, In order to guide the government to find a suitable road for green health development, to help the government to select, control and guide the enterprises to carry out low-carbon production reasonably and effectively, to speed up the process of the low-carbon production and transformation path of the enterprise, and to make the low-carbon production in China, The road of sustainable development has some reference significance.
【学位授予单位】:安徽工程大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F272

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前10条

1 赵黎明;陈U喼,

本文编号:2426791


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