管理者过度自信对上市公司投资行为的影响研究

发布时间：2019-02-26 12:56

【摘要】：20世纪80年代以来,市场异象频发,传统“理性人”假设遭到质疑。受行为经济学影响,财务学引入心理学与行为科学的相关理论成果,形成了行为财务学的研究范式。在新范式下产生了许多围绕个体认知偏差这一核心观点展开的理论研究,过度自信理论就是其中之一。当前,管理者过度自信对公司投资行为的影响研究很少,国内外研究者主要关注金融市场投资者的过度自信。本文在行为财务学框架下,在管理者过度自信理论的基础上,以企业投资为切入点,并以我国制造业上市公司为例,采用修正后的管理者相对报酬法度量管理者过度自信,运用理论分析与实证研究方法,探讨管理者过度自信对非效率投资的影响,主要是对过度投资的影响,进而结合我国特殊环境因素,从外部金融市场和公司内部治理两个角度,考察有哪些因素会导致管理者出现过度自信的心理偏差。最后,总结本文研究结论并提出政策性建议。研究过程中,首先,阐述相关理论基础,包括过度自信的定义、表现以及原因分析,传统的投资理论,非效率投资等。其次,通过管理者过度自信对公司投资影响的理论分析,结合我国的具体环境,从外部金融市场和公司内部治理的角度,提出有关假设。最后,利用修正后的管理者相对报酬法衡量管理者过度自信,以沪市A股制造业上市公司为例,选取2012-2014年的相关数据作为研究样本,进行了实证分析。通过实证研究得出的结论:(1)公司投资支出与管理者过度自信的心理倾向正相关。而且当公司内部存在充足的现金流时,过度自信管理者会更倾向于增加投资,即管理者过度自信的公司具有较高的投资现金流敏感性。(2)公司过度投资程度与管理者过度自信心理倾向正相关。当内部现金流充足的公司进行投资活动时,如果公司管理者存在过度自信心理偏差,该公司会出现更加严重的过度投资行为。(3)管理者过度自信导致的上市公司过度投资行为受我国金融市场环境的影响。公司内部不存在充足的现金流,当金融市场投资者对公司产生过于乐观的预期,情绪越高涨,公司股票换手率越高时,过度投资程度反而越弱,管理者投资越谨慎。公司存在充足的现金流,当金融市场投资者对公司产生过于乐观的预期,情绪越高涨,股票换手率越高时,公司过度投资对现金流的敏感性越强,过度投资程度越强。(4)上市公司内部治理机制影响管理者过度自信导致的投资过度行为。董事会成员人数越多,规模越大,对管理者约束力越弱,过度投资行为越频繁。上市公司中独立董事制度不能对过度投资行为起到制约作用,这与我国公司治理现状相符合,绝大多数的独立董事不具备独立性,不能对公司管理者起到有效的监督作用。
[Abstract]:Since 1980's, market anomalies have occurred frequently, and the traditional hypothesis of rational man has been questioned. Under the influence of behavioral economics, the research paradigm of behavioral finance has been formed by introducing the related theories of psychology and behavioral science into finance. Under the new paradigm, a lot of theoretical research has been carried out around the core point of view of individual cognitive deviation, one of which is the theory of overconfidence. At present, there is little research on the influence of managers' overconfidence on corporate investment behavior, and the domestic and foreign researchers mainly pay attention to the overconfidence of investors in financial market. Under the framework of behavioral finance and based on the theory of overconfidence of managers, this paper takes the investment of enterprises as the starting point, and takes the listed manufacturing companies in China as an example to measure managers' overconfidence by using the modified method of relative compensation of managers, which is based on the theory of overconfidence of managers. By using the methods of theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper discusses the influence of managers' overconfidence on inefficient investment, mainly on over-investment, and then combines the special environmental factors of our country, from the two angles of external financial market and corporate internal governance. Examine what factors lead to overconfident psychological biases among managers. Finally, this paper summarizes the research conclusions and puts forward policy recommendations. In the course of the research, first of all, the related theoretical basis, including the definition of overconfidence, performance and cause analysis, traditional investment theory, inefficient investment, and so on. Secondly, through the theoretical analysis of the influence of managers' overconfidence on corporate investment, combined with the specific environment of our country, this paper puts forward some hypotheses from the angle of external financial market and corporate internal governance. Finally, the revised relative compensation method is used to measure managers' overconfidence. Taking A-share manufacturing listed companies in Shanghai stock market as an example, the related data from 2012-2014 are selected as the research samples, and the empirical analysis is carried out. The conclusions are as follows: (1) there is a positive correlation between investment expenditure and managers' psychological tendency of overconfidence. And when there is sufficient cash flow within the company, overconfident managers are more likely to invest more. That is, managers overconfident companies have higher cash flow sensitivity. (2) the degree of over-investment is positively related to managers' psychological tendency of overconfidence. When a company with sufficient internal cash flow carries out investment activities, if there is an overconfident psychological bias on the part of the company's managers, The overinvestment behavior of the company will be more serious. (3) the overinvestment behavior of listed companies caused by overconfidence of managers is influenced by the environment of financial market in China. There is no sufficient cash flow within the company. When the financial market investors are too optimistic about the company, and the higher the sentiment is, the higher the stock turnover ratio, the weaker the over-investment degree and the more cautious the manager's investment. There is sufficient cash flow in the company. When investors in the financial market are too optimistic about the company, the higher the sentiment and the higher the stock turnover ratio, the more sensitive the over-investment is to the cash flow. The greater the degree of over-investment. (4) the internal governance mechanism of listed companies affects the over-investment behavior caused by managers' overconfidence. The larger the number of board members and the larger the size, the weaker the binding force on managers and the more frequent over-investment behavior. The independent director system in listed companies can not restrict the over-investment behavior, which is consistent with the current situation of corporate governance in China. Most independent directors do not have independence and can not play an effective role in supervising the management of the company.
【学位授予单位】：延安大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F275

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