高管变更与财务重述:基于管理防御的视角

发布时间：2019-03-17 11:09

【摘要】：管理层与股东利益冲突极为尖锐的高管变更期间,前后任高管实现自身利益最大化的动机很可能导致财务重述的增加。笔者将管理防御理论纳入高管变更与财务重述关系研究框架,利用我国上市公司2010—2015年高管变更及上年财务重述数据进行实证检验,结果发现:高管变更上年的财务报表更容易被重述,且多是调减利润的财务重述,这一现象主要发生于新任高管为外部继任的公司。进一步检验发现:前后任高管的管理防御强度提高均会加剧财务重述的发生。研究表明,严重影响上市公司信息透明度的财务重述既是高管进行管理防御的结果,也是他们实施管理防御的工具。本研究从财务重述视角检验了高管变更对会计信息质量的影响,揭示出管理防御动机是财务报表更容易被重述的重要内在动因,丰富了公司治理方面的研究成果,同时也为加强会计信息质量监管提高资本市场效率提供了决策参考。
[Abstract]:During executive changes in which management and shareholder conflicts are extremely acute, the motivation of former executives to maximize their own interests is likely to lead to an increase in financial restatements. The author introduces the theory of management defense into the framework of research on the relationship between executive change and financial restatement, and empirically tests the data of executive change and financial restatement in 2010-2015 of listed companies in China. The results show that it is easier for executives to restate their financial statements from the previous year, and that most of them are financial restatements of reduced profits, a phenomenon that occurs mainly in companies where new executives take over as external successors. Further tests found that the increased intensity of management defense among former and former executives would aggravate the occurrence of financial restatement. The research shows that the financial restatement, which seriously affects the information transparency of listed companies, is not only the result of executive management defense, but also a tool for them to implement management defense. This study examines the impact of executive change on the quality of accounting information from the perspective of financial restatement, reveals that management defense motivation is an important internal motivation for financial statements to be restated more easily, and enriches the research results on corporate governance. At the same time, it also provides a decision-making reference for strengthening the supervision of accounting information quality and improving the efficiency of capital market.
【作者单位】：山东理工大学商学院;天津财经大学;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“产权视角下的审计师声誉机制及其经济后果研究”(项目编号:71272189) 山东理工大学博士科研启动经费资助项目“高管变更影响财务决策研究” 山东省社会科学规划项目(项目编号:15CGLJ02) 山东省高等学校人文社会科学项目“制度环境、管理层权力与文化企业高管薪酬的激励效应研究”(项目编号:J14WG24)
【分类号】：F275;F272.91

【相似文献】