NY公司软件外包项目激励机制研究
发布时间:2018-03-03 14:45
本文选题:项目外包 切入点:项目管理 出处:《南京理工大学》2012年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:本文通过对NY公司软件外包项目现有激励政策不足的研究,从激励机制角度寻求提升软件外包项目的交付质量的措施。 本文从企业间的契约关系以及外包员工个体感受两个层面加以分析,发现影响NY公司软件交付质量的根本问题在于承包企业缺乏持续改进的动力,以及对外包员工的人文关怀不够。运用经济学理论进一步分析研发现,导致承包企业缺乏持续改进动力的原因在于质量激励合约正向激励不足,导致承包方不愿意在质量达标基础上,花费额外成本来进一步提升质量的“逆向选择”现象,以及没有建立起有效的“关系契约”导致承包企业担心被“敲竹杠”而不愿意进行“专属性投资”。而从知识型员工的个体激励要素来看,非物质激励能够对外包员工起很大作用,在这方面存在直接工作接触的NY公司能够发挥较强的积极作用。 本文最终从解决“信息不对称”和消除承包方对“专属性人力资源投资”的顾虑入手,提出:签订针对质量改进、效率提升实施奖励的框架协议,将承包公司的持续改进量化并与奖励指标挂钩等手段,调动承包公司持续改进和长期合作意愿,建立起有效的“关系契约”;为承包企业专属性人力资源投资带来的效率提升溢价予以奖励,并通过推荐优秀外包员工入职为承包方专属性人力投资提供退出方案的方式,消除承包方对“专属性人力资源投资”的顾虑。同时本文强调了直接面向外包员工精神激励的必要性,给出以较低的成本通过设立各种针对外包员工的专项奖励的建议,直接激励外包员工主动改进。最终通过上述多种措施的综合运用,实现软件外包项目交付质量的提升。
[Abstract]:Based on the research on the insufficient incentive policy of the software outsourcing project in NY Company, this paper looks for measures to improve the delivery quality of the software outsourcing project from the angle of incentive mechanism. This paper analyzes the contractual relationship among enterprises and the individual feelings of outsourced employees, and finds that the fundamental problem affecting the quality of software delivery in NY Company lies in the lack of motivation for continuous improvement in the contracting enterprises. And the humanistic concern of outsourcing staff is not enough. Further analysis and research on the application of economic theory shows that the reason for the lack of continuous improvement power of contracting enterprises lies in the lack of positive incentives for quality incentive contracts. The "adverse selection" phenomenon that leads to the contractor's unwillingness to spend additional costs to further improve the quality on the basis of quality standards, And the lack of an effective "relationship contract" that causes contracting firms to be "rigged" and unwilling to make "exclusive investments." and in terms of individual motivational elements for knowledge workers, Non-material incentive can play a great role in outsourcing employees, and NY company, which has direct working contact in this respect, can play a strong positive role. Finally, this paper begins with the solution of "information asymmetry" and the elimination of contractor's concern about "exclusive human resource investment", and proposes to sign a framework agreement for quality improvement and efficiency enhancement. To quantify and link the continuous improvement of the contracting company with the incentive index, and to mobilize the willingness of the contracting company to continuously improve and cooperate in the long run, Establish an effective "relationship contract", reward the efficiency improvement premium brought by the exclusive human resource investment of the contracting enterprise, and provide the exit scheme for the contractor's exclusive human resources investment by recommending the excellent outsourcing staff to join the position. At the same time, this paper emphasizes the necessity of direct encouragement for outsourced employees, and gives some suggestions for setting up special incentives for outsourced employees at lower cost. Direct incentive outsourcing employees to actively improve. Finally, through the comprehensive use of the above measures to achieve the quality of software outsourcing project delivery.
【学位授予单位】:南京理工大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F272.92;F49
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