联保贷款违约传染问题研究

发布时间：2018-01-18 02:36

本文关键词：联保贷款违约传染问题研究　出处：《沈阳师范大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：联保贷款始于孟加拉Grameen银行的团体贷款模式,该模式于1993年进入中国,逐渐在中国发展起来,联保贷款以其骄人的还款率和在扶贫方面的突出成绩吸引了众多经济学家和政策制定者的目光。该机制将社会资本引入,降低了贷款的信息不对称的问题。解决了信贷过程中的逆向选择和道德风险问题,提高了其贷款效率。联保贷款降低了个人违约风险的同时,但与此同时也增加了集体违约的风险。本文从联保贷款带来的集体违约风险出发,选中导致集体违约的违约传染为研究对象,将违约传染分为组间的跨组违约传染和组内的组员间违约传染,并提出了解决办法。在组间的跨组违约传染方面本文写作较为略写,主要从信息制度上给出解决办法,而关于发起违约传染的源头---组内传染作为本文的重点研究对象。研究在正文提出联保贷款的运行机制,并在联保贷款的运行机制中的出违约传染存在的客观性。随之具体阐述在现行的联保贷款机制下导致的问题:一、后违约者比先违约者有更强的违约意愿;二、联保贷款中,一旦存在策略违约,必定出现违约传染,并导致集体违约。上述策略违约是在考虑团体成员间的惩罚的前提下的,而本文通过博弈矩阵的分析得到,一旦发生违约传染,组员间的惩罚威慑是无效的,而与此同时联保贷款在违约传染发生时面临的是一个非完全信息博弈,在联保贷款违约传染发生时横向监督无效的情况下如何做到避免违约传染继续发生成为了本文研究的重点。本文定义从第一个违约者出现到策略违约前最后一个违约者之间为违约传染缓冲区,同时面临加入组员间惩罚和不加入组员间惩罚的两个违约传染临界点。通过延长非违约传染区来解决上述问题。集体违约一旦发生,横向监督失效,所以只有在银行的纵向监督的前提下,根据现实社会中的情况在解决违约传染的方法中重新考虑加入抵押这一因素,以保证来自银行的纵向监督的有效性。本文提出有限连带责任制,取消原来联保制度中的无限责任联保,联保责任不超过最高限额,履约者不再继续发生策略违约,违约传染被终止。对于限定联保责任最高限额随之而来的银行的亏损的风险,本文用增加组员人数的方法将限定最高对银行带来的亏损风险转化为行业本身的系统风险。银行的工作由原来的调查借款人的资信来筛选借款人转化成调查行业风险来筛选可贷款的行业。
[Abstract]:The UNPROFOR loan started with the group loan model of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which entered China in 1993 and gradually developed in China. With its impressive repayment rate and outstanding performance in poverty alleviation, UNPROFOR has attracted the attention of a large number of economists and policy makers. The problem of information asymmetry of loan is reduced, the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard in credit process is solved, and the efficiency of loan is improved, while the risk of individual default is reduced by UNPROFOR loan. But at the same time, it also increases the risk of collective default. From the risk of collective default brought by UNPROFOR loan, this paper selects the contagion of collective default as the research object. The paper divides default contagion into inter-group default contagion and inter-group default contagion, and puts forward some solutions. Mainly from the information system to give the solution, and about the origin of the default contagion -intra-group infection as the focus of this study. The main body of the study put forward the operational mechanism of UNPROFOR loans. And the objectivity of default contagion in the operational mechanism of UNPROFOR loan. Then the problems caused by the current UNPROFOR loan mechanism are expounded in detail: first, the latter defaulters have stronger willingness to breach the contract than those who defaulted first; Second, in the UNPROFOR loan, once there is a strategic default, there must be default contagion, and lead to collective default. The above mentioned strategic default is based on the consideration of punishment among the members of the group. Through the analysis of game matrix, it is concluded that once the default contagion occurs, the punishment deterrent among the members is ineffective, and at the same time, the UNPROFOR loan is faced with a incomplete information game when the default contagion occurs. How to avoid further default contagion in the case of ineffective horizontal supervision during the occurrence of default contagion on UNPROFOR loan has become the focus of this paper. The definition of this paper is from the first defaulter to the last one before the strategic default. The default contagion buffer between the defaulters. At the same time, it faces two critical points of contagion between the members and non-members. The above problems can be solved by extending the non-default contagion zone. Once the collective default occurs, the horizontal supervision fails. So only in the premise of vertical supervision of banks, according to the actual situation in the real society in the solution of default contagion in the way to re-consider the inclusion of mortgage this factor. In order to ensure the effectiveness of vertical supervision from the bank, this paper proposes a limited joint and several responsibility system, eliminating the unlimited liability in the original UNPROFOR system, which does not exceed the maximum limit. The performing party no longer continues to default on the strategy, and the contagion of default is terminated... the risk of bank losses following the limitation of the maximum amount of UNPROFOR liability. This paper uses the method of increasing the number of staff to convert the maximum loss risk to the bank into the systemic risk of the industry itself. The job of the bank is to screen the borrower from the credit of the original borrower to investigate the industry. Risk to sift through loanable industries.
【学位授予单位】：沈阳师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F832.4

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