我国房地产上市公司高管薪酬激励的实证研究

发布时间：2018-04-07 00:05

本文选题：高管薪酬　切入点：公司绩效　出处：《吉林财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：伴随着我国经济的持续快速发展和当前国际经济的大环境的影响，房地产行业发展的突飞猛进，对我国国民经济产生很大的影响。同时高管人员也是最近比较受关注的焦点，鉴于以上两点，本文就以上市公司房地产的高管薪酬为研究对象，研究上市公司高管薪酬激励体制。本文选取了2009-2011年深圳交易所和上海交易所中的房地产A股上市公司的数据作为研究客体。数据来源于中国证监会官方网站、深圳国泰安信息技术有限公司开发的CSMAR数据库、巨潮资讯官网以及上市公司年报，辅助SPSS13.0统计软件进行了多元回归分析。通过建立回归模型进行实证分析，检验房地产上市公司的高管薪酬与公司绩效、公司规模、董事会规模、股权集中度是否具有关联性，实证结论表明：（1）房地产上市公司的业绩与高管薪酬这两者之间有着很明显的正比例关系。这也就说明我国房地产上市公司的业绩与高管薪酬的挂钩的原则越来越完善，从而使房地产上市公司的高管薪酬---业绩合约得到进一步完善。（2）房地产公司规模的扩大，会使高管薪酬得到相应的提高。（3）房地产上市公司股权集中度与高管薪酬有着显著的负相关的影响，证实了股权集中度越明显，大股东对高管的监督就会越有效，高管薪酬就会越少。但是股权集中度这一公司治理结构还需要进一步完善，从而使高管薪酬激励机制得到完善。（4）房地产上市公司的董事会规模与高管薪酬的正相关性没有通过t检验。说明两者的正相关是不成立的。针对实证研究的结论，，本文最后提出了完善房地产上市公司高管薪酬激励机制的相关建议和措施：(1)房地产上市公司绩效目标的正确设定，从而使高管薪酬激励机制得到进一步完善；（2）建立科学合理有效的业绩评价机制将短期激励与长期激励相结合，从而进一步完善高管薪酬激励机制；（3）完善相关的法律法规，从而为高管薪酬激励机制提供法律保障。
[Abstract]:With the sustained and rapid development of our economy and the impact of the current international economic environment, the rapid development of the real estate industry has a great impact on our national economy.At the same time, executives are also the focus of attention recently, in view of the above two points, this paper takes the real estate executive compensation of listed companies as the research object, studies the incentive system of executive compensation of listed companies.The data of real estate A-share listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2011 are selected as the object of this study.The data comes from the official website of CSRC, the CSMAR database developed by Shenzhen Cathay & an Information Technology Co., Ltd., the giant information website and the annual report of listed companies, and the multivariate regression analysis of SPSS13.0 statistical software.By establishing a regression model to analyze the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance, corporate size, board size, ownership concentration, and so on, the paper analyzes the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance, corporate size, board size, and equity concentration of listed real estate companies.The empirical results show that there is a significant positive relationship between the performance of real estate listed companies and executive compensation.This also shows that the principle of linking the performance of listed real estate companies with executive compensation is becoming more and more perfect, thus making the real estate listed companies' executive compensation -performance contracts further improved. 2) the scale of real estate companies is expanded.It will increase the executive compensation accordingly.) the ownership concentration degree of the real estate listed companies has a significant negative correlation with the executive compensation, which proves that the more obvious the equity concentration degree, the more effective the supervision of the executive will be by the large shareholders.The lower the executive pay, the less.However, the corporate governance structure of equity concentration needs to be further improved, so that the incentive mechanism of executive compensation is improved. 4) the positive correlation between board size and executive compensation of listed real estate companies has not passed t test.It shows that the positive correlation between the two is untenable.In view of the conclusion of the empirical study, this paper finally puts forward the relevant suggestions and measures to improve the executive compensation incentive mechanism of real estate listed companies, and measures: 1) the correct setting of performance objectives of real estate listed companies.So that the incentive mechanism of executive compensation can be further improved. 2) to establish a scientific, reasonable and effective performance evaluation mechanism to combine short-term incentive with long-term incentive, thus further improve the incentive mechanism of executive compensation and improve the relevant laws and regulations.In order to provide legal protection for executive compensation incentive mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：吉林财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F299.233.4

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