金融上市公司高管薪酬对公司绩效的影响研究

发布时间：2018-04-10 15:37

本文选题：金融上市公司 + 高管薪酬　；参考：《哈尔滨工业大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国金融业承担着资金储存，转移和融通等社会职能，政府在一定程度上给予其政策扶持。金融业是一个非充分竞争的行业，在国民经济体制中起着举足轻重的作用，，其盈利水平越来越受到人们的广泛关注。在影响公司绩效的众多因素中，高管薪酬是重要影响因素之一，人们对其高管的薪酬激励更关注。随着资本结构的多元化和复杂化，金融上市公司吸引了越来越多的精英管理人才。针对金融上市公司，旨在以公司监管为视角，分析高管薪酬对公司绩效的影响。希望通过理论分析和实证研究，为完善金融上市公司高管激励体系的设计提供参考。研究对象选取41家金融上市公司，分析高管货币性薪酬、高管团队内部的薪酬差距和高管持股对公司绩效的影响机制，以及股东监管和独立董事监管对薪酬激励效果和公司绩效的影响。以实证工作设计为支撑，选择前五大股东持股比例和独立董事比例代表股东和独立董事监管变量，利用Excel表格和SPSS18.0统计软件，通过对2010-2012年金融上市公司的123个样本数据进行描述性统计分析、相关性分析和多元线性回归分析，研究公司监管、高管薪酬对公司绩效的影响关系，验证理论分析中提出的研究假设。研究结果表明，引入公司监管因素前后，金融上市公司高管货币薪酬对公司绩效均有显著的激励效应，高管持股对公司绩效有负面影响且影响不显著，扩大高管薪酬差距不利于公司绩效的提高，同时认为股东和独立董事的监管未能发挥有效的监管和约束作用，应创造良好的激励体制的同时建立有效监管和约束环境，以进一步提高薪酬激励效应和公司绩效。
[Abstract]:China's financial industry undertakes social functions such as fund storage, transfer and financing, and the government gives its policy support to a certain extent.The financial industry is an industry which is not fully competitive and plays an important role in the national economic system, and its profit level is paid more and more attention by people.Executive compensation is one of the most important factors that affect the performance of the company. People pay more attention to the incentive of the executive.With the diversification and complexity of capital structure, financial listed companies attract more and more elite management talents.The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of executive compensation on corporate performance from the perspective of corporate supervision.Through theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper provides a reference for improving the design of financial listed companies' executive incentive system.The participants selected 41 financial listed companies to analyze the monetary compensation of senior executives, the pay gap within the executive team and the impact mechanism of executive ownership on corporate performance.And the influence of shareholder supervision and independent director supervision on salary incentive effect and company performance.Based on the empirical design, this paper selects the top five shareholder shareholding ratio and independent director ratio to represent the shareholder and independent director supervision variables, and uses Excel table and SPSS18.0 statistical software.Through the descriptive statistical analysis, correlation analysis and multivariate linear regression analysis of 123 sample data of financial listed companies from 2010 to 2012, the relationship between corporate supervision and executive compensation on corporate performance is studied.Verify the research hypotheses put forward in the theoretical analysis.The results show that, before and after the introduction of corporate regulatory factors, the monetary compensation of financial listed companies have significant incentive effects on corporate performance, and executive ownership has a negative impact on corporate performance and the impact is not significant.Expanding executive pay gap is not conducive to the improvement of corporate performance. At the same time, it is considered that the supervision of shareholders and independent directors can not play an effective regulatory and binding role, and we should create a good incentive system and establish an effective regulatory and constraint environment at the same time.To further improve compensation incentives and corporate performance.
【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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