重庆农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款的路径优化研究

发布时间：2018-06-23 22:22

本文选题：农村土地承包经营权 + 抵押贷款　；参考：《重庆工商大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：缺乏有效抵押物使得农村融资难，农民获取贷款难，农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款的出现，使农村土地经营者取得中长期信贷资金成为现实，这也是农业可持续发展的关键措施之一。本文采取理论分析、案例分析以及博弈分析相结合的研究方法，立足于国情和重庆实际，对农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款的主体行为选择进行研究，探索其发展的内在动力。通过对重庆农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款实施的背景分析，总结国内外研究现状；以土地产权理论、土地信用理论及风险理论、规模经济理论作为指导，描述了重庆市农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款的现状及存在的问题，主要表现在抵押权难实现、抵押物价值难确定、贷后管理难、贷款风险难控制、法律不完善、金融机构放贷积极性不高等方面。用博弈方法分析银行和农业经营大户的贷款选择策略，找到促进其发展的内在动力。研究表明，只有当土地承包经营权可以变现才能成为一个可置信威胁，银行选择贷款给农业经营大户，农业经营大户也会选择偿还贷款，政府应该最大限度的帮助农业生产者降低生产风险获取收益偿还贷款；农业生产的特殊性使得农业经营大户可能无法偿还贷款，此时银行将变现土地承包经营权以获得补偿，因此，土地承包经营权能够快速便捷的变现是促进抵押贷款实施的有效路径。针对存在问题和博弈策略，设计了重庆市农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款的优化方案，，方案包括操作流程的优化，政策优化和风险防范三个方面；操作流程的优化，严格加入评估环节，担保公司参与，评估机构和担保公司通过登记，能形成有效信息交流。为保证土地承包经营权抵押贷款操作顺畅，还需要完善法律、建立土地流转市场、引导资金流向等多方面的政策支持。
[Abstract]:The lack of effective mortgage makes it difficult to finance in rural areas, difficult for farmers to obtain loans, and the emergence of mortgage loans for contracted management of rural land makes it a reality for rural land operators to obtain medium- and long-term credit funds. This is also one of the key measures for sustainable agricultural development. This paper adopts the research methods of theoretical analysis, case analysis and game analysis, based on the situation of Chongqing and the reality of Chongqing, studies the subject behavior choice of the rural land contractual management right mortgage loan, and explores the internal motive force of its development. Based on the background analysis of the implementation of mortgage loan for rural land contractual management in Chongqing, this paper summarizes the current research situation at home and abroad, which is guided by land property right theory, land credit theory and risk theory, and scale economy theory. This paper describes the present situation and existing problems of mortgage loan for contracted land management right in rural areas of Chongqing, which are mainly manifested in the difficulty of realizing mortgage right, the difficulty of determining the value of mortgage, the difficulty of management after loan, the difficulty of controlling loan risk, and the imperfection of law. Financial institutions lending enthusiasm is not high, and so on. This paper analyzes the loan selection strategies of banks and large agricultural operators by means of game theory, and finds out the internal motive force to promote their development. Studies have shown that only when the land contractual management right can be realized can it become a credible threat. Banks choose to lend to large agricultural operators, and large agricultural operators will also choose to repay the loans. The government should help agricultural producers to reduce the risk of production to obtain income to repay loans; the particularity of agricultural production may make large agricultural operators unable to repay loans, and the banks will realize the land contractual management right to get compensation. Therefore, land contractual management right can be realized quickly and conveniently is an effective way to promote the implementation of mortgage loan. Aiming at the existing problems and game strategy, the optimization scheme of Chongqing rural land contracted management right mortgage loan is designed. The scheme includes three aspects: the optimization of operation flow, the optimization of policy and risk prevention, the optimization of operation process, and the optimization of operation process. Join the evaluation link strictly, the guarantee company participates, the appraisal organization and the guarantee company can form the effective information exchange through the registration. In order to guarantee the smooth operation of the mortgage loan of the land contract and management right, it is necessary to perfect the law, establish the land circulation market, guide the fund flow and other aspects of policy support.
【学位授予单位】：重庆工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F301.2;F832.4

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