央地利益博弈视角下地方保护主义问题研究

发布时间：2018-08-24 11:40

【摘要】：近年来，随着行政分权和分税制改革的不断深化，中央与地方关系格局发生了重大变化，地方自主权的不断扩大，为地方保护主义的兴起和加剧提供了可乘之机。地方保护主义的危害极大，引起了理论界和实务界的高度关注。本文通过对地方保护主义的理论研究与存在现状的分析，认为地方保护主义之所以兴起和发展，它的根源在于中央政府与地方政府的利益关系失衡。正是在这种思维逻辑的指引下，，本文以利益博弈理论及其中央与地方权力关系理论为基础，结合我国地方保护主义的具体表现，分析了地方保护主义对我国政治、经济造成的危害，并深入探讨了其产生的原因，据此提出了相关政策建议。笔者从博弈的角度分析了在中央与地方利益博弈时，地方政府为何会采取对抗而不是合作。首先，中央与地方博弈中的信息不对称，使地方政府采取逆向选择和道德风险等机会主义行为来实现自身利益最大化的诉求；其次，中央与地方博弈中个体理性与集体理性的冲突，使地方政府面临以国家利益为主还是以地方利益为主的选择时，会舍弃集体理性或国家利益而选择个体理性或者地方利益；再次，约束中央与地方博弈的制度缺失，直接导致处在博弈优势的地方政府违背博弈规制，采取不合作行为来追求自身利益最大化。中央与地方利益博弈所形成的地方保护主义问题，不仅制约着中央政府宏观调控效果和全国各地区基本公共服务的均等化，而且还妨碍着竞争有序的市场经济体系和全国统一市场的形成。因此，解决地方保护主义问题刻不容缓，需要从多方面下功夫：第一，依法规范地方政府的自利性行为；第二，建设统一开放竞争有序的社会主义市场经济体系；第三，协调中央政府与地方政府的利益关系；第四，完善中央与地方的利益博弈机制；第五，尽快制定中央与地方利益关系法及其配套的法律体系；第六，完善地方政府官员政绩考核制度等等。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the deepening of the reform of administrative decentralization and tax sharing, the pattern of the relationship between the central and local governments has undergone great changes, and the continuous expansion of local autonomy has provided an opportunity for the rise and intensification of local protectionism. The great harm of local protectionism has aroused great concern of the theorists and practitioners. Based on the theoretical research and analysis of the present situation of local protectionism, this paper holds that the origin of the rise and development of local protectionism lies in the imbalance between the interests of the central government and the local government. Under the guidance of this kind of thinking logic, this paper, based on the theory of interest game and the relationship between central and local power, and the concrete manifestation of local protectionism in our country, analyzes the influence of local protectionism on the politics of our country. The harm caused by economy and its causes are discussed, and the relevant policy suggestions are put forward. From the point of view of game, the author analyzes why the local government adopts confrontation rather than cooperation in the game between central and local interests. First, the information asymmetry in the game between central and local governments makes local governments adopt opportunistic behaviors such as adverse selection and moral hazard to maximize their own interests. The conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality in the game between central and local governments makes local governments choose individual rationality or local interest instead of collective rationality or national interest when they are faced with the choice between national interest and local interest. Thirdly, the lack of system to restrain the central and local game directly leads the local government in the game advantage to violate the game rules and regulations, and adopt the non-cooperative behavior to pursue the maximization of its own interests. The problem of local protectionism caused by the game between central and local interests not only restricts the effect of macro-control of central government and equalization of basic public services in all regions of the country. It also hinders the formation of a competitive and orderly market economy and a unified national market. Therefore, it is urgent to solve the problem of local protectionism, and we need to make efforts in many aspects: first, to regulate the self-interest behavior of local governments according to law; second, to build a unified, open, competitive and orderly socialist market economy system; and third, to build a socialist market economy system that is unified, open, and orderly. Coordinate the interest relationship between central government and local government; fourth, perfect the game mechanism between central and local interests; fifth, formulate the central and local interest relationship law and its supporting legal system as soon as possible; sixth, Improve the performance appraisal system of local government officials and so on.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D630

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