国际合作框架下的碳博弈研究

发布时间：2018-01-17 00:00

  本文关键词：国际合作框架下的碳博弈研究　出处：《西南交通大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

  更多相关文章： 国际合作 技术转移 碳权分配 Shapley值

【摘要】：由大量的温室气体排放所导致的全球极端气候变化问题日益严峻,实现全球性碳减排是国际社会共同关注的焦点。低碳经济作为一种公共物品,典型的经济负外部性决定了国际合作将是实现世界性碳减排的必然选择。各国虽达成了碳减排的共识,但基于差异性的环境效用和碳减排技术,碳权分配及减排利益始终难以协调,使得碳博弈陷入困局,成为实现合作共赢的最大阻力。 在国际环境合作的框架下,发达国家同发展中国家之间的博弈主要集中于低碳技术的转让以及初始碳权的分配这两个方面,所以本文主要针对上述问题展开分析。首先从两国博弈的角度建立了低碳技术转移模型,通过对成功转移的必要条件及交易均衡解的分析,得知要实现国际间的技术转移,各国需要在降低交易成本、完善价格机制、增强政府驱动力等方面做出努力；其次,国际环境合作不仅仅基于两国之间,最终要解决的是全球碳权分配问题,所以在两国模型的基础上,本文将碳博弈进一步拓展到多维博弈的角度,通过对碳权分配的模拟及均衡解的分析,推断多标准的分配原则更能全面考虑全球所有国家的利益,而分配标准的制定在一定程度上又取决于谈判国话语权大小,即国家综合实力。为此,本文又引入了Shapley值方法对谈判话语权进行定量分析,从分析结果可以看出,欧盟及以美国为首的伞形集团将成为话语权比重最大的国家。 显而易见,先进的低碳技术、强大的国家综合实力是赢得话语权最关键的要素。因此,为实现世界性的碳减排,各国必须加强国内技术研发、完善碳减排机制、提升国家综合实力,为进军低碳市场创造更多的竞争优势。而中国作为发展中大国,更应该加大减排技术的研发力度、增强碳交易市场管制、拓宽碳金融衍生品市场,加快向低碳经济转型,最终实现全球合作共赢。
[Abstract]:The global extreme climate change problem caused by a large amount of greenhouse gas emissions is becoming more and more serious. The realization of global carbon emission reduction is the common focus of the international community. Low-carbon economy as a public good. The typical negative externality of economy determines that international cooperation will be the inevitable choice to achieve worldwide carbon emission reduction. Although countries have reached a consensus on carbon emission reduction, but based on the difference of environmental utility and carbon emission reduction technology. The distribution of carbon rights and the benefits of emission reduction are always difficult to coordinate, which makes the carbon game difficult and becomes the biggest resistance to win-win cooperation. In the framework of international environmental cooperation, the game between developed and developing countries mainly focuses on the transfer of low-carbon technology and the allocation of initial carbon rights. So this paper mainly focuses on the above problems. Firstly, a low-carbon technology transfer model is established from the point of view of the game between the two countries, through the analysis of the necessary conditions for successful transfer and the transaction equilibrium solution. Know that to realize the international technology transfer, countries need to reduce transaction costs, improve the price mechanism, strengthen the government driving force and other aspects of efforts; Secondly, international environmental cooperation is not only based on the two countries, the ultimate solution is the global carbon distribution, so on the basis of the two countries model, this paper further expand the perspective of multi-dimensional game. Through the simulation of carbon right allocation and the analysis of equilibrium solution, it is concluded that the multi-criteria allocation principle can consider the interests of all countries in the world more comprehensively. To a certain extent, the formulation of allocation criteria depends on the power of the negotiator, that is, the comprehensive strength of the country. Therefore, this paper introduces the Shapley value method to carry out quantitative analysis. According to the analysis, the EU and the Umbrella Group led by the United States will become the most influential countries. It is obvious that advanced low-carbon technology and strong national comprehensive strength are the most important factors to win the right to speak. Therefore, in order to achieve global carbon emission reduction, countries must strengthen domestic technology research and development. Improve the carbon emission reduction mechanism, improve the comprehensive strength of the country, to enter the low-carbon market to create more competitive advantage. As a developing country, China should increase the intensity of research and development of emission reduction technology, and strengthen the regulation of carbon trading market. Broaden the carbon derivatives market, accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy, and ultimately achieve global win-win cooperation.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F113.3;F224.32

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