区域综合客运通道多方式竞争力博弈模型

发布时间：2018-02-04 02:31

本文关键词： 交通管理多方式价格竞争博弈论 NL模型市场演化市场分担率　出处：《交通运输工程学报》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：为了研究综合客运通道内多方式价格竞争对市场分担率与利润的影响,基于非集计NL模型与博弈理论,构建了各客运方式市场分担率与运输价格关系的双矩阵博弈模型。以成渝通道为基础,研究了高速铁路和高速公路大巴2种典型运输方式不同情景下的市场竞争均衡价格与分担率的变化特征。分析结果表明:在采用双矩阵博弈模型所计算的均衡价格条件下,高速铁路和高速公路大巴平均市场分担率分别增加了56.15%和80.58%,有利于发挥二者的规模效益;当出行模式结构相同时,时间价值的变化会影响运营利润和市场分担率,随着时间价值系数的增大,高速铁路的平均运营利润增加34.60%,平均市场分担率增加9.98%,同时高速公路大巴平均运营利润减少29.70%,平均市场分担率减少3.49%;对于出行时间处于劣势的高速公路大巴,适当降低票价有利于增加营运利润;该博弈模型的计算结果符合区域综合运输通道客运市场实际变化规律,高速铁路和高速公路大巴不可能通过无限制降价的方式来追求最大利润,运营利润都呈现先增后减的趋势,在某个价格下运营利润最大;该博弈模型具有价格均衡解,在外界情况变化时,通过博弈高速铁路和高速公路大巴价格可以达到利润最优状态。
[Abstract]:In order to study the effect of multi-mode price competition on market share rate and profit in integrated passenger transport channel, the model of non-set NL and game theory are used to study the effect of multi-mode price competition on market share and profit. This paper constructs a two-matrix game model of the relationship between market share rate and transport price of each mode of passenger transportation, which is based on Chengdu-Chongqing channel. The variation characteristics of equilibrium price and share rate of market competition under different scenarios of two typical transport modes of high-speed railway and expressway bus are studied. The results show that:. Under the condition of equilibrium price calculated by using the two-matrix game model. The average market share rate of high-speed railway and expressway bus increased by 56.15% and 80.58, respectively, which was beneficial to the development of their economies of scale. When the structure of travel mode is the same, the change of time value will affect the operating profit and market share rate. With the increase of time value coefficient, the average operating profit of high-speed railway increases by 34.60%. The average market share rate increased 9.98%, while the average operating profit of the expressway bus decreased 29.70%, and the average market share rate decreased 3.49%; For the expressway bus with inferior travel time, the proper reduction of the ticket price is conducive to increase the operating profit; The calculated results of the game model accord with the actual changes of the regional integrated transport channel passenger transport market. The high-speed railway and the expressway bus can not pursue the maximum profit by the way of unlimited price reduction. The operating profit shows the trend of first increasing and then decreasing, and the operating profit is the largest at a certain price. The game model has a price equilibrium solution. When the external situation changes, the price of high-speed railway and highway bus can reach the optimal state of profit.
【作者单位】：重庆交通大学土木工程学院;重庆交通大学交通运输学院;
【基金】：重庆市社会科学规划培育项目(2015PY36) 国家自然科学基金项目(51308569) 重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学研究重点项目(14SKG03)
【分类号】：U116.2
【正文快照】： 0引言随着中国高速铁路网的逐步完善,区域运输通道面临多方式竞争的新局面,科学定量分析通道内各方式的竞争力及市场演化规律成为当前研究的重要课题,为通道内各方式的定位与发展规划提供前提和依据。已有关于客运多方式竞争的研究成果大多是以效用理论为基础,构建方式选择MNL

【相似文献】