收费公路PPP项目收益补偿模型研究

发布时间：2018-06-21 06:46

本文选题：收费公路PPP项目 + 收益补偿　；参考：《兰州交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：收费公路的建设不仅能带动区域经济发展,而且能进一步提升区域交通区位优势、改善投资环境、为区域产业布局提供有力支撑。收费公路项目属于资金、技术密集型项目,由于其建设周期长、建设环境复杂及社会对其越来越高的建设和服务要求,仅仅依靠政府一方提供已经完全不现实。近年来迅速发展起来的PPP模式以“特许经营权”的方式将政府部门部分支出责任转移给私人部门,不仅缓解了政府财政压力,也使得私人部门的闲置资本得到合理有效的利用。因此,对于收费公路领域来说,PPP模式的引入能够极大促进其发展。然而,由于收费公路准公共产品属性和正外部性等特征,私人部门并不能够获得合理的收益,为此政府需要承担一定的补偿责任。通过文献研究发现目前的PPP项目补偿模型只能补偿私人部门的投资缺口,并没有对私人部门起到激励性作用。因此,建立有效且具有激励性质的收益补偿模型,为收费公路PPP项目的顺利实施提供保障显得尤为重要。本文综合运用文献研究法、博弈分析法、定性和定量分析相结合的方法,对收费公路PPP项目的收益补偿模型进行了研究。首先,对目前我国收费公路的发展现状进行阐述,对PPP模式的国内外补偿现状进行梳理和分析。随后对收费公路PPP项目收益补偿的相关理论进行阐述,分析了收费公路PPP项目的四大经济特性及补偿的必要性,同时对博弈论和委托代理理论进行了介绍,并对收费公路PPP项目收益补偿中的委托代理关系进行了研究,为后文理论模型的构建做好铺垫。其次,对收费公路PPP项目收益补偿问题进行描述,介绍了目前PPP项目补偿主流的两种补偿模式:建设期补偿模式和运营期补偿模式;在明确政府和私人部门是委托代理关系的情况下,借用委托代理模型分别构建了“补建设”和“补运营”两种情形下的“固定补偿+激励补偿”的收益补偿委托代理博弈模型,并对模型进行求解和分析,探讨了信息对称下和信息不对称下政府给予私人部门的固定补偿,企业努力水平和政府激励报酬之间的关系,以及企业的风险规避度、外部影响因素对最优补偿合约的影响,进而从理论上分析了激励补偿模型的有效性和可行性。最后,结合具体实际案例,重点对信息不对称情况下“补建设”和“补运营”两种补偿模型进行了定量分析,并提出基于运营成本的补偿模型选择是政府的最优补偿决策,同时根据本文构建的补偿模型及计算结果提出了几条补偿实施建议。
[Abstract]:The construction of toll roads can not only promote the regional economic development, but also further enhance the regional transportation location advantages, improve the investment environment, and provide strong support for the regional industrial distribution. Toll road project is a kind of capital and technology-intensive project. Because of its long construction cycle, complex construction environment and the society's increasing demands on its construction and service, it is completely unrealistic to rely solely on the government to provide it. In recent years, the PPP mode, which has developed rapidly, transfers part of government expenditure responsibility to the private sector in the form of "franchise", which not only alleviates the government financial pressure, but also makes the idle capital of the private sector reasonably and effectively utilized. Therefore, the introduction of PPP model can greatly promote the development of toll roads. However, due to the characteristics of quasi-public goods and positive externalities of toll roads, the private sector can not obtain reasonable income, so the government should bear certain compensation responsibilities. It is found that the current PPP project compensation model can only compensate for the investment gap of the private sector, and does not play an incentive role to the private sector. Therefore, it is very important to establish an effective and incentive revenue compensation model to guarantee the smooth implementation of PPP project of toll road. In this paper, the revenue compensation model of toll road PPP project is studied by means of literature research, game analysis, qualitative and quantitative analysis. Firstly, the development of toll roads in China is expounded, and the compensation status of PPP at home and abroad is analyzed. Then it expounds the relevant theories of PPP project income compensation, analyzes the four economic characteristics of toll road PPP project and the necessity of compensation, and introduces the game theory and principal-agent theory. The principal-agent relationship in the revenue compensation of PPP project of toll road is studied, which lays the foundation for the construction of the theoretical model. Secondly, the paper describes the revenue compensation of PPP project of toll road, and introduces two main compensation modes of PPP project: compensation mode in construction period and compensation mode in operation period; Under the condition that the government and the private sector are principal-agent relationship, the principal-agent game model of "fixed compensation incentive compensation" and "fixed compensation incentive compensation" is constructed by using the principal-agent model. By solving and analyzing the model, the paper discusses the fixed compensation given by the government to the private sector under information symmetry and information asymmetry, the relationship between the level of enterprise effort and the government incentive reward, and the risk aversion of the enterprise. The influence of external factors on the optimal compensation contract is analyzed, and the validity and feasibility of the incentive compensation model are analyzed theoretically. Finally, combined with practical cases, the paper focuses on the quantitative analysis of compensation models of "compensation construction" and "compensation operation" under the condition of asymmetric information, and points out that the choice of compensation model based on operation cost is the optimal compensation decision of the government. At the same time, according to the compensation model constructed in this paper and the results of calculation, several suggestions for the implementation of compensation are put forward.
【学位授予单位】：兰州交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F542;F283

【参考文献】