交通诱导系统中的博弈模型研究

发布时间：2019-04-30 11:49

【摘要】：近年来，随着现代社会进步与经济迅速发展，交通运输的各方面需求明显增加，随之而来的城市交通问题也逐渐突显，交通拥挤和堵塞现象成为现代社会亟待解决的问题之一。从可持续发展的角度来讲，通过提升城市交通运输网络的现代化水平来提高交通运输资源的有效利用是一种十分可行的办法，随即交通诱导系统作为解决城市交通运输问题的重要技术手段进入了人们的视野。为了提高路网上的交通诱导效率、均衡路网中的交通资源分配，本文在交通诱导系统研究中引入了博弈论的基本思想及研究方法。首先针对诱导信息条件下的交通振荡现象，从路网出行者的角度出发，研究了出行者之间因竞争相同路网资源而产生的利益冲突关系；根据出行者个体与群体之间的博弈行为提出了基于NASH博弈和随机用户均衡SUE的交通诱导模型，并根据WARDROP第一原理，应用随机用户均衡SUE来求解NASH均衡，降低了交通诱导中的振荡现象发生的概率，实现了路网中各出行者的出行费用最小化的目的。为了进一步提高路网上的交通运输性能，本文对城市交通条件下路网出行者与交通管理者之间的博弈行为进行了深入研究，提出了基于交通管理者与路网出行者之间的STACKELBERG博弈的交通诱导模型，并结合改进LOGIT模型求解了系统最优与用户均衡这两种交通诱导原则之间的博弈均衡，，实现了交通管理者与路网出行者双赢的局面，提高了路网上的交通诱导效率和通行质量。最后，将两部分内容结合起来，对路网上的所有交通参与者之间的冲突与合作关系进行系统的分析与研究，并在微观交通仿真软件VISSIM结合VC6.0/MFC的仿真平台上验证了博弈模型的正确性与有效性，实验结果表明，本文提出的两种基于博弈思想的交通诱导模型可以在更符合路网交通实际情况的条件下提高路网上的行驶速度、实现路网上的车流均衡、优化路网的整体交通运输性能。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of modern society and the rapid development of economy, the demand of various aspects of transportation has increased obviously, and the urban traffic problems have also gradually become prominent, traffic congestion and congestion have become one of the problems that need to be solved urgently in modern society. From the perspective of sustainable development, it is very feasible to improve the effective utilization of transport resources by upgrading the level of modernization of urban transport networks. Traffic guidance system (TSS), as an important technical means to solve urban transportation problems, has entered people's field of view. In order to improve the efficiency of traffic guidance on the road network and balance the traffic resource allocation in the road network, this paper introduces the basic ideas and research methods of game theory in the study of traffic guidance system. Firstly, aiming at the phenomenon of traffic oscillation under induced information, from the perspective of road network travelers, this paper studies the conflict of interest between travelers due to competition for the same road network resources. A traffic guidance model based on NASH game and stochastic user equilibrium SUE is proposed according to the game behavior between individual and group of travelers. According to the first principle of WARDROP, the random user equilibrium SUE is used to solve the NASH equilibrium. It reduces the probability of oscillation in the traffic guidance and realizes the purpose of minimizing the travel cost of the travelers in the road network. In order to further improve the traffic performance of the road network, this paper makes a deep research on the game behavior between the road network travelers and the traffic managers under the urban traffic conditions. In this paper, a traffic guidance model based on STACKELBERG game between traffic managers and road network travelers is proposed, and the game equilibrium between system optimization and user equilibrium is solved by using the improved LOGIT model. The win-win situation between traffic managers and road network travelers is realized, and the traffic guidance efficiency and traffic quality on the road network are improved. Finally, the two parts are combined to analyze and study the conflict and cooperative relationship among all the traffic participants on the road network. The correctness and effectiveness of the game model are verified on the platform of microscopic traffic simulation software VISSIM and VC6.0/MFC. The experimental results show that: Two traffic guidance models based on game theory proposed in this paper can improve the driving speed of the road network, realize the equilibrium of traffic flow on the road network, and optimize the overall traffic performance of the road network under the conditions that are more in line with the actual traffic conditions of the road network.
【学位授予单位】：沈阳航空航天大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：U495

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