基于损失厌恶和损失概率厌恶的绩效薪酬模型研究

发布时间：2018-05-18 15:49

本文选题：绩效薪酬 + 委托代理　；参考：《青岛大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：在企业的生产经营过程中,企业所有者的目的是获得最大利润,而利润的获得离不开员工的努力工作。如何有效地激励企业员工的努力度,是企业提高产量、保证产品质量,并进一步拓展市场份额、提升市场竞争能力的关键。因此设计一种科学高效的绩效薪酬激励机制,具有重要的意义和极高的研究价值。本文在委托代理理论框架下,考虑在生产过程中产出受代理人努力程度和干扰因素共同影响的生产关系,研究了有限理性下具有不同行为特征的委托人对具有不同行为特征的代理人的绩效薪酬设计问题。利用累积前景理论,刻画了委托人和代理人在有限理性下对利润的感知,并分析了代理人和委托人的行为选择。通过算例,解释了各个因素对委托人和代理人行为选择以及其感知价值的影响。本文先初步研究了完全理性绩效薪酬模型中代理人和委托人的行为选择及其利润,并通过算例分析了基础工资以及企业生产能力对代理人(或委托人)行为以及利润的影响,随后研究了具有损失厌恶行为特征的绩效薪酬模型,并分析了加入这一有限理性行为特征后各因素对委托人和代理人行为选择以及其感知价值的影响,最后又在绩效薪酬模型中纳入了损失概率厌恶行为特征,利用累积前景理论,采用非连续决策权重函数形式,分析了在添加了损失厌恶行为和概率损失厌恶行为特征后各个因素对代理人和委托人行为选择以及其感知价值的影响。研究结果表明,代理人的行为选择(最优努力程度的选择)受企业生产能力与委托人设置利润分享系数共同影响,与其有限理性行为特征无关,但其感知价值受其有限理性行为特征影响;委托人则不同,他所选择的行为(利润分享系数的设置)以及其感知价值均受其有限理性行为特征影响。
[Abstract]:In the process of production and operation, the purpose of the owner is to obtain the maximum profit, and the profit can not be obtained without the hard work of the staff. How to effectively encourage the effort of employees is the key to improve the output, ensure the quality of products, further expand the market share and enhance the competitiveness of the market. Therefore, the design of a scientific and efficient performance compensation incentive mechanism has important significance and high research value. Under the framework of principal-agent theory, this paper considers the production relations which are influenced by the degree of agency effort and interference factors in the production process. This paper studies the performance compensation design of agents with different behavior characteristics under limited rationality. Based on the theory of cumulative prospect, this paper describes the perception of profit between principal and agent under finite rationality, and analyzes the behavior choice of agent and agent. The influence of various factors on the behavior choice and perceived value of principal and agent is explained by an example. In this paper, the behavior choice and profit of agent and principal in complete rational performance compensation model are studied, and the effect of basic wage and enterprise productivity on agent (or principal) behavior and profit is analyzed through an example. Then, the paper studies the performance compensation model with loss aversion behavior, and analyzes the influence of various factors on the behavior choice and perceived value of principal and agent after adding this limited rational behavior feature. Finally, the loss probability aversion behavior is incorporated into the performance compensation model, and the cumulative foreground theory is used in the form of discontinuous decision weight function. After adding loss aversion behavior and probabilistic loss aversion behavior, the influence of each factor on agent and principal behavior choice and its perceived value is analyzed. The results show that the agent's behavior choice (the choice of the optimal effort level) is influenced by the productivity of the firm and the profit sharing coefficient set by the principal, but it has nothing to do with the characteristics of the limited rational behavior. However, its perceived value is influenced by its limited rational behavior characteristics, while the client's behavior (the setting of profit sharing coefficient) and its perceived value are all affected by its limited rational behavior characteristics.
【学位授予单位】：青岛大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F224;F272.92

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