普遍化平凡性结果与必输赌注契约论证

发布时间：2018-08-12 20:39

【摘要】：本文试图论证两个论点:一、放弃斯托内克对条件句概率的主张不应该是解决平凡性结果的唯一办法;二、"必输赌注契约论证"并不构成一个支持经典概率理论的充分理由。自刘易斯提出平凡性结果以来(Lewis 1976,1986),大多数学者认为平凡性结果所带给我们的教训是:我们不能把条件句视为具有真假值的命题(Adams 1965,1975,1998;Edgington 1995,2006;Bennett 2003)。本文试图论证平凡性结果所带来的真正教训是:我们应该重新反省经典概率理论。自此衔接第二个论点,因为支持经典概率理论的常见论证就是"必输赌注契约论证"(Skyrms 1986;Hacking 2001),而本文试图指出必输赌注契约论证不构成一个好理由来接受经典概率理论,所以经典概率理论并不如大家所认为的那样可信。
[Abstract]:This paper attempts to prove two arguments: first, giving up Stonecker's claim on conditional sentence probability should not be the only way to solve the trivial result; second, "lose bet contract argumentation" does not constitute a sufficient reason to support the classical probability theory. Since Lewis proposed the result of triviality (Lewis 19761986), most scholars think that the lesson of the result of triviality is that we cannot regard conditional sentence as a proposition with true and false value (Adams 1965 / 1975 / 1998 / Edgington 1995 / 2006 / Bennett 2003). The real lesson of this paper is that we should rethink the classical probability theory. From then on, the second argument is connected, because the common argument supporting the classical probability theory is the "Skyrms bet contract demonstration" (Skyrms 1986 / acking 2001), and this paper attempts to point out that the necessity bet contract argument does not constitute a good reason to accept the classical probability theory. So the classical probability theory is not as credible as everyone thinks.
【作者单位】：山东大学哲学与社会发展学院;
【基金】：山东大学人文社科青年团队项目的资助(编号:IFYT17017)
【分类号】：O211

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