广东省高速公路施工阶段多属性项目管理者利益博弈研究

发布时间：2019-01-12 15:30

【摘要】：广东省位于我国大陆南端的沿海地区,经济发展迅速,其高速公路的发展与建设对全国的交通规划具有战略性的影响。广东省政府为改善省内东西北地区的整体交通状况,促进各区域协调发展,要求举全省之力打赢广东省高速公路建设的大会战。“BOT+EPC”模式鉴于其既融合了BOT模式的融资优势,又融合了EPC模式的施工优势,以施工利润来补偿投资人投资收益不足、投资回报率低的缺陷,在广东省高速公路建设中的推广应用迎来了巨大的机遇。此时的总承包商不再是传统意义上的总承包商,而是项目公司的投资人之一,是具有投资人身份和总承包商身份的项目管理者,即多属性项目管理者。因此,研究广东省高速公路“BOT+EPC”模式下的施工阶段多属性项目管理者的博弈具有重要的意义。为全面研究广东省高速公路在“BOT+EPC”模式下的施工阶段多属性项目管理者的利益博弈,首先,本文对广东省高速公路“BOT+EPC”模式下施工阶段的利益相关者进行分析,界定了多属性项目管理者与单属性项目管理者的内涵,分别从身份特点和利益诉求两方面对多属性和单属性项目管理者的特征进行了研究,指出了多属性特征对施工阶段博弈的影响,并从正常施工和利用风险两方面对多属性项目管理者和单属性项目管理者的利润进行了预测。然后,基于多属性项目管理者的视角,结合博弈论理论,构建出广东省高速公路“BOT+EPC”模式下的施工阶段,多属性项目管理者与单属性项目管理者的不完全信息动态博弈模型,通过海萨尼转换对博弈模型进行了求解与分析。同时,对“BOT+EPC”模式下施工阶段的博弈过程与行为进行分析,分别讨论了多属性项目管理者与单属性项目管理者在利益一致与利益不一致时的风险清单和具体的风险应对措施,分析了多属性项目管理者的博弈效果,总结出多属性项目管理者视角下广东省高速公路“BOT+EPC”模式在施工阶段的项目管理特性。最后,本文通过案例分析,以采用“BOT+EPC”模式建设的SJ项目为例,分析SJ项目的施工阶段多属性项目管理者与单属性项目管理者之间的博弈过程,并对博弈效果进行阐述,从而验证本文研究的正确性和适用性。
[Abstract]:Guangdong Province is located in the coastal area of the southern end of the mainland of China. The development and construction of its expressway has a strategic impact on the transportation planning of the whole country. In order to improve the overall traffic situation in the east and northwest areas of the province and promote the coordinated development of various regions, the Guangdong Provincial Government, The "BOT EPC" model, which combines the financing advantages of the BOT model and the construction advantage of the EPC model, is required to win the major battle of highway construction in Guangdong Province. In view of the fact that the "BOT EPC" model combines the advantages of the BOT model and the construction advantage of the EPC model, the construction profits are used to compensate the investors for the lack of investment returns. The defect of low rate of return on investment brings great opportunity to the popularization and application of highway construction in Guangdong province. At this time, the general contractor is no longer the general contractor in the traditional sense, but one of the investors of the project company. He is the project manager with the status of investor and general contractor, that is, the multi-attribute project manager. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the game of multi-attribute project managers in the construction stage of Guangdong Expressway "BOT EPC" mode. In order to study the benefit game of multi-attribute project manager in the construction stage of Guangdong expressway under "BOT EPC" mode, firstly, this paper analyzes the stakeholders in the construction stage of Guangdong expressway "BOT EPC" mode. The connotation of multi-attribute project manager and single-attribute project manager is defined, and the characteristics of multi-attribute and single-attribute project manager are studied from two aspects of identity characteristics and interest demand. This paper points out the influence of multi-attribute characteristics on the game in construction stage, and forecasts the profit of multi-attribute project manager and single-attribute project manager from two aspects of normal construction and utilizing risk. Then, based on the view of multi-attribute project manager and the theory of game theory, the construction stage of Guangdong expressway "BOT EPC" mode is constructed. The dynamic game model of incomplete information between multi-attribute project manager and single-attribute project manager is solved and analyzed by Hysani transformation. At the same time, the game process and behavior in the construction stage under "BOT EPC" mode are analyzed. This paper discusses the risk list and concrete risk response measures of multi-attribute project managers and single-attribute project managers when the interests are consistent with or without consistent interests, and analyzes the game effect of multi-attribute project managers. This paper summarizes the project management characteristics of "BOT EPC" mode in the construction stage of Guangdong expressway from the view of multi-attribute project manager. Finally, this paper analyzes the game process between the multi-attribute project manager and the single-attribute project manager in the construction stage of the SJ project, taking the SJ project constructed by "BOT EPC" mode as an example, and expounds the effect of the game. In order to verify the correctness and applicability of this study.
【学位授予单位】：重庆交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：U415.1;F224.32

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