基于累积前景理论的联盟企业知识转移演化博弈分析

发布时间：2019-03-28 08:57

【摘要】：知识转移过程是一个复杂的博弈过程,演化博弈论可以很好地解释转移主体行为。考虑到传统的演化博弈模型不能对知识转移主体非理性心理因素及风险偏好问题进行有效解释,本文将累积前景理论与演化博弈相结合,运用前景价值函数完善支付矩阵的部分参数,分析博弈模型的演化稳定策略。通过仿真模拟得出如下结论:知识转移存在两个演化稳定策略;转移策略由直接收益、转移成本及前景损益等因素决定;转移方的风险损失对转移策略影响较大,而接收方潜在收入对知识转移策略影响较小。
[Abstract]:The process of knowledge transfer is a complex game process. Evolutionary game theory can explain the behavior of transfer subjects well. Considering that the traditional evolutionary game model can not effectively explain the irrational psychological factors and risk preference of knowledge transfer subjects, this paper combines cumulative prospect theory with evolutionary game theory. Using the foreground value function to perfect some parameters of the payment matrix, the evolutionary stability strategy of the game model is analyzed. The simulation results are as follows: there are two evolutionary stability strategies for knowledge transfer, which are determined by the factors such as direct income, transfer cost and prospect profit and loss, etc. The risk loss of the transferer has a great influence on the transfer strategy, while the potential income of the receiver has little effect on the knowledge transfer strategy.
【作者单位】：江苏科技大学经济管理学院;苏州科技大学科研产业部;
【基金】：国家社科基金重点项目“产业技术创新联盟企业动态能力提升的创新机制与实现路径研究”的研究(14AGL001) 国家自然科学基金项目“‘政产学研金’协同创新下知识流动力学模型及制度设计”(71271119);国家自然科学基金“跨界隐性知识的协同效应对颠覆式创新绩效的影响研究”(71471091)
【分类号】：F224.32;F272

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