基于博弈论的项目业主应对索赔研究

发布时间：2019-04-03 13:33

【摘要】：建设工程具有规模大、投资高、工期长、施工节点多、未知风险多、管理技巧强等特点,在建设过程中,随着社会环境和经济环境动态变化的因素影响,工程建设项目的各个利益相关方随时面临着无法预见的不确定性风险。随着我国经济下行压力加大、投资增长乏力的局面出现,国内工程建设承包与发包市场的竞争日益激烈,"低价中标,高额索赔"已经成为项目施工方为赢取中标而采取的措施,利用项目业主方应对索赔管理水平较低、经验不足的缺陷,达到最终盈取暴利的目的。因此,对于项目业主来说,应对索赔工作经验的总结与完善不仅仅只是一个思想意识是否重视的问题,更是一个能否把工程项目的结算价格控制在合理的计划范围之内的重要事情,涉及到工程项目投资的成败。本文从项目业主方的视角,通过对工程项目合同在履行的过程中就施工方与项目业主方围绕干扰事件所带来的损失而进行的索赔与应对索赔工作中出现的问题进行了研究。首先,本文对工程项目的应对索赔进行了定义,并从应对索赔的作用、分类和特点进行了描述。然后详细研究了项目业主应对索赔的工作内容、实施原则以及索赔争端的解决方式,并对项目业主应对索赔工作的常见问题进行了分析。随后,本文引入经济学中"博弈论"理论,把业主应对施工方索赔的博弈过程分成"维护自身利益"和"解决索赔争端"两个阶段,建立起两个阶段博弈模型,既而得出了当诉讼(含仲裁)的代价足够小时,博弈双方无论对手选择什么样的行动,自身的最优行动为诉讼(含仲裁)等结论。最后,本文通过基于博弈推演的结论,从项目业主方的角度提出了三条"变防范为主动"的应对索赔工作优化措施,并通过案例进行了验证。
[Abstract]:The construction project has the characteristics of large scale, high investment, long construction period, many construction nodes, unknown risks, strong management skills and so on. In the construction process, along with the dynamic changes of social and economic environment, the factors influence, All stakeholders of construction projects are faced with unpredictable and uncertain risks at any time. With the increasing downward pressure on China's economy and the appearance of a situation of weak investment growth, the competition between domestic project construction contracting and contracting market is increasingly fierce. "the low price won the bid. The "high claim" has become the measure taken by the project construction party to win the bid, using the defects of the project owner in dealing with the low level of claim management and inexperience to achieve the ultimate goal of profiting profiteering. Therefore, for the project owners, to sum up and improve the experience of claim work is not only a question of whether or not the ideology attaches importance to it. It is also an important thing whether the settlement price of project can be controlled within the reasonable scope of the plan, which involves the success or failure of the project investment. From the point of view of the owner of the project, this paper studies the claims made by the construction party and the owner of the project about the losses caused by the interference events and the problems in the work of responding to the claims through the course of the performance of the contract of the project. First of all, this paper defines the claims for engineering projects, and describes the role, classification and characteristics of the claims. Then, the work contents, implementation principles and dispute settlement methods of project owners' claims are studied in detail, and the common problems of project owners' claims are analyzed. Subsequently, this paper introduces the "game theory" theory in economics, and divides the game process of owner's response to the construction party's claim into two stages: "safeguarding their own interests" and "resolving the claim dispute", and sets up two-stage game model. It is concluded that when the cost of litigation (including arbitration) is small enough, the optimal action of both sides of the game is litigation (including arbitration) no matter what action the opponent chooses. Finally, based on the conclusion of game deduction, this paper puts forward three optimization measures to deal with the claim from the point of view of the owner of the project, and validates it by a case.
【学位授予单位】：广西大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.92;F224.32

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