多种种群的演化博弈模型相关问题研究
发布时间：2019-05-19 07:22
【摘要】：演化博弈论研究的是竞争个体之间相互作用的模型,它广泛应用于生物学,经济学,和其他社会科学等方面.现阶段,研究的博弈主要都被建模在单种群的生态学方面,单种群演化博弈模型的研究可以解决一个大的种群中个体之间存在矛盾、竞争和合作等问题,然而,不同的生物种群中的个体也可能会相互作用,并且这种现象在实际生活中更为普遍,通过研究多种群的演化博弈理论可以对生态演化、自组织涌现行为、网络化系统、经济动力学等多方面的研究起到强大的作用.因此研究多个种群的演化博弈模型是一件非常有意义的工作.本文共分为四章.第一章绪论主要论述了本文的研究背景、研究意义、目前研究现状、主要内容以及使用工具和创新点.第二章是单种群博弈的演化博弈问题研究.第三章是多种群博弈的演化博弈模型研究.第四章是结论与展望.本文的主要研究工作如下:(1)推广了单种群单态演化博弈中演化稳定邻域入侵策略的概念和相关性质,从而解决了单种群二态演化博弈中演化稳定策略的动态可达性问题,并用实例进行了验证.(2)建立了多种群演化博弈模型,将单种群演化博弈模型中相关理论延拓到多种群博弈中,在多种群非对称博弈中给出了演化稳定邻域入侵策略概念,分析了演化稳定策略的动态可达性问题,在突变和自然选择的共同作用下,多种群演化博弈存在一个演化稳定邻域入侵策略.
[Abstract]:Evolutionary game theory studies the model of interaction between competitive individuals, which is widely used in biology, economics, and other social sciences. At present, the game studied is mainly modeled in the ecology of single population. The study of single population evolutionary game model can solve the problems of contradiction, competition and cooperation among individuals in a large population. Individuals in different biological populations may also interact, and this phenomenon is more common in real life. Through the study of multi-population evolutionary game theory, ecological evolution, self-organizing emergence behavior, networked systems can be studied. Economic dynamics and other aspects of the study play a strong role. Therefore, it is a very meaningful work to study the evolutionary game model of multiple populations. This paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter mainly discusses the research background, research significance, current research status, main content, the use of tools and innovation. The second chapter is the evolutionary game problem of single population game. The third chapter is the evolutionary game model of multi-population game. The fourth chapter is the conclusion and prospect. The main research work of this paper is as follows: (1) the concept and related properties of evolutionary stable neighborhood intrusion strategy in single population singlet evolutionary game are extended, and the dynamic reachability of evolutionary stability strategy in single population binary evolutionary game is solved. An example is given to verify it. (2) A variety of group evolutionary game models are established, the related theories in the single population evolutionary game model are extended to a variety of group games, and the concept of evolutionary stable neighborhood intrusion strategy is given in a variety of group asymmetric games. The dynamic reachability of evolutionary stability strategy is analyzed. Under the combined action of mutation and natural selection, there is an evolutionary stable neighborhood intrusion strategy in multiple group evolutionary games.
【学位授予单位】：辽宁师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：O225
本文编号：2480510
[Abstract]:Evolutionary game theory studies the model of interaction between competitive individuals, which is widely used in biology, economics, and other social sciences. At present, the game studied is mainly modeled in the ecology of single population. The study of single population evolutionary game model can solve the problems of contradiction, competition and cooperation among individuals in a large population. Individuals in different biological populations may also interact, and this phenomenon is more common in real life. Through the study of multi-population evolutionary game theory, ecological evolution, self-organizing emergence behavior, networked systems can be studied. Economic dynamics and other aspects of the study play a strong role. Therefore, it is a very meaningful work to study the evolutionary game model of multiple populations. This paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter mainly discusses the research background, research significance, current research status, main content, the use of tools and innovation. The second chapter is the evolutionary game problem of single population game. The third chapter is the evolutionary game model of multi-population game. The fourth chapter is the conclusion and prospect. The main research work of this paper is as follows: (1) the concept and related properties of evolutionary stable neighborhood intrusion strategy in single population singlet evolutionary game are extended, and the dynamic reachability of evolutionary stability strategy in single population binary evolutionary game is solved. An example is given to verify it. (2) A variety of group evolutionary game models are established, the related theories in the single population evolutionary game model are extended to a variety of group games, and the concept of evolutionary stable neighborhood intrusion strategy is given in a variety of group asymmetric games. The dynamic reachability of evolutionary stability strategy is analyzed. Under the combined action of mutation and natural selection, there is an evolutionary stable neighborhood intrusion strategy in multiple group evolutionary games.
【学位授予单位】：辽宁师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：O225
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