奥巴马时期美国参与中美BIT谈判的政策分析

发布时间：2018-05-31 21:24

本文选题：中美双边投资协定谈判 + 双重博弈理论　；参考：《北京外国语大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：双边投资协定(Bilateral Investment Treaty,BIT)是当今世界最主要的双边经贸合作协定形式之一,对于双边贸易往来有着直接的促进和引导作用。双边投资协定谈判不只是外交或商务谈判,其背后是谈判双方所代表的国家利益之间的博弈。中美两国作为世界上经济总量最大的两个国家,互相之间的投资贸易量巨大,也亟需规范的协定来规范双边贸易活动。自2008年起,中美开启了双边投资协定谈判(中美BIT谈判),至今已经过去8年有余,在此期间主要的谈判均发生在奥巴马执政时期。截至2016年11月6日,双方已进行31轮谈判,并已对文本条款和以负面清单为基础进行谈判达成一致,但却仍未能在奥巴马任期内达成最终协议。双方仍在负面清单的规定和准入前国民待遇方面存在巨大分歧。由于中美BIT谈判时间跨度之长、难度之大,也常被中国学者戏称为"第二次入世谈判"。为何双方在谈判中进度会如此缓慢,美方如此不同于中方的谈判立场之后又隐藏着什么样的博弈呢?哈佛大学教授罗伯特·普特南(Robert D.Putnam)于1988年提出的双层博弈理论模型为解释这一问题提供了很好的分析工具。普特南教授认为,每一国家在国际谈判中都会同时面临两层博弈,一层是国家之间的国际博弈,另一层则是国内博弈。两层博弈的合力才最终形成了一国在国际谈判中的立场。本文以普特南教授的双层博弈理论为基础,分析在中美双边投资谈判进程中,美国一方所面临的国内及国际双重博弈情况,并借此探讨这两重博弈对于美方在中美BIT谈判中立场的影响。通过梳理研究,本文发现在美国所面临的第一层博弈即国际博弈中,美国同中国在国有企业待遇问题、准入前国民待遇问题、知识产权问题、透明度问题及负面清单问题中存在很大分歧,这些都是影响奥巴马政府在中美BIT谈判中立场的国际因素;在其所面临的第二层博弈即国内博弈中,谈判权力分配、谈判代理人(奥巴马政府)偏好及国内利益集团所影响的获胜集合都会对美国的立场产生作用,这些则是影响奥巴马政府在中美BIT谈判中立场的国内因素。最后,本文回归到对于本案例和普特南教授双层博弈理论的思考上,回顾在本案例中双层博弈理论的适用情况,并通过笔者在本案例中发现的新情况来为丰富双层博弈理论贡献一份力量。
[Abstract]:Bilateral Investment treaty (bit) is one of the most important bilateral economic and trade cooperation agreements in the world, which plays a direct role in promoting and guiding bilateral trade. Bilateral investment treaty (bits) negotiation is not only diplomatic or commercial negotiation, but also the game between the national interests represented by the negotiating parties. As the largest economy in the world, China and the United States have a huge amount of investment and trade between each other, and there is also a need for a standardized agreement to regulate bilateral trade activities. Since 2008, China and the United States have opened bilateral investment treaty negotiations (BIT negotiations between China and the United States, now more than eight years have passed, during which the main negotiations took place during the Obama administration. As of November 6, 2016, the two sides had held 31 rounds of negotiations and agreed on the terms of the text and on the basis of a negative list, but failed to reach a final agreement during the Obama term. The two sides still have huge differences over negative list rules and pre-entry national treatment. Because of the long time span and the difficulty of the BIT negotiation between China and the United States, it is often called "the second WTO negotiation" by Chinese scholars. Why did the two sides progress so slowly in the negotiations, and what kind of game did the US side hide after it was so different from the Chinese side's negotiating position? Robert D. Putnami, a professor at Harvard University, put forward a two-level game theory model in 1988, which provides a good analytical tool to explain this problem. Professor Putnam believes that every country faces two levels of game in international negotiations, one is the international game between the countries, the other is the domestic game. The combination of two levels of game finally formed a country's position in international negotiations. Based on Professor Putnam's two-level game theory, this paper analyzes the domestic and international double game situation faced by the United States in the process of bilateral investment negotiations between China and the United States. This paper discusses the influence of these two games on the position of the US in the BIT negotiations between China and the United States. By combing the research, this paper finds that in the first layer of game that the United States faces, namely, the international game, the treatment of state-owned enterprises between the United States and China, the issue of national treatment before admission, the issue of intellectual property rights, There are great differences in transparency and negative lists, which are the international factors that influence the Obama administration's position in the BIT negotiations between China and the United States, and the distribution of negotiating power in the second layer of the game, that is, the domestic game, faced by the Obama administration. The preferences of the negotiating agent and the winning set influenced by domestic interest groups will have an impact on the U.S. position. These are the domestic factors that influence the Obama administration's position in the Sino-US BIT negotiations. Finally, this paper returns to the thinking of this case and Professor Putnam's two-level game theory, and reviews the application of the two-level game theory in this case. And the author finds the new situation in this case to contribute to enrich the double-level game theory.
【学位授予单位】：北京外国语大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D822.371.2

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