从政治角度分析社会力量对比与智利税收改革—应用权力资源理论

发布时间：2018-06-01 22:29

本文选题：税收改革 + 智利　；参考：《北京外国语大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：上世纪七八十年代见证了世界经济的转型。七十年代开始的经济减速以及财政收入减少威胁了福利国家模式并促使其对经济政策进行调整。在财政政策领域,较为突出的是税收改革,包括使用增值税、降低收入税等。这些措施的目的是简化税收结构、增加公共收入并提高财政效率。在拉丁美洲国家,税收收入历史上一直处于较低水平,其主要原因是较低的直接税收入。高比例的间接税以及低比例的直接税不仅限制了政府调整经济的能力,也损害了再分配以及社会公正。鉴于税收对于财政平衡和社会发展的重要性,研究税收政策的决定因素是很有意义的。直到不久之前,同很多拉美国家一样,智利的税收收入中直接税占比较低而增值税占比较高。2001年的税收改革试图转变这一结构,然而最终结果仅仅是企业税的微调。然而,从2010年开始,智利的税收改革开始发生变化:直接税收入和增值税收入在总税收中的占比开始趋同。长期以来的改革困境和近年来改革进程的突然提速都是值得研究并需要合理的解释的现象。探明决定税收结构改变和决定改革进程的因素对于其他国家具有借鉴意义。应用权力资源理论,我的论文认为商业集团和民众之间的力量对比是决定税收改革结果的因素。这两个群体对于财政政策有不同的偏好,并拥有不同的权力资源。当提高财政收入、开展税收改革的必要性出现时,商业组织更希望增加增值税而非企业税。而民众则更希望增加企业税,并避免增加增值税。如果税收改革进入了政治议程,双方都将用自己具有的权力资源来达到自己的目标、影响改革的进程和结果。商业组织拥有工具性权力,即政治力量。他们通过同政客和政党的联系以及运用自己的金钱资源来增强其工具性权力。另一种权力资源是结构性权力,即威胁减少投资、影响经济发展的能力。在民众的权力资源方面,在民主政体中,民众拥有选举权带来的权力,即选出支持再分配的左翼政府。民众还拥有社会动员的权力,即开展抗议活动、罢工、动乱的能力,直接对政府施压。当权力对比有利于商业组织时,税收改革将十分有限,尤其是增加直接税的改革;当权力对比有利于民众时,改革幅度将更大且具有再分配的效果。为证明这一论点,我将运用对比案例研究的方法。研究同一个国家不同时期的改革可以控制历史、文化、制度等变量。两个案例分别为2001年和2014年税收改革。使用的数据包括学者做过的访谈、国会文件、商业组织的备忘录等。此外我参考民族志作品来了解智利社会运动的变化。最后,参考媒体报道和报告用以了解改革进程。在2001年,由于威权政府时期的制度遗留,商业组织的工具性权力较强,由于经济减速,其结构性权力也较强。另一方面,由于选举制度不利于民众的代表性,民众的选举权带来的权力较弱;同时,由于民主转型的去动员化效果,民众的社会动员能力也处于较弱水平。双方力量对比有利于商业组织,因而2001年大幅增加直接税的改革难以进入政治议程,改革幅度较小。相反,在2014年,税收改革进程突然提速,并损害了商业组织的核心利益。商业组织的权力虽然有小幅下降,但并不明显。因而,这一结果主要是由于民众力量的增加。中左翼在2013年选举中同时控制了行政权和立法权,同时,2011年开始的社会运动改变了智利的历史进程并重塑了政治议程。这两个案例不同结果之间的对比支持了我的假说。论文主要有两个贡献。首先,我的理论相比于现有理论更具有解释力。我的理论能够解释同一个国家不同时期改革的不同结果,并有助于理解政治是如何影响经济政策的。其次,我的理论不否认制度的影响,但是却提出了解释制度变化的假说。根据我的论点,制度本身即是社会力量对比的结果。力量对比在短期内的浮动不会对制度造成大的影响。然而,如果社会力量对比发生了长久性根本性的变化,这一变化会同时造成制度的变革。智利的例子显示了社会力量的变化是如何同时导致了制度的改变和政策结果的改变。
[Abstract]:The 70s and 80s last century witnessed the transformation of the world economy. The economic slowdown and the decrease in fiscal revenue in 70s threatened the welfare state model and adjusted its economic policy. In the field of fiscal policy, the more prominent is the tax reform, including the use of VAT, and the reduction of income tax. The purpose of these measures is to Simplifying the tax structure, increasing public income and improving financial efficiency. In Latin American countries, the tax revenue has been at a lower level in history, mainly due to lower direct tax revenues. A high proportion of indirect taxes and low proportion of direct taxes not only restrict the government's ability to adjust the economy, but also damage redistribution and social public. In view of the importance of tax on fiscal balance and social development, it is meaningful to study the determinants of tax policy. Until recently, like many Latin American countries, Chile's tax revenue was low in tax revenue and the tax reform, which was higher in.2001 years, tried to change this structure, but the final result was only the result. However, since 2010, the tax reform in Chile began to change: the proportion of direct tax revenue and VAT income in the total tax revenue began to converge. The long-term Reform Dilemma and the sudden speed of the reform process in recent years are both worthy of study and a reasonable explanation. The factors that make changes and determine the process of reform are useful for other countries. Applying the theory of power resources, my thesis holds that the strength contrast between the commercial group and the public is the factor determining the result of the tax reform. These two groups have different preferences on fiscal policy and have different power resources. When it comes to the necessity of tax reform, business organizations want to increase VAT rather than corporate taxes. People prefer to increase corporate taxes and avoid increasing VAT. If tax reform enters the political agenda, both sides will use their own power resources to reach their own goals and affect the process and results of the reform. Industry organizations have instrumental power, that is, political power. They strengthen their instrumental power by linking with politicians and political parties and using their own money resources. Another power resource is structural power, that is, the ability to threaten to reduce investment and to affect economic development. In the democratic regime, the public owns the power resources. The power brought by the right to vote is to select the left-wing government that supports redistribution. The public also has the power of social mobilization, that is, the ability to carry out protests, strikes, and unrest, to pressure the government directly. When the power comparison is beneficial to commercial organizations, the tax reform will be very limited, especially the reform of increasing direct tax; when the power comparison is beneficial to the people, it is beneficial to the people. In order to prove this, I will use the method of comparative case study to study the reform of the same country at different times. The two cases are the tax reform in 2001 and 2014. The data used by the scholars include interviews with scholars. In addition, I refer to the ethnographic works to understand the changes in the social movement in Chile. Finally, I refer to the media reports and reports to understand the process of reform. In 2001, due to the legacy of the authoritarian regime, the commercial organizations have strong instrumental power, and their structural power is stronger because of economic slowdown. On the other hand, because the electoral system is not conducive to the representative of the people, the power of the people's right to vote is weak. At the same time, because of the mobilization effect of the democratic transformation, the social mobilization ability of the people is also weak. The comparison between the two sides is beneficial to the commercial organization, so the reform of the direct tax increase in 2001 is difficult to enter the political discussion. On the contrary, in 2014, the process of tax reform was suddenly accelerated and undermined the core interests of commercial organizations. The power of commercial organizations, although a small decline, was not obvious. Thus, this result was mainly due to the increase of the public power. The middle left wing controlled both the administrative and legislative power in the 2013 election, while at the same time, The social movement, which began in 2011, changed the historical process of Chile and reshaped the political agenda. The contrast between the results of the two cases supported my hypothesis. The thesis has two contributions. First, my theory is more explanatory than the existing theory. My theory can explain the reform of the same country at different times. The same results help to understand how politics affect economic policy. Second, my theory does not deny the influence of the system, but it puts forward a hypothesis that explains the changes in the system. According to my argument, the system itself is the result of the comparison of social forces. The changes in social forces have changed in a long and fundamental way. This change will also cause changes in the system. The example of Chile shows how the changes in social forces have resulted in changes in the system and the change of policy results.
【学位授予单位】：北京外国语大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D778.4;F811.4

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