农村集体建设用地流转驱动力的博弈分析

发布时间：2018-02-25 22:18

本文关键词： 集体建设用地流转博弈流转驱动力　出处：《西南大学学报(自然科学版)》2015年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在我国现有土地制度的框架下,集体建设用地流转虽不被允许,但流转的现实需求却真实存在.为探究驱使集体建设用地流转的动因,本文运用博弈论,构建博弈模型,从内部因素分析集体建设用地流转的动因.研究发现:(1)集体建设用地转出方、土地使用方及土地管理方在比较利益的驱使下,经过反复的博弈,其最终的混合战略纳什均衡是转出集体建设用地,转向集体建设用地和允许集体建设用地流转.(2)在流转收益分配方面,村集体需根据农村集体正常生活和生产需要来确定两者之间的收益分配比例以及对农户的补偿额.政府在保障农民社会保障和集体经济组织可持续发展的情况下,主要通过开征相关税种获得增值效益.
[Abstract]:Under the framework of the present land system of our country, the collective construction land circulation is not allowed, but the realistic demand of the circulation actually exists. In order to explore the motivation that drives the collective construction land circulation, this paper uses the game theory to construct the game model. This paper analyzes the motivation of collective construction land transfer from internal factors. It is found that: 1) the collective construction land transfer, land use and land management, driven by comparative interests, undergo repeated games. Its final mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is to transfer out of collective construction land, to collective construction land and to allow collective construction land transfer. According to the normal life and production needs of the rural collectives, the village collectives should determine the proportion of the income distribution between the two and the compensation amount to the farmers. The government should ensure the social security of farmers and the sustainable development of collective economic organizations. Mainly through the introduction of related taxes to gain value-added benefits.
【作者单位】：重庆工商大学旅游与国土资源学院;重庆农村土地交易所;西南大学资源环境学院;
【基金】：国家自然基金资助项目(41101568) 重庆市决策咨询与管理创新项目(CSTC2013jccxA0158) 重庆市教委科技项目(KJ120726)
【分类号】：F321.1;F224.32

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