机构投资者的异质性对盈余管理与高管薪酬关系影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-06-28 21:33

本文选题：机构投资者 + 高管薪酬　；参考：《吉林大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：委托代理所带来的公司治理问题，，一直以来都是学术界探讨的热点，也是长期未能得到有效解决的难题。上市公司经营权和所有权的分离必然会导致上市公司的股东与高级管理者的利益矛盾，高级管理者通常为了自己的利益会损害上市公司的股东的权益。在委托代理问题中，高管薪酬激励处于核心的地位，而高管薪酬激励制度的不完善也是公司治理中最为突出的问题。如果上市公司的高管薪酬激励制度不科学，机构投资者是否会作为机构大股东采取积极行动对高管薪酬激励制度的制定与完善进行干预。根据成本效益原理，机构投资者对公司高管薪酬机制进行干预后所获得的收益大于其所付出的成本，机构投资者就会愿意采取积极行动影响高管薪酬制度。最近三十年来，机构投资者在资本市场上不断发展壮大，成为金融领域的新兴力量。机构投资者占上市公司流通股的股份也越来越大，更多的机构投资者逐步成为上市公司的前十大的股东，为解决委托代理问题提供了一线希望。机构投资者作为上市公司的外部治理结构，其主动参与上市公司治理优化能够完善公司的内部治理结构，进一步促进高管努力工作，进而提高公司的绩效。当前中国金融市场上的机构投资者主要包括：券商自营投资、保险公司、社保基金、QFII、企业年金等等，这些机构投资者的投资目标和投资期限各异。不同类型的机构投资者对企业盈余管理的影响显著不同，对高级管理者薪酬的影响也存在很大的差异。本文依据机构投资者与被投资企业是否存在已有的或隐含的影响和不同投资政策对机构投资者投资行为的影响，并且在考虑到中国机构投资者本身特点的基础上将机构投资者划分为压力抵制型机构投资者和压力敏感型机构投资者两类。本文选取沪深两市A股与中小板2007-2013年间的上市公司财务数据为样本，深入研究机构投资者的异质性对盈余管理和高管薪酬关系的影响。实证结果表明，机构投资者作为专业的投资机构，能够发现上市公司治理结构中高管薪酬激励制度存在的问题，并主动的参与公司内部治理结构的改善，在一定程度上也显著提高了高管的薪酬水平。同时，机构投资者也会加强对高管盈余管理行为的监督，在一定程度上减少了高管从盈余管理行动中获得的超额报酬。这一研究结果说明引入机构投资者可以加强对高级管理者盈余管理行为的监督，对解决公司委托代理问题、保证投资者的利益，继而提高社会各种资源的利用效率和效果有着重大的理论和现实意义。
[Abstract]:The problem of corporate governance brought by principal-agent has always been a hot topic in academic circles, and it is also a difficult problem that has not been solved effectively for a long time. The separation of management rights and ownership rights of listed companies will inevitably lead to conflicts between shareholders and senior managers of listed companies. The interests of shareholders of listed companies are usually damaged by senior managers for their own benefit. In the principal-agent problem, executive compensation incentive is at the core, and the imperfection of executive compensation incentive system is the most prominent problem in corporate governance. If the executive compensation incentive system of listed companies is not scientific, whether institutional investors will take positive actions as institutional shareholders to intervene in the formulation and improvement of executive compensation incentive system. According to the principle of cost-effectiveness, institutional investors will be willing to take positive action to influence the executive compensation system. Over the past three decades, institutional investors have grown in capital markets and become new financial forces. Institutional investors account for more and more shares of outstanding shares in listed companies, and more institutional investors gradually become the top 10 shareholders of listed companies, which provides a glimmer of hope for solving the principal-agent problem. As the external governance structure of listed companies, institutional investors actively participate in the optimization of corporate governance can improve the internal governance structure of the company, further promote the hard work of executives, and then improve the performance of the company. At present, institutional investors in China's financial market mainly include: brokerage's proprietary investment, insurance company, social security fund QFII, enterprise annuity and so on. These institutional investors have different investment objectives and investment periods. The influence of different types of institutional investors on earnings management is significantly different, and the influence on the compensation of senior managers is also very different. Based on the existing or implied influence of institutional investors and invested enterprises and the influence of different investment policies on the investment behavior of institutional investors, On the basis of considering the characteristics of Chinese institutional investors, institutional investors are divided into two types: pressure resistance institutional investors and pressure-sensitive institutional investors. In this paper, the financial data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares and small and medium stock markets from 2007 to 2013 are selected as samples to study the influence of heterogeneity of institutional investors on earnings management and executive compensation. The empirical results show that, as a professional investment institution, institutional investors can find out the problems existing in the high management compensation incentive system in the governance structure of listed companies, and actively participate in the improvement of the internal governance structure of the companies. To a certain extent, also significantly improved executive compensation levels. At the same time, institutional investors will also strengthen the supervision of earnings management behavior, to a certain extent, reduce executives from earnings management actions of excess compensation. The results show that the introduction of institutional investors can strengthen the supervision of earnings management behavior of senior managers, solve the principal-agent problem of companies, and ensure the interests of investors. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to improve the efficiency and effect of social resources.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F275;F272.92

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