机构投资者、企业生命周期与会计信息质量

发布时间：2018-09-14 13:04

【摘要】：高质量的会计信息必须真实、准确地反映企业的盈利能力和财务状况,是公司内外部治理机制得以有效运行的基础。首先,高质量的会计信息便于股东对公司进行监督,维护其行使表决权的能力。同时,高质量的会计信息也有助于吸引资金,因为会计信息是投资者的重要决策依据,投资者倾向于选择信息披露质量高的上市公司进行投资。然而,现代企业中委托代理关系使得资本所有者与资产经营者相分离,所有者不再亲自经营企业,使得股东不能够直接观察到管理层的工作努力程度。这种信息不对称给了代理人实现自身利益最大化的可乘之机,管理者为实现自身利益进行盈余操纵甚至会计造假,大大削弱了财务报告的可靠性和信息披露的透明度。另外,许多中小股东由于自身力量的薄弱,无力对抗大股东的信息优势,进一步降低了会计信息披露的质量。而机构投资者拥有的专业信息搜集、分析能力使其能更好地通过透视上市公司会计信息判断公司价值,能持续地对上市公司会计信息进行研究和监督,以便及时有效地发现上市公司在会计信息披露中存在的问题。此外,机构投资者强大的资本实力也能对大股东形成有效制衡,约束大股东自利行为。最后,上市公司对机构投资者庞大资金的需求也倒逼其改善信息披露,塑造良好形象。虽然2006年至今,我国机构投资者进入快速发展时期,初步形成了以证券投资基金为主,证券公司、信托公司、保险公司、合格境外机构投资者、社保基金、企业年金等其他机构投资者相结合的多元化格局。机构投资者不仅在数量和规模上持续扩大,种类上更为丰富,其专业能力和整体质量也日益提升,证券市场投资主体的机构化倾向日益凸显。但是,与西方发达国家相比,我国机构投资者仍不成熟,无论是数量、规模还是投资理念都有差距,因此机构投资者是否能发挥提高会计信息质量的重要作用值得进行深入研究。基于上面的分析,本文首先对研究机构投资者影响企业会计信息质量的相关结论进行了整理和分析,发现国内外专家对机构投资者影响会计信息的效果有着截然不同的看法。接着,本文对相关概念进行了界定,从机构投资者的内涵着手,全面分析了其区别于个人投资者的专业能力、资本实力及规范化的投资行为。然后基于委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和公司治理理论深入剖析了机构投资者能够提高会计信息质量的动因和方式。此外,本文对机构投资者持股比例与会计信息质量之间关系研究并未仅仅局限于探讨了二者之间的简单线性关系,而是进一步深入研究,从企业生命周期和异质性两个角度切入,研究机构投资者持股比例与会计信息质量之间的关系,拓宽了以往研究框架,能够深入揭示二者之间的关系。本文以我国2013到2015年深市A股上市公司为样本,从财务报告可靠性和会计信息披露透明度两方面来研究机构投资者持股比例与会计信息质量之间的关系,并进一步探讨考虑企业生命周期和机构投资者异质性下二者之间的关系。本文研究发现我国的机构投资者总体持股提高了财务报告可靠性,同时提高了信息披露透明度,另外相比于压力敏感型机构投资者,压力抵抗型机构投资者对会计信息质量的影响更大,并且在不同成长阶段机构投资者与企业会计信息质量之间的关系有所差异。
[Abstract]:High-quality accounting information must truly and accurately reflect the profitability and financial situation of the enterprise, which is the basis for the effective operation of the internal and external governance mechanism of the company. Jin, because accounting information is an important basis for investors to make decisions, investors tend to choose listed companies with high quality of information disclosure to invest. However, the principal-agent relationship in modern enterprises makes the capital owners and asset managers separate, the owners no longer run the enterprise in person, so that shareholders can not directly observe the management. This information asymmetry gives agents an opportunity to maximize their own interests. Managers manipulate earnings or even falsify accounting to achieve their own interests, greatly weakening the reliability of financial reports and transparency of information disclosure. In addition, many small and medium shareholders are unable to cope with their own weaknesses. The information superiority of large shareholders further reduces the quality of accounting information disclosure, and the professional information collection and analysis ability of institutional investors make it better to judge the company value through the perspective of accounting information of listed companies, and can continue to study and supervise the accounting information of listed companies, so as to discover the listing in time and effectively. In addition, the strong capital strength of institutional investors can also form effective checks and balances against major shareholders and restrain their self-interest behavior. Finally, the huge capital demand of listed companies on institutional investors has forced them to improve information disclosure and create a good image. In the period of rapid development, the investors have initially formed a diversified pattern which combines securities investment funds, securities companies, trust companies, insurance companies, qualified foreign institutional investors, social security funds, enterprise annuities and other institutional investors. However, compared with the western developed countries, the institutional investors in China are still immature, regardless of the quantity, scale or investment concept, so whether the institutional investors can play an important role in improving the quality of accounting information or not. Based on the above analysis, this paper firstly collates and analyzes the relevant conclusions on the impact of institutional investors on the quality of enterprise accounting information, and finds that domestic and foreign experts have completely different views on the effect of institutional investors on accounting information. Then, this paper defines the relevant concepts, from the organization. Then, based on the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and corporate governance theory, this paper deeply analyzes the motivation and ways that institutional investors can improve the quality of accounting information. The research on the relationship between the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and the quality of accounting information is not limited to the simple linear relationship between the two, but to further study the relationship between the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and the quality of accounting information from the perspective of enterprise life cycle and heterogeneity. Based on the sample of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen from 2013 to 2015, this paper studies the relationship between institutional investors'shareholding ratio and accounting information quality from the aspects of financial reporting reliability and accounting information disclosure transparency, and further explores the relationship between corporate life cycle and institutional investment. This paper finds that the overall ownership of institutional investors in China improves the reliability of financial reporting and the transparency of information disclosure. In addition, compared with pressure-sensitive institutional investors, pressure-resistant institutional investors have a greater impact on the quality of accounting information, and at different stages of growth. The relationship between institutional investors and the quality of accounting information is different.
【学位授予单位】：扬州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275

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