论二战后艾登的对埃政策

发布时间：2018-05-15 11:15

本文选题：艾登 + 埃及政策　；参考：《浙江师范大学》2009年硕士论文

【摘要】： 目前对艾登的埃及政策论述大多偏重于艾登在苏伊士运河危机和运河战争的失败,而对于运河危机前艾登的埃及政策较少提及,本文将艾登在二战后担任英国外交大臣和英国首相(1951.11—1957.1)期间对埃及的外交活动作为一个完整的过程,分析他的埃及政策得失,通过分析二战后艾登对埃政策演变揭示英美两国在五十年代初在中东的合作和冲突以及艾登埃及政策的失败对二十世纪五十年代初英国在中东殖民体系的影响。论文拟从六个部分展开:第一部分是绪论,主要介绍艾登战后埃及政策的研究动态和这一选题的学术价值和现实意义。艾登在战后的埃及政策主要是与埃及围绕英国从苏伊士运河撤军、组建巴格达组织、解决埃以争端和苏伊士运河危机的冲突展开,这些冲突最终导致了艾登在运河战争的失败。他的对埃政策也经历了安抚埃及、限制埃及到敌视埃及的变化,而且伴随着美国与英国两国在埃及问题上的合作和冲突。第二部分主要介绍埃及在艾登的英国中东战略中的地位,艾登把埃及当作英国在中东殖民统治的中心,他坚信只有控制住埃及,才能稳定英国在中东的殖民统治。这使得他的对埃政策有三重目标:让埃及远离苏联,并将埃及纳入到英国主导的中东防御体系中;借助美国、法国等西方大国的力量,压制埃及反对英国的行为,使埃及的民族独立运动对英国在中东殖民体系的冲击降到最低;从经济上援助埃及,并向埃及提供少量的武器,让埃及依赖于英国,从而更好地维持英国在埃及的利益。第三部分主要介绍艾登任外交大臣期间,主要推行安抚埃及的政策。由于二战后埃及国内不断高涨的反英浪潮,艾登继承前劳合·乔治政府和艾德礼政府的埃及政策,一方面艾登极力主张将埃及纳入到西方国家的“中东司令部”中,从而变相地维护英国对埃及的控制。另一方面他主张英国从运河基地撤军来满足埃及独立的要求,从而安抚埃及,同时他通过新的苏伊士运河条约,将英军重新返回运河的可能和纳赛尔允诺在中东发生战争时与英国合作的以法律的形式固定下来。以英埃和解为契机,他积极联合美国,要求以色列作适当的让步来解决埃及的现实威胁,推动埃以实现和解。第四部分是主要介绍艾登如何转向推行敌视埃及的政策。艾登在组建和扩大巴格达组织、约旦问题和援助阿斯旺高坝上,与埃及领导人冲突不断,1955年底,艾登已将埃及视为英国在中东最大威胁。由于埃及与苏联靠近反对英国殖民统治,艾登在格拉布事件后推行敌视埃及的政策。此刻艾登的对埃政策越来越混乱:艾登使埃及远离苏联却由于埃苏武器协定使埃及更加靠近苏联;他组建巴格达组织目的是联合美国限制埃及,却使美国在维护英国中东殖民统治的路上走得更远,而且巴格达组织也成为埃及人攻击的目标;他在经济上援助埃及的目的是换取埃及在中东,特别是在埃及与英国合作,但是阿斯旺高坝贷款却成为埃及发动运河危机的导火索。第五部分主要探讨艾登如何从苏伊士运河危机走向运河战争。为了维护英国在埃及的利益,艾登积极争取美国,以武力为后盾用外交途径迫使埃及放弃控制运河,但是英美之间的分歧和纳赛尔灵活的外交策略,致使艾登在联合国的谈判显得苍白无力,在外交解决运河危机的努力失败后,他不得不联合法国和以色列发动运河战争。第六部分是对全文的总结主要分析影响艾登决策和执行埃及政策的因素,其中美国对艾登的对埃政策影响最大。艾登对埃政策的主要目的是为了维护英国对埃及的殖民利益,这决定了艾登与纳赛尔之间是根本对立的。虽然艾登不断妥协,并放弃一些英国在埃及的殖民利益以换取埃及方面的合作,但是艾登最终走向运河战争。也只有认识这一点,我们才能更好地了解其与前任政府和后任政府的对埃政策既有区别又有某种连续性的特性。
[Abstract]:At present, most of Aydin's Egyptian policy discourse focuses on Aydin's failure in the Suez Canal Crisis and the Canal War, while Aydin's Egyptian policy was rarely mentioned before the canal crisis. This article took Aydin as a complete diplomatic activity of the British Foreign Minister and British Prime Minister (1951.11 - 1957.1) after World War II. The process, analysis of his Egyptian policy gains and losses, through the analysis of the evolution of Aydin's policy towards Egypt after World War II to reveal the British and American cooperation and conflict in the Middle East in the early 50s and the failure of Aydin's Egyptian policy on the influence of Britain in the Middle East colonial system at the beginning of the 1950s.
The thesis will be carried out from six parts: the first part is the introduction, which mainly introduces the research trends of Aydin's post-war Egyptian policy and the academic value and practical significance of this topic. Aydin's post war Egyptian policy was mainly to withdraw the army from the Suez canal in Britain and to form the Baghdad organization, to solve the dispute between the Egyptians and the Suez canal crisis. The conflict unfolded, which eventually led to the failure of Aydin in the Canal War. His policy towards Egypt also went through appeasing Egypt, restricting Egypt to hostility to Egypt, and accompanied the cooperation and conflict between the United States and Britain on the Egyptian problem.
The second part mainly introduces Egypt's position in Aydin's British Middle East strategy. Aydin regards Egypt as the center of British colonial rule in the Middle East. He firmly believes that only the control of Egypt can stabilize the British colonial rule in the Middle East, which makes his policy towards Egypt three goals: to keep Egypt away from the Soviet Union and to bring Egypt into Britain. In the dominant Middle East defense system, the power of the Western powers such as the United States, France, and other Western powers suppressed Egypt's actions against Britain, made the Egyptian national independence movement to the lowest impact on Britain's colonial system in the Middle East, provided aid to Egypt economically, and provided a small amount of weapons to Egypt, so that Egypt depended on Britain, thus better maintaining the UK. The interests of the country in Egypt.
The third part mainly introduced Aydin's policy of appeasing Egypt during the period of the foreign minister. Because of the rising tide of anti Britain in Egypt after World War II, Aydin inherited the Egyptian policy of the former Lloyd George government and the Attlee government. On the one hand, Aydin strongly advocated the inclusion of Egypt into the "Middle East Command" in the western countries. On the other hand, he advocated Britain's control of Egypt. On the other hand, he advocated the withdrawal of Britain from the canal base to meet Egyptian independence requirements, thus appeasing Egypt, and he passed the new Suez Canal Treaty to return the British army to the canal, and Nasser promised to cooperate with Britain in the form of law in the Middle East during the war. Fixed. Taking the opportunity of Anglo Egyptian reconciliation, he actively united with the United States, demanding that Israel make appropriate concessions to solve the real threat of Egypt and promote reconciliation between Egypt and Israel.
The fourth part was mainly about how Aydin turned to the policy of hostility to Egypt. Aydin was in conflict with the Egyptian leaders in the formation and expansion of Baghdad, the Jordan question and aid to the Aswan high dam. At the end of 1955, Aydin considered Egypt the greatest threat in the Middle East. Aydin pursued a hostile Egyptian policy after the grub incident. At the moment, Aydin's policy towards Egypt became more and more chaotic: Aydin made Egypt far away from the Soviet Union but was closer to the Soviet Union because of the Soviet Union's arms agreement; the purpose of the formation of Baghdad was to unite the United States to restrict Egypt, but to keep the United States on the way of maintaining British colonial rule in the Middle East. Further, and Baghdad was the target of the Egyptian attack; his economic aid to Egypt was to exchange Egypt's cooperation in the Middle East, especially in Egypt, but the Aswan high dam loan became the fuse of Egypt to launch the canal crisis.
The fifth part mainly discusses how Aydin moves from the Suez Canal Crisis to the Canal War. In order to safeguard Britain's interests in Egypt, Aydin actively strives for the United States and forces Egypt to give up the control of the canal by diplomatic means. However, the differences between Britain and the United States and Nasser's diplomatic strategy have led Aydin to negotiate in the United Nations. He looked pale and weak, and after the failure of the diplomatic solution to the canal crisis, he had to unite France and Israel to wage the Canal War.
The sixth part is the summary of the full text of the main analysis of the influence of Aydin decision-making and the implementation of the Egyptian policy factors, of which the United States has the greatest impact on Aydin's policy to Egypt. The main purpose of Aydin's policy is to maintain the British colonial interests of Egypt, which determines the fundamental opposition between Aydin and Nasser. In order to understand the difference and continuity between the former government and the later government, we can better understand the difference between the former government and the later government in order to give up some British colonial interests in Egypt in exchange for cooperation in Egypt, but Aydin finally went to the Canal War.

【学位授予单位】：浙江师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：K561.5

【引证文献】