越南统一战争研究(1973—1975)
本文选题:越南 + 北越 ; 参考:《华东师范大学》2007年硕士论文
【摘要】: 本文论述从1973年1月27日巴黎协定签署之后,到1975年4月30日西贡被北越攻占为止,越南统一战争的进程。除绪论之外,,全文共分为五章。 第一章主要论述巴黎协定签订前后南越的形势。美国为了推动越南南北双方签署巴黎协定,向南越保证不会抛弃它,而向北越示意,在一定间隔期后不干预北越对南越的进攻。在此情况下,北越采取了不强调军事进攻的“政治优先”政策,而南越则推行“绥靖蚕食”政策。但事实上,越南南北双方都没有严格遵守协定。协定签署前,双方都力图在停火生效前抢占尽可能多的地盘,以便使自己的控制区合法化。协定签署后,双方也没有遵守停火协定。 第二章主要论述北越在1973—1974年政策的转变。1973年7月的越南劳动党三届二十一中全会上,北越将政治优先政策改为主动的军事进攻。在武力统一的问题上,南方革命者的态度较北方更为积极。1973年和1974年战略计划的制定反映出决策层在战争时间和主战场方面存在的分歧。 第三章主要论述统一战争军事决策的制订以及军事准备。在1974年12月至1975年1月召开的北越政治局扩大会议上,14号公路——福隆战役的胜利促使北越做出了在两年内统一越南的决定。与此同时,北越一直在进行人员物资渗透、后勤建设和军队整编,并发动局部进攻,为统一越南做着军事准备。 第四章主要论述北越发动的三大战役以及南越的崩溃。1975年3月,北越发动了“西原战役”,邦美蜀之战的巨大胜利促使其做出了在1975年雨季来临前解放西贡的决定。在取得“西原战役”、“顺化——岘港战役”的胜利后,北越发动“胡志明战役”,在1975年4月30日攻克西贡,南越政府宣布投降。越南统一战争最终以北越统一南越而宣告结束。 第五章主要分析北越胜利而南越失败的原因。外在因素对战争结局的影响是巨大的。美国抛弃了南越,急剧削减对其援助,坐视其一步步陷入绝境,而与此同时,苏联和中国却一直在经济上、军事上大力支援北越。此外,南越政治腐败、政权腐朽,而北越却斗志昂扬,为了统一不惜付出任何代价。上述原因最终造成了北越胜利、南越失败的结局。
[Abstract]:From January 27, 1973, after the signing of the Paris Agreement, to April 30, 1975, Saigon was captured by North Vietnam. In addition to the introduction, the full text is divided into five chapters. The first chapter mainly discusses the situation of South Vietnam before and after the signing of the Paris Agreement. In order to promote the signing of the Paris Agreement between the North and the South of Vietnam, the United States promised South Vietnam that it would not abandon it, and signaled to the North Vietnam that it would not intervene in the North Vietnamese attack on South Vietnam after a certain interval. Under these circumstances, North Vietnam adopted the policy of "political priority", which did not emphasize military attack, while South Vietnam carried out "appeasement and encroachment" policy. But in fact, Vietnam's north and south did not strictly abide by the agreement. Before the agreement was signed, both sides tried to secure as much territory as possible before the ceasefire came into effect in order to legitimize the area under their control. After the signing of the agreement, the two sides did not abide by the ceasefire agreement. The second chapter mainly discusses the policy transformation of North Vietnam from 1973 to 1974. At the 21 Plenary session of the third Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party in July 1973, North Vietnam changed the political priority policy into an active military attack. On the issue of the unification of force, the attitude of the southern revolutionaries was more active than that of the north. The strategic plans of 1973 and 1974 reflected the differences in the time of war and the main battlefield among the decision-makers. The third chapter mainly discusses the military decision-making and military preparation of unified war. At the enlarged meeting of the political Bureau of North Vietnam from December 1974 to January 1975, the victory of the Battle of Highway 14-Fulong prompted the decision of North Vietnam to unify Vietnam within two years. At the same time, North Vietnam has been carrying out personnel and materials infiltration, logistics construction and army integration, and launched a partial offensive, for the reunification of Vietnam military preparations. The fourth chapter mainly discusses the three major campaigns launched by North Vietnam and the collapse of South Vietnam. In March 1975, North Vietnam launched the Battle of Western Plains, the great victory of the Battle of the United States and Shu led it to make the decision to liberate Saigon before the rainy season in 1975. After winning the Battle of Xiyuan and the Battle of Hue Da Nang, North Vietnam launched the Battle of Hu Zhiming, captured Saigon on April 30, 1975, and the South Vietnamese government announced its surrender. The Vietnam Unification War ended with the unification of South Vietnam to the north. The fifth chapter mainly analyzes the reasons why North Vietnam wins and South Vietnam loses. The influence of external factors on the outcome of the war is enormous. The United States abandoned South Vietnam and cut its aid sharply, while the Soviet Union and China supported North Vietnam economically and militarily. In addition, South Vietnam political corruption, regime decay, North Vietnam is fighting, at any cost for reunification. The above reasons resulted in victory in North Vietnam and defeat in South Vietnam.
【学位授予单位】:华东师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2007
【分类号】:K333.6
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