遏制与孤立：60年代美国对华政策

发布时间：2018-07-03 03:55

本文选题：遏制 + 孤立　；参考：《复旦大学》2004年博士论文

【摘要】：60年代美国政府对中国仍然奉行遏制与孤立的政策，只是策略更灵活，手段更隐蔽。为应对美国的核威胁，中国决心发展自己的核武器。在中国发展核武器的过程中，美国政府一直试图联合苏联或单方面对中国核设施发动先发制人的军事打击，以迟滞中国核计划的发展与实施，即使在中国成功实现第一次核爆炸后，美国仍没有放弃这一想法。对于蒋介石“反攻”大陆，美国政府意识到明确支持或反对都是不利的，因而从肯尼迪到约翰逊政府前期，美国政府采取了模糊立场，一方面同意向国民党提供一定水平的武器装备，另一方面反对国民党发动规模较大的进攻，以使事态始终处于美国的控制之下。这使美台关系一直处于一种适度的紧张之中，它对美国的对华政策造成了很大压力。随国际环境的变化，美国政府开始明确反对国民党“反攻”大陆，但对于台湾小规模的袭击，美国认为它不会导致大规模的冲突，因而并不表示反对或支持。对大使级会谈，美国政府早就决定了参加会谈但不解决任何问题的方针。肯尼迪、约翰逊政府参加会谈的考虑是：平息美国国内外对美国对华政策的批评、把中美对峙的责任推给中国和作为两国联系的渠道。在对待中国在联合国代表权问题上，美国在坚决反对中华人民共和国进入联合国的前提下，其目标和手段都具有灵活性。美国一直视苏联为战略对手，视中苏联盟为心腹之患，但随中苏分裂的发展，美国政府认为中国更好战、更危险和更具有侵略性。因此采取了对苏缓和、而对中国更严厉也是更敌视的政策，，甚至多次试图联合苏联共同对付中国。美国的对外战略目标与具体政策之间出现了不协调。本文认为：遏制与孤立是密不可分的，在一定意义上遏制就是孤立，孤立也是遏制，孤立是为了更好的遏制，是肯尼迪政府的灵活反应战略明确的让非军事的孤立手段承担起遏制的责任，约翰逊政府继承了这一政策。肯尼迪本人根本不愿改善对华关系，他的一些被认为是改善对华关系的言行的动机是不纯的，他根本没有、也不愿意做出真正的努力纠正对中国的遏制与孤立政策，他也没有准备向公众表明对中国应采取更为合理的和现实的政策。本文认为：美国在奉行对华遏制与孤立的政策时，对中国既没有挑战美国的能力、也没有挑战美国的意愿是相当清楚的。中国并不像美国认定的那样更好战、更危险和更具有侵略性。在中美关系中，美国始终处于主动地位，当美国没有改善双边关系的意愿和行动时，中国采取主动措施是没有用的，是不能改善中美关系的。中国的行为只是对美国的一种反应；美国在实行遏制与孤立政策时，所表现出来的灵活性，其意不在改善中美关系，而是意在通过展示灵活性，把不能改善关系的责任推给中国；1966年以后，美国并没有实施遏制而不孤立的对华政策。
[Abstract]:In 60s, the US government pursued a policy of containment and isolation against China, but the strategy was more flexible and more covert.
In order to cope with the nuclear threat of the United States, China is determined to develop its own nuclear weapons. In the course of the development of nuclear weapons in China, the United States government has been trying to unite the Soviet Union or unilaterally face a pre emptive military strike against the Chinese nuclear facilities in order to delay the development and implementation of the Chinese nuclear program, even after the successful realization of the first nuclear explosion in China. The country has not given up the idea.
For Jiang Jieshi's "counter offensive" on the continent, the United States government realized that it was unfavourable to clear support or opposition, so from Kennedy to the Johnson administration, the American government took a vague position, on the one hand, agreed to provide a certain level of weaponry to the Kuomintang, on the other hand, to launch a larger attack on the Kuomintang, in order to make a state of affairs. The United States has always been under the control of the United States. This has kept us and Taiwan Relations in a moderate strain. It has caused great pressure on the US policy to China. As the international environment changes, the US government has begun to clearly oppose the "counteroffensive" by the Kuomintang, but for the small attack in Taiwan, the United States believes it will not lead to a large scale. Conflict, therefore, does not express opposition or support.
At the ambassadorial level, the US government had long decided to take part in the talks but did not solve any problems. Kennedy, the Johnson administration took part in the talks, to quell the American and domestic criticism of the US policy towards China, and to push the responsibility of the confrontation between China and the United States to China and the channels of relations between the two countries.
On the issue of China's representation in the United Nations, the United States is flexible in its objectives and means, under the premise that the United States resolutely opposes People's Republic of China's entry into the United Nations.
The United States has always regarded the Soviet Union as a strategic opponent and regards the Sino Soviet Union as a heart trouble, but with the development of the Sino Soviet Union, the United States government believes that China is better fighting, more dangerous and more aggressive. Therefore, it took the policy of easing the Soviet Union, and more severe and hostile to China, and even tried to unite the Soviet Union against China. There is a lack of coordination between strategic objectives and specific policies.
This article holds that: containment and isolation are inseparable. In a certain sense, containment is isolated, isolation is also contained, and isolation is for better containment. It is the Kennedy administration's flexible response strategy that explicitly lets non military isolated means bear the responsibility of containment. The Johnson government inherits this policy. Kennedy himself is not at all. To improve relations with China, some of his motives which are considered to improve relations with China are not pure. He has not, nor is he willing to make a real effort to correct China's policy of containment and isolation. He is not prepared to show the public that China should adopt a more reasonable and realistic policy.
This article holds that when the United States pursues a policy of containment and isolation, it is quite clear that China has neither the ability to challenge the United States nor the willingness to challenge the United States. China is not as much more aggressive, more dangerous and more aggressive as the United States has identified. In Sino US relations, the United States is always on the initiative, when the United States has not changed. When the willingness and action of good bilateral relations are good, China's initiative is useless and can not improve Sino US relations. China's behavior is only a reaction to the United States; the flexibility shown by the United States in the implementation of the policy of containment and isolation is not to improve Sino US relations, but is meant to be unable to do so by showing flexibility. The responsibility for improving relations was pushed to China; after 1966, the United States did not implement a policy of containment rather than isolation.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：K712

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