美国在苏伊士运河危机中的作用和影响
[Abstract]:The Suez Canal Crisis in 1956 was a complex international event and one of the more important events during the Cold War. Although it lasted only a few months, its causes and processes were complex. The United States played a subtle role in the whole crisis. The outcome of the crisis affected American policy towards the Middle East and the United States, Britain and the United States. The consequences of the development of the relationship between Egypt and Egypt are far-reaching and far beyond the Middle East.
In this crisis, the United States, Britain, France, Israel, Egypt, the Soviet Union and other countries have full performances, although it happened in Egypt, but it is a typical event in the game of great powers. Among them, the United States played a very important balance in the process of the crisis. The United States adopted a peaceful settlement in the Suez Canal crisis. The policy of crisis has made great efforts for the peaceful settlement of the crisis, but its policy has been contradicted by Britain, France and other countries. It has failed to prevent the outbreak of war and has produced unexpected consequences.
The modern Suez Canal was officially opened in 1869, and the Suez Canal Company was founded in 1858. It was then controlled by Britain and France. Arms and weapons, the United States to cancel loans to build Aswan Dam as a means to force Egypt, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, which led to the outbreak of the Suez Canal crisis.
After the Suez Canal Crisis broke out, countries with great interests in the canal made different reactions, and the different reactions of each country paved the way for different policies in the future. Public opinion, the CIA, the President and the Secretary of State made different decisions and had different impacts before the Soviet War broke out. Congress and public opinion did not play a substantive role, but became a tool for the President to oppose the war. The CIA did not provide accurate and fully affirmative information, resulting in the United States Failure to stop the outbreak of war in time limits the role of American peaceful means on the other hand.
After the outbreak of the Suez Canal War, the various departments that influenced American foreign policy-making, including the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the President and the Secretary of State, carried out different foreign policies and practices, which played an important role in the end of the war. The National Security Council of the United States discussed and formulated a cease-fire decision. In the draft, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff provided military information and suggestions, the United States was ready for military preparations, the CIA was accurate in its intelligence analysis of the Soviet Union, and regarded the Soviet threat as a means of forcing Britain and France to surrender. The end played a crucial role.
In Anglo-French aspect, before the war, Britain and France opposed American policy and wanted American support. On the one hand, they negotiated diplomatically with the United States, hoping to win the support of the United States for their military action, on the other hand, they wanted the support of the United States. After the war, under the mediation and pressure of the United States, Egypt had to accept the cease-fire resolution and withdraw its troops from Egypt. Egypt supported the U.S. policy and hoped to alleviate the crisis through the U.S. restrictions on Anglo-French actions. After the war, Egypt resisted fully. The Soviet Union warned the Soviet Union not to use force, the Soviet Union did not want to use force war with the United States, only want to use this war for profit, so no military intervention in the Suez Canal crisis. The balance function made the checks and balances between Britain and France and the Soviet Union changed the trend and outcome of the crisis.
【学位授予单位】:山东师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:K153
【参考文献】
中国期刊全文数据库 前8条
1 武向峰;;苏伊士运河战争前的美国外交决策分析[J];重庆科技学院学报(社会科学版);2008年11期
2 杨冬燕;关于1956年苏伊士运河危机的英美外交史学[J];世界历史;2001年04期
3 兰岚;;20世纪50年代美国的中东政策——从欧米加计划到艾森豪威尔主义的诞生[J];世界历史;2009年01期
4 罗会钧;美国与1956年苏伊士运河危机[J];湖南师范大学社会科学学报;1998年06期
5 温显娟;论苏伊士运河战争中的英美关系[J];历史教学;2003年10期
6 杨冬燕;巴格达条约的形成及其对中东的影响——英美在中东的矛盾与争夺[J];南京大学学报(哲学.人文科学.社会科学版);2001年02期
7 胡才珍;左昌飞;;从苏伊士运河事件看英美“特殊关系”[J];武汉大学学报(人文科学版);2006年02期
8 朱伟东;苏伊士运河战争后英美“特殊关系”的变化[J];西安联合大学学报;2001年01期
中国硕士学位论文全文数据库 前6条
1 杨小林;试析艾森豪威尔政府的中东政策[D];陕西师范大学;2001年
2 冯志伟;艾森豪威尔、杜勒斯与美国外交政策的制定(1953—1959)[D];陕西师范大学;2002年
3 石玉瑶;英国麦克米伦时期外交政策调整探析[D];华中师范大学;2006年
4 褚浩;艾森豪威尔政府对埃及政策研究[D];云南师范大学;2006年
5 汪芳;论哈罗德·麦克米伦与苏伊士运河危机[D];浙江大学;2007年
6 戴中伏;论二战后艾登的对埃政策[D];浙江师范大学;2009年
本文编号:2239625
本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/shekelunwen/xifanglishiwenhua/2239625.html