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哲学直觉的证据地位——认知科学是否有一席之地

发布时间:2018-10-15 16:17
【摘要】:20世纪中叶的心理学研究降低了目击证言证据的分量和强度,实验哲学家通过在受控制的环境系统中测试受访者,同样找到了质疑直觉状态作为可靠证据来源的理由,而一些传统主义者却否认认知科学能够质疑哲学直觉判断的可靠性。我们不应该急于对哲学直觉的错误成分做出最终的判断。一方面,在个人认知的分类形成过程中,还有许多研究需要去实施;另一方面,根据孔多赛的"陪审团定理",一旦我们意识到哲学需要利用群体共同发生的直觉,那么就可以大幅提高直觉方法在哲学上的证据价值。
[Abstract]:Psychological research in the middle of the 20th century reduced the weight and strength of eyewitness evidence, and experimental philosophers found reasons to question intuitive states as a reliable source of evidence by testing respondents in a controlled environmental system. Some traditionalists deny that cognitive science can question the reliability of philosophical intuitive judgment. We should not rush to make the final judgment on the wrong elements of philosophical intuition. On the one hand, there is still a lot of research to be done in the process of classifying personal cognition; on the other hand, according to Condoleezzi's jury Theorem, once we realize that philosophy needs to take advantage of collective intuition, The philosophical evidentiary value of intuitionistic methods can then be greatly enhanced.
【作者单位】: 罗格斯大学哲学系;
【分类号】:B842.1


本文编号:2273083

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