政治关系、市场化改革与股东财富效应

发布时间：2018-03-24 13:49

  本文选题：政治关系　切入点：市场化改革　出处：《吉林大学社会科学学报》2017年05期

【摘要】：结合中国市场化改革的现实情景,从"代理假说"、"干预假说"和"挤占假说"进行对比分析并考察政治关系给公司股东带来的价值预期及其财富效应。通过公司高管变更的事件研究发现,高管的政治关系减少了股东的价值,其财富效应显著为负,但仅体现在市场化高的地方,而在市场化低的地方,高管的政治关系没有明显的股东财富效应。这说明,在市场化高的地方,竞争力比政治关系对公司的发展更重要,但是政治关系会挤占公司对竞争力建设的资源投入,让公司的竞争力遭受损害。研究结论支持政治关系的"挤占假说"。
[Abstract]:Combined with the reality of China's market-oriented reform, From the perspective of "agency hypothesis", "intervention hypothesis" and "crowding hypothesis", this paper makes a comparative analysis of the value expectation and wealth effect brought by political relations to shareholders. The political relationship of executives reduces the value of shareholders, and the wealth effect is significantly negative, but only in places where the market is high, and where the market is low, there is no obvious shareholder wealth effect in the political relationship of executives. In places where marketization is high, competitiveness is more important to the development of the company than political relations, but political relations will crowd out the resources invested by the company in the construction of competitiveness. The results support the "crowding hypothesis" of political relations.
【作者单位】： 四川大学商学院;对外经济贸易大学国际商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71302132) 中央高校基本科研业务费研究专项项目(SKQY201650)
【分类号】：D0;F123.9;F271
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本文编号：1658578