独立董事履职行为与处罚机制研究

发布时间：2017-12-27 09:13

本文关键词：独立董事履职行为与处罚机制研究　出处：《中央财经大学》2016年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：从全球范围内来看独立董事制度是一个成功的制度安排,有效抑制了现代企业两权分离产生的内部人控制和代理问题,构成了现代公司治理不可缺少的环节。自1992年伦敦证券交易所(LSE)颁布条例规定英国上市公司董事会中至少需保留3名独立董事席位以来,随后的7年间至少有18个国家引进了独立董事制度,尤其是在发源地美国上市公司的董事会中独立董事的比例已经达到了70%以上。我国证监会在01年也颁布了《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》,初步规定了独董任职条件和权责范围,由此拉开了中国独立董事制度发展的帷幕。但是在此期间发生了郑百文独立董事第一案,又有北大荒集体哑声等事件,使得独立董事履职行为受到了广泛的质疑和指责,诸如“花瓶董事”、“独董不独立”等报道屡见不鲜。而且最近随着中组部18号文件的出台,资本市场出现了官员独立董事的离职潮,再一次将独立董事制度推到了风口浪尖。因此如何激励独立董事勤勉履职,完善独立董事处罚机制成为规范独立董事履职行为的重要内容。本文在结合已有研究文献的基础上,针对中国上市公司独立董事履职行为和处罚机制作出了本土化深入研究,摆脱了以往研究中广泛借鉴欧美研究范式和思路的模式,扎根中国现实环境考察了独立董事履职行为和处罚机制设计运行中的有效性。文章以独立董事履职行为作为研究切入点,通过探讨独立董事处罚机制中不同层次的作用效果,主要解决以下两个问题:一个是独立董事履职行为与客观环境的调查研究,为后续处罚机制的研究和完善提供现实基础。特别是在我国独立董事制度作为舶来品已经得到了广泛应用和普及的背景下,却鲜有结合我国现实环境和文化习俗对独立董事制度进行本土化研究,这可能导致对独立董事履职行为的正确认知存在偏误。另一个问题则是在评估履职行为和客观环境的基础上,考察现有独立董事处罚机制的合理、有效性,并就如何完善及改进独立董事处罚机制作出系统性研究。具体而言本文的研究内容是通过以下四个方面展开的:首先从独立董事个体出发,通过问卷调查的形式了解我国独立董事在任职过程中的履职行为和客观环境,以便更加客观清晰地描述独立董事履职效果和面临的履职风险状况。我们发现先无论是在人数比例、受重视程度以及信息可获得方面,我国独立董事相对于其他执行董事而言是一个明显的弱势群体,这就导致了其履职所需的资料、沟通、和会议安排都不能到充分满足。表明独立董事履职风险很大一部分来自于不可控的系统风险,无法通过勤勉履职来进行分散。此外独立董事没有投反对票或弃权票经历并不代表履职懈怠,而是体现了董事会决策流程中浓厚的协商制民主文化,真正原因在于企业倾向于在董事会会议前征询独立董事的意见,并事先对有争议的议案进行修订和改正。其次民事责任层面处罚机制作为独立董事处罚机制的第一层次,文章首先通过对构建独立董事民事责任的必要性和困境进行了探讨。接着借鉴美国、英国、德国、日本等国外实施经验,来考察比对中国在独立董事民事责任领域处罚机制的实施效果和现实状况,厘清了独立董事民事责任和保护机制的构建逻辑和内容。提出该层面处罚机制的改进应将诉讼程序和保护机制有机结合起来,当诉讼程序上的便利导致独立董事存在过高的连带诉讼概率时,就搭配种类繁多、覆盖面更广的保护机制,而当保护机制存在缺陷或者应用不广泛时,则提高对独立董事连带起诉门槛。再次文章针对独立董事行政监管层面处罚机制的有效性和缺陷作出了研究。在研究过程中我们以行政处罚事件中独立董事连带受到处罚作为研究切入点,选取2003年至2013年证监会等相关机构作出的涉及自然人行政处罚公告作为研究样本,检验了公司层面和独董个体层面行政处罚机制的合理有效性。发现:(1)行政处罚机制中未督促企业真实有效披露是首要诉因,而且当独立董事未能发现或阻止企业违规运营(担保、关联交易等)会进一步加强其连带处罚概率。证明证监会和沪深交易所行政机构在实践执法过程中合理考虑了违规原因;(2)行政监管机构在对独立董事与董事会成员之间的责任认定标准进行了区分,既保持一定的联系但又有主次,因此独立董事处罚程度认定中保持了一定的限定和比较,显得处罚结果较公允;(3)委员会等履职平台的增加,使得独立董事在保护自身履职中有了更大屏障,证监会和沪深交易所在责任认定时考虑了履职勤勉和忠实的客观环境;(4)沪深交易所在日常执法实践中依旧存在缺陷和不足,执法不严成为改进的重要领域。尤其是在监管污点独立董事在时效内新任职存在重大遗漏,没有做好资格认定和诚信调查的工作,污点独立董事的候选人声明与上市公司的提名候选人声明中存在造假和措辞不当的现象。最后市场惩戒机制作为处罚机制中最难以构建,却又不可忽略的非正式制度。我们在研究过程中首先利用cox生存风险模型检验了污点独立董事的生存时间和影响因素,发现我国独立董事市场惩戒机制是现实存在的,并正在发挥着积极的作用。接着以污点独董在新任职方面的行为表现作为研究切入点,检验了自我风险规避和声誉效应。发现有87.5%的污点独董无法在3年内新任职,而且剩余部分污点独董新任职的企业财务特征要显著优于之前任职的企业。证明了非正式制度中污点独董个体自我修正机制的有效性,此外大多数污点独立董事无法新任职又从侧面证明了声誉机制的存在,意味着污点独立董事无法再受到优秀企业的青睐。最后还以涉案企业作为对象研究了市场惩戒机制的运作机理,发现涉案企业倾向聘用经验较少、资历欠缺的独立董事,导致处罚前后独董履职行为没有显著差异,风险溢价没有得到补偿。
[Abstract]:From a global perspective, the independent director system is a successful institutional arrangement. It effectively inhibits the insider control and agency problems arising from the separation of the two powers of modern enterprises, and constitutes an indispensable part of modern corporate governance. Since 1992, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) regulations promulgated by the directors of UK listed companies will need to retain at least 3 independent directors seats since the next 7 years at least 18 countries to introduce the independent director system, especially in the birthplace of the board of directors of Listed Companies in the proportion of independent directors has reached more than 70%. China Securities Regulatory Commission also issued in 01 years "guidance" on the establishment of independent director system in the listed company, provides preliminary independent director qualifications and responsibilities, thus beginning the development of independent director system Chinese curtain. But this occurred during the first case of Zheng Baiwen independent director, and the Great Northern Wilderness collective mute events such as the independent directors behavior has been questioned and criticized, such as "vase directors" and "independent director independent" reported It is often seen. And recently, with the introduction of Document No. 18 of the Central Committee, there has been a wave of resignation of the independent directors in the capital market. Once again, the independent director system has been pushed to the top of the storm. Therefore, how to encourage independent directors to be diligent and diligent and to improve the punishment mechanism of independent directors has become an important part of standardizing the performance of independent directors. Based on the existing research literature on the Chinese performance of independent directors of listed companies behavior and punishment mechanism made in-depth study of localization, get rid of the western research paradigm and thinking mode of extensive reference to previous research, rooted in reality China examined the validity of the design operation mechanism of independent directors to perform their duties behavior and punishment in. The independent directors act as the starting point, the effects of different levels of punishment mechanism of independent directors, mainly to solve the following two problems: a survey of independent directors behavior and the objective environment, provide a realistic basis for the study and subsequent punishment mechanism. Especially in China's independent director system has been widely used as an exotic and popular in the background, but rarely combined with China's reality and cultural practices for localization research of the independent director system, which may lead to independent directors behavior is confirmed in known error. Another problem is to evaluate the rationality and effectiveness of the existing independent director's punishment mechanism based on the evaluation of duty behavior and objective environment, and make a systematic research on how to improve and improve the punishment mechanism of independent directors. The research content specifically through the following four aspects: first, from the independent directors of the individual, to understand the performance and behavior of independent directors in China in the post process and the environment through the form of questionnaire, in order to more clearly and objectively describe the performance of independent directors and the effect of their risk status. We first found both in the proportion and degree of attention and information can be obtained, the independent director of our country is a significant relative to other vulnerable groups of executive directors, which leads to the information needed to perform their duties, communication, and meeting arrangements are not fully met. It shows that a large part of the risk of independent director's performance is from uncontrollable system risk and can not be dispersed through diligence and performance. In addition, the independent directors did not vote against or abstain from voting experiences do not perform their duties on behalf of the board of directors slack, but reflects strong negotiation decision process system of democratic culture, the real reason is that the enterprises tend to seek independent directors in the board of directors meeting before the opinions, and prior to the controversial bill of amendment and correction. Secondly, the punishment mechanism at the civil liability level is the first level of the independent director's punishment mechanism. Firstly, the necessity and dilemma of building the independent director's civil liability are discussed. Then we learn from the experience of foreign countries, such as the United States, Britain, Germany and Japan, to compare the implementation effect and reality of the punishment mechanism in China's independent director's civil liability area, and clarify the logic and content of the independent director's civil liability and protection mechanism. The level of improvement should be procedural punishment mechanism and protection mechanism of organic combination, when the procedure to facilitate the lead independent director is the joint action of high probability, on the protection mechanism of different kinds, collocation of wider coverage, and when the protection mechanism is flawed or not widely used, is to improve the independent director joint prosecution threshold. Thirdly, the paper studies the effectiveness and defects of the penalty mechanism on the level of administrative supervision of independent directors. In the course of the study we take administrative penalty incident of independent directors jointly and severally punished as the starting point, from 2003 to 2013 the Commission and other relevant agencies to make the natural person involved administrative penalty notice as the research sample, test the effectiveness of the corporate level and individual level administrative punishment mechanism of the independent director. It is found that: (1) in the administrative punishment mechanism, it is a primary cause for failure to supervise the effective and effective disclosure of enterprises, and when independent directors fail to discover or prevent illegal operations, such as guarantees and related transactions, they will further enhance their joint and several punishment probability. Proof of Administration Commission and the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the practice of law enforcement in the process of considering the illegal reasons; (2) administrative regulatory agencies were distinguished in standards between members of the responsibility of independent directors and the board of directors, both keep in touch but there are primary and secondary, independent directors so the degree of punishment to maintain a limited and comparative identification the result is fair is punished; (3) increase the Commission and other duties of the platform, make independent directors have more screen in the performance of their duties to protect themselves
【学位授予单位】：中央财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F271

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