制度背景、高管变更与企业技术创新
发布时间:2018-01-06 20:22
本文关键词:制度背景、高管变更与企业技术创新 出处:《华中科技大学》2016年博士论文 论文类型:学位论文
更多相关文章: 高管变更 技术创新 短视行为 家族企业 代际传承
【摘要】:在我国新常态时期的制度背景下,本文考察高管变更及家族企业代际传承是否抑制了企业的技术创新行为。本文将企业继任高管的绩效压力和治理环境内生于企业技术创新决策模型中,从高管短视行为视角阐释我国技术创新效率低下的一个理论与现实逻辑。通过综合运用包括基于倾向得分匹配的双重差分模型估计在内的诸多定量研究方法进行因果关系的识别,从制度背景层面对因果关系进行全面而审慎地考察,并以家族企业代际传承为高管变更的特殊研究场景进行进一步研究分析,试图为理解新常态时期中国企业技术创新诸多影响因素中的高管行为因素提供一个新视角。研究内容与结论如下:第一,企业高管变更后,在信息不对称和证券市场投资者存在短期资本利得偏好的情形下,继任高管往往从短视行为逻辑出发,放大企业短期盈余以缓解绩效压力,进而削减研究与开发支出,减少技术创新活动。对于变更情形的进一步分析发现,发生非自愿离职的公司,外部引进继任高管的公司,继任者具有较低的管理决策权力或离任高管具有政治关联的公司,高管变更对于技术创新的负面影响更为显著。关于变更情形的进一步考察支持了继任高管在上任之初更容易选择短视投资行为的机制过程推断。第二,对于制度背景调节效应的考察发现,非国有企业、第一大股东持股比例较低的公司、较少被证券分析师跟踪的公司或财务信息透明度较低的公司在发生高管变更后,继任高管受证券市场表现压力影响更为突出,削减研究与开发支出的可能性更大,高管变更对于企业技术创新的破坏作用更为明显。第三,本文提供的经验证据支持了家族企业代际传承抑制了企业技术创新的论断。进一步地,对于经历了代际传承的家族企业而言,具有良好的家族治理、控股权设计、公司治理的公司,代际传承对于技术创新的破坏作用更弱。同时,通过研究代际传承中的不利于技术创新的制度困境,本文发现较差的信息环境会导致代际传承后技术创新能力更为急剧的下降。基于此,我们认为,制度困境增加了代际传承后企业价值滑坡的可能性。最后,本文发现我国家族企业的代际传承确实带来了比较显著的价值损失,而代际传承后技术创新水平的下降在代际传承——价值损失的因果关系中发挥了渠道效应。综上,在我国资本市场有效性不足的情形下,本文提供了金融市场对于实体经济运行存在扭曲效应的证据;丰富了企业技术创新影响因素的研究,验证了一个解释技术创新抑制效应的高管短视行为逻辑;对高管变更的研究做出了贡献,高管短视行为亦可以用来分析高管变更后其它经济后果的内在机制;同时,本文首次以中国大陆家族企业为研究对象,探索代际传承与技术创新的因果关系。我们认为,推进我国资本市场建设,扭转客观上抑制长期价值投入的资本市场倾向,培育有利于企业技术创新的制度环境,对于企业的长期发展和价值创造将产生积极的促进作用。
[Abstract]:In the institutional background of China's new normal period, this paper examines executives change and succession in family business whether inhibition of technology innovation behavior of enterprises. This paper will in enterprise performance pressure and governance environment in the technology innovation decision model of enterprise executives in succession, from a theoretical and practical perspective to interpret the behavior as short logic executives in China technology innovation efficiency. By using double difference identification including propensity score matching based on model estimation, many quantitative research methods of causal relationship, to conduct a comprehensive and careful investigation in the face of a causal relationship from the institutional background layer, and in succession in family business executives to change the scene for special research for further study analysis and try to provide a new perspective for understanding the behaviors of the executives of the new normal period of technological innovation enterprises China factors affecting factors research. The contents and conclusions are as follows: first, corporate executives after the change, there are short-term capital gains preference in the information asymmetry and stock market investors under the condition that the succession executives often starting from short-sighted behavior logic, enlarge the enterprise short-term earnings to alleviate the pressure of performance, and thus reduce the cost of research and development, reduce the activities of technological innovation. For the further analysis of change of circumstances found that the non voluntary turnover of the company, the company executives outside succession, a successor has lower management decision-making power or outgoing executives political association of the company, the high tube negative impact on technology innovation change is more significant. Further investigation about the change situation in support of executive succession in the office at the beginning of more easy to choose the process of inference mechanism short-sighted investment behavior. Second, the institutional background of the regulatory effect of the discovery, the non state-owned enterprises, the first large Shareholding ratio lower, less securities analyst tracking companies or companies with low financial transparency in succession after the change of executives, executives by the securities market pressure effect is more prominent, reduce the possibility of research and development expenditure is greater, for executives to change the destructive effect of enterprise technology innovation is more obvious. Third, the paper provides empirical evidence supporting the family business succession inhibit the enterprise technological innovation thesis. Further, after the inter generational transmission of family enterprises, good family governance, ownership design, corporate governance, intergenerational inheritance for the destruction of technical innovation is weak. At the same time, through the study on the institutional predicament during the succession is not conducive to technological innovation, this paper found that the poor information environment will lead to the intergenerational transmission of technological innovation ability is more urgent after Play down. Based on this, we believe that the dilemma of the system increases the possibility of landslide succession after enterprise value. Finally, this paper found that the intergenerational transmission of family enterprises in China have brought value loss significantly, and the level of technological innovation after the decline in intergenerational inheritance inheritance: play a causal role in value loss channel effect. To sum up, in China's capital market effectiveness is insufficient, this paper provides the financial market for the existence of the distorting effects of evidence of real economy; enrich the research on the influence factors of enterprise technology innovation, proved an innovative interpretation technique suppresses the effect of executives short-sighted behavior logic; contribute to the study of executive changes the executives, short-sighted behavior can also be used for the internal mechanism of economic consequences analysis after the change of executives in this paper; at the same time, Chinese, family Enterprise as the research object, explore the succession and technological innovation. We believe that the causal relationship, promote the construction of China's capital market, reversing the restrained long-term value investment capital market tendency, fostering institutional environment conducive to technological innovation, for the enterprise long-term development and value creation will have a positive role in promoting.
【学位授予单位】:华中科技大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2016
【分类号】:F272.91;F273.1
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本文编号:1389398
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