中国地方政府债务成因、风险及财政收支调整研究

发布时间：2018-01-07 12:23

  本文关键词：中国地方政府债务成因、风险及财政收支调整研究　出处：《中央财经大学》2016年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

  更多相关文章： 地方政府债务 债务风险 财政脆弱性 非对称性

【摘要】：2008年爆发全球金融危机以来,我国出台了积极的财政政策和宽松的货币政策,在国家4万亿投资计划的刺激下,我国地方政府债务规模急剧膨胀。地方政府债务问题成了当前社会公众关注的焦点问题和学术研究的热点问题。从既有研究成果来看,学者们围绕地方政府债务成因、债务风险与债务管理开展了大量研究,并取得了较为丰富的研究成果。然而,对比国内外研究并联系我国债务发展的新形势,以下四个问题还有待进一步深入研究:(1)改革开放三十多年来,地方政府债务经历了怎样的发展历程?呈现出怎样的特征?(2)地方政府债务规模变动成因到底是什么?其影响机理如何?(3)随着地方债务规模的急剧膨胀,其引发的风险到底有多高?如何进行有效的测度?(4)地方财政收支关系如何?财政失衡如何进行调整?随着审计署和地方审计部门对地方政府债务数据的逐渐公开,为学者们研究以上问题提供了重要的基础和依据。基于弥补现有研究的不足,本文以我国地方政府债务形成、发展、风险及其财政收支调整为主线,对以上问题进行了探索与剖析,形成如下基本结论:通过对问题(1)的研究表明,如果根据不同时期我国地方政府在债务内容、风险结构及债务规模的动态变化情况,可以把改革开放后地方政府债务发展过程划分为六个阶段:第一阶段:初步形成阶段,1979-1992年;第二阶段:较快增长阶段,1993-1997年;第三阶段:全面发展阶段,1998-2003年;第四阶段:治理与增长并存阶段,2004-2008年;第五阶段:急剧膨胀阶段,2009-2013年;第六阶段:全面规范治理阶段,2014年-至今。在地方政府债务形成与发展过程呈现了三个显著特征:第一,在债务形成原因方面,债务成因复杂多样,具有明显的转轨经济特征;第二,在债务风险方面,债务风险不断暴露,突出表现为或有债务直接化,隐形债务显性化;第三,在债务管理方面,中央制度模糊导致地方政府投资行为异化,债务规模难于得到有效控制。针对问题(2)的研究,本文侧重于制度视角,从财政体制、政治体制及财政政策三个方面对我国地方政府债务成因进行了理论与实证分析。基于财政体制的分析表明,我国地方政府债务形成与发展的路径与我国财政制度的安排与变迁紧密相关,尤其是分税制改革后,财权的上收与事权的下放造成了我国地方政府财政困难,地方政府承担了大量的本应由中央政府承担的支出。但2005年以后,随着公共财政体制的完善及转移支付制度的规范,地方政府财政状况得到明显改善,从支出权的角度看,地方政府财权与事权并不存在明显的不匹配问题。因此,地方政府巨额债务的积累已经不能完全从财政体制方面得到充分地解释。基于政治体制的分析表明,我国财政分权下的政治集权体制是我国地方政府债务规模不断膨胀的重要原因。在单一政治体制下,地方政府官员的仕途取决于上级政府。在以gdp为核心的政绩考核体系下,为了政治上的晋升,地方政府间展开了进行激烈的gdp竞赛,通过债务融资进行公共投资以拉动gdp增长成为地方政府竞争的基本手段。而且,我国投融资制度不健全,在现行法律和制度环境下,地方政府面临上级政府、选民与债权人的软预算约束,地方政府投资不断扩张,债务风险不断积累。在实施财政政策的过程中,中央政府将大量的经济稳定职能赋予地方政府是地方政府债务规模不断膨胀的另一重要原因。中央政府为了自身利益最大化,将财政稳定职能分配给地方政府。在财政分权与政治集权环境下,地方政府为了自身政治利益与经济利益大规模举债以进行公共投资,而将债务融资的负担推给下届政府,我国地方政府债务规模在短视政府的博弈中不断增长。通过采用双固定效应空间杜宾模型的实证分析结果表明:第一,从地方政府债务规模的空间滞后项系数上看,出于政绩竞赛思维,地方政府对临近地区经济增长率较为敏感,债务规模的变动也更容易受邻近地区的影响,当本地在以gdp为主要指标的政绩竞赛中落后时,对外地政府债务变动的反应系数为0.705,而当本地在政绩竞赛中领先时,该系数为0.322。因此,基于政绩考核下的政府竞争是地方政府债务规模不断扩张的重要原因。第二,就解释变量系数而言,财政分权、城镇化水平以及产业结构都对地方政府债务规模的变动有正向推动作用。而各地财政透明度与地方政府债务变动呈显著的反向变动关系。第三,在解释变量空间滞后项回归系数看:本地政府债务规模易受到临近地区的财政分权、城镇化水平以及产业结构的的正向影响。针对问题(3)的研究,本文依据审计部门公布的相关数据,对我国地方政府债务的直接风险和引致风险进行了评估。基于常规评价指标如负债率、债务率以及偿债率对地方政府债务的直接风险的评估表明,我国地方政府负债率如果以25%为地方政府负债率警戒线的上限的话,2009年至今,我国地方政府债务规模一直处于警戒线以上。分省份看,截止到2013年底,在30个省份中,只有6各地区的的负债率位于25%水平以下外,基本分布在东部发达地区,中部地区以及东北三省的债务负担水平普遍处于25%-40%之间,而全国债务率较高的省份基本位于经济欠发达的西部地区。可见,我国地方政府债务局部区域风险偏高。如果仅以地方公共财政收入计算地方财力,我国地方政府债务率2009年开始突破了150%的警戒线。如果把预算外收入和政府性基金收入纳入地方财力的话,我国地方政府债务率还保持在150%的警戒线以内。如果按地方公共财政收入测算偿债率,2014年总债务的偿债率为30.02%,政府负有偿还责任的债务偿债率约为28.88%,二者都超过了20%的国际警戒线。如果按照地方总收入计算债务率,2014年总债务偿债率约为20.05%,政府负有偿还责任的债务偿债率约为19.29%,也已接近20%的警戒线。除了现实偿债风险外,过高的地方政府债务规模,会带来政府公共债务规模的激增,从而增加财政脆弱性,使得财政政策不可持续。地方政府债务会掣肘国家宏观经济政策。本文结合公共债务动态模型,在区分结构性成分和周期性成分基础上,提出一种评估财政脆弱性的新方法。利用该方法研究表明,2008以来,为应对全球性金融危机对我国经济的冲击,大量地方政府债务的不断增加,财政收支结构矛盾进一步突出,使得财政脆弱性进入了一个新的高度。如果将脆弱度指数的均值加上一个标准差之和作为“极度脆弱”的临界值,那么2009年至今我国财政就一直处于“极度脆弱”状态。因此,应进一步控制债务规模总量和赤字规模,避免我国财政出现流动性和偿债能力风险。综上研究表明,无论从偿债能力,还是对宏观经济政策的影响来看,地方政府债务风险已经比较严重,债务风险化解亟待解决。针对问题(4)的研究,本文认为我国地方财政收支关系会受到生产力发展水平、市场化程度和财政体制改革等诸因素的影响。进一步的实证研究表明,1978-1993年,地方财政收支呈现相互影响关系,满足“同步”假说,1994-2014年存在“以支定收”的单向因果关系,研究表明这种财政调整模式对经济增长更为有利(alesinaandperotti,1996;agnelloetal.,2014)。在1994-2014年样本期间,利用非线性自回归分布滞后模型(nardl)模型还检验出了地方财政支出对地方财政收入具有非对称调整特征。即地方财政支出每上升1%,会引起地方财政收入上升3.974%;而地方财政支出每下降1%,则会引起地方财政收入下降5.721%。这意味着地方财政支出对财政收入的负向变动的影响更大。本文认为财政收支非对称调整的原因在于经济周期的非对称、政府对待财政失衡的不同态度、纳税人对税收变化的敏感性不同以及税种对宏观经济的敏感程度不同。本文的创新之处主要体现在:第一,在地方政府债务成因研究方面,本文考虑了地方政府的举债行为所产生的显著空间效应,并采用了两区制双固定效应空间杜宾模型识别出了地方政府债务融资的空间溢出效应。研究表明:当本地政府在政绩竞赛中落后时,对外地政府债务变动的反应系数较领先时更为敏感。第二,在财政风险的测度方面,不仅利用常规的债务风险判断指标(如债务率、负债率以及偿债率)对地方政府债务的直接风险进行了研究,同时还在区分周期性预算与结构预算基础上,通过构建财政脆弱性指标来识别地方政府债务的引致风险,即包括地方政府债务在内的债务规模的不断增加对财政政策可持续性产生的影响。这有利于政府全面把握地方政府债务风险,为宏观经济政策的制定与调整提供帮助。第三,考虑到宏观经济变量间的非线性特征的存在,本文采用了非线性ARDL模型对我国改革开放以来的地方财政收支关系进行了检验,并识别出在分税制改革后,我国地方财政失衡调整具有非对称调整的特征。并从经济周期的非对称、政府对待财政失衡的不同态度、纳税人对税收变化的不同敏感性以及税种对宏观经济的不同敏感程度等四方面进行了原因解释。这对于控制财政赤字,防范债务风险具有重要的意义。
[Abstract]:Since the 2008 outbreak of the global financial crisis, China has introduced a proactive fiscal policy and loose monetary policy in the national 4 trillion plans to stimulate investment, local government debt scale in China. The rapid expansion of local government debt issues become the focus of the current public concern hot issues and academic research of the existing research. Results, scholars around the origin of local government debt, debt risk and debt management to carry out a lot of research, and have made abundant achievements. However, compared with domestic and foreign research and the new situation in China debt development, the following four problems need to be further studied: (1) thirty years of reform and opening up the local government debt, experienced how the development process? Show how? (2) what is the change in the size of local government debt causes? Its impact mechanism (3) with? The rapid expansion of the scale of local debt, the risk caused by how high? How to carry out effective measures? (4) how the local fiscal revenue fiscal imbalance relationship? How to adjust? With the audit office and local audit department of the local government debt data gradually open, provides the foundation and basis for the research scholars more than compensate for the lack of existing research. Based on the development of this form, with China's local government debt risk, and fiscal adjustment, the above problems are explored and analyzed, the conclusions are as follows: Based on the problem by (1) study shows that if according to the different period of China's local government debt the dynamic changes of content, structure and size of the debt risk, the local government debt after the reform and opening up the development process is divided into six stages: the first stage: the initial stage, 1979-1992 Years; the second stage: rapid growth stage, 1993-1997 years; the third stage: the stage of comprehensive development, 1998-2003; the fourth stage: the coexistence of governance and growth stage, 2004-2008 years; the fifth stage: the rapid expansion phase, 2009-2013 years; the sixth stage: a comprehensive governance stage since 2014. With the development process had three significant characteristics formed in the local government debt causes: first, in terms of debt, debt causes are complex and diverse, with obvious characteristics of transition economy; second, the debt risk, debt outstanding performance is constantly exposed to the risk of debt or direct contact, explicit debt; third in debt management, the fuzzy system the local government investment behavior alienation, the size of the debt is difficult to be controlled. In order to solve the problem (2) of the study, this paper focuses on the perspective of the system, from the financial system, political system and financial policies of the three party Facing the causes of China's local government debt through the theoretical and empirical analysis. The analysis shows that the financial system is based on the arrangement and change the path of formation and development of China's local government debt and the fiscal system of China are closely related, especially after the tax system reform, decentralization of powers and taking the result of local government financial difficulties I in China, the local government has undertaken a lot of the central government should bear the expenses. But after 2005, with the improvement of the transfer payment system and public finance system norms, local government financial situation improved significantly, from the perspective of spending power, local government financial authority and powers does not exist, not obvious. Therefore, local the government has accumulated huge debts can not be fully explained from the financial system. Based on the analysis of political system shows that, under fiscal decentralization in China Politics Centralized system is an important reason for the local government debt scale in China expanding. In a single political system, local government officials of the career depends on the higher levels of government. In the GDP as the core of the performance evaluation system, to promote the political, local government launched a fierce competition for GDP, through debt financing public investment to boost GDP growth has become the basic method of local government competition. Moreover, China's investment and financing system is not perfect, in the current legal and institutional environment, local governments face higher levels of government, the soft budget constraint of voters and creditors, local government investment expansion, debt risks continue to accumulate. In the process of the implementation of fiscal policy the central government will, the function of economic stability a lot of local government is another important reason of local government debt scale expanding. The central government in order to maximize their own interests, The financial stability function assigned to the local government. In the fiscal decentralization and political centralization environment, local government debt to large-scale public investment for their own political and economic interests, and the burden of debt financing will be pushed to the next government, China's local government debt scale growing in game short-sighted government. Through empirical analysis by fixed effect spatial Durbin model results show that: first, a coefficient from the point of view of local government debt scale spatial lag, competition for political thinking, the local government is sensitive to the rate of economic growth of neighboring region, the size of the debt changes are more easily influenced by the neighboring regions, when local backward with GDP as a main index the performance of the competition, the government debt to change reaction coefficient is 0.705, and when the local leader in the performance competition, the coefficient of 0.322. because of this, based on the government The performance evaluation of government competition is an important reason for the local government debt scale expansion. Second, as the explanatory variable coefficient, fiscal decentralization, changes in the level of urbanization and industrial structure are on the scale of local government debt has a positive role in promoting. Throughout the fiscal transparency and local government debt changes significantly reverse changes in the relationship. Third and lag regression coefficients in the explanatory variable space: the local government debt scale in vulnerable areas close to the fiscal decentralization, the level of urbanization and industrial structure positive influence. Aiming at the problem of (3) research, data released on the basis of the audit department, directly risk and risk caused on the debt of local government in China is evaluated. The conventional evaluation indicators such as the debt ratio based on the debt ratio and debt service ratio directly on risk assessment of local government debt that China's local government If the debt ratio to 25% for the local government debt ceiling rate warning line of words, since 2009, the local government debt scale in China has been in a line above. The look of the provinces by the end of 2013, in 30 provinces, only 6 of the region's debt ratio is below 25%, the basic distribution in the eastern region, central region and the northeast of the debt burden level is generally in the range of 25%-40%, while the national debt rate higher provinces basically located in the underdeveloped western regions. Therefore, China's local government debt risk of local area high. If only by local public finance revenue in local finance, China's local government debt rate in 2009 to break the warning line of 150%. If the budget income and income from government funds into the local financial resources, China's local government debt is still growing at a rate of 150% of the cordon. If the local public finance revenue debt rate, 2014 total debt repayment rate is 30.02%, the government bears the responsibility to repay the debt repayment rate is about 28.88%, two more than 20% of the international warning line. If the total income calculated in accordance with the local debt rate, 2014 total debt repayment rate is about 20.05%, the government bears the responsibility to repay the debt repayment rate is about 19.29%, has nearly 20% of the cordon. In addition to the real risk of debt is too high, the size of local government debt, will bring a surge in the size of the public debt of the government, so as to increase the financial fragility, the fiscal policy is not sustainable. The local government debt constraints of national macroeconomic policies. Combining the public the debt dynamic model, the distinction between structural components and periodic components of the foundation, proposed a new method to assess the financial fragility. Based on this method shows that, since 2008, in response to the full The impact of global financial crisis on China's economy, the increasing number of local government debt, fiscal expenditure structure further highlight the contradiction, the financial fragility has entered into a new height. If the average vulnerability index plus one standard deviation as a "critical value fragile", so since 2009 China's finance has been in a very fragile state. Therefore, we should further control the size of the total debt and the size of the deficit, to avoid China's financial liquidity and solvency risk. In conclusion, in terms of solvency, or the impact on macro economic policy, local government debt risk has been more serious, debt risk resolve to be solved. In order to solve the problem (4) of the study, this paper argues that China's local finance relations will be the development of productive forces, the degree of marketization and the reform of the financial system. Influence of various factors. Further research shows that 1978-1993, showing the interaction between the local fiscal revenue and expenditure, to meet the "synchronization" hypothesis, 1994-2014 "to support fixed income one-way causal relationship, studies show that the fiscal adjustment mode of economic growth is more favorable (alesinaandperotti, 1996; agnelloetal., 2014). During the 1994-2014 sample, using nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag model (nardl model) is a test of local fiscal expenditure has the characteristics of asymmetric adjustment of local fiscal revenue. The local fiscal expenditure increased by 1%, will cause the local fiscal revenue increased by 3.974%; and local fiscal expenditure decreased by 1% each, will cause the local fiscal revenue this means that the decline of 5.721%. effect of local fiscal expenditure on fiscal revenue negative changes greater. This paper argues that fiscal balance of asymmetric adjustment because of the economic cycle Non symmetrical period, different attitudes towards government fiscal imbalances, the sensitivity of taxpayers to tax changes and tax on the different sensitivity of macro economy. The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in: first, in the study of the causes of local government debt, considering the significant spatial effect generated by the behavior of local government debt, and the identification of the two district fixed effect spatial Durbin model the spatial spillover effect of local government debt financing. The study shows that when the local government performance in the backward race, foreign government debt changes the reaction coefficient ahead is more sensitive. Second, in the measure of financial risk, not only by the debt risk index for judging the conventional (such as debt ratio, debt ratio and debt ratio) direct risk of local government debt is studied, at the same time also distinguish between cyclical and budget Based on the structure of the budget, to identify local government debt risk caused by constructing financial vulnerability indicators, including local government debt, the debt increasing impact on the sustainability of fiscal policy. This helps the government to comprehensively grasp the local government debt risk, to provide help for the formulation and adjustment of macroeconomic policies. Third, considering the nonlinear characteristics between macroeconomic variables exist, this paper adopts nonlinear ARDL model of China's reform and opening up of the local financial revenue and expenditure were identified in the test, and after the tax reform, characteristics of China's local fiscal imbalance adjustment with asymmetric adjustment. And from the asymmetric economic cycle the government, different attitudes toward fiscal imbalances, four of taxpayers to tax changes are different in sensitivity and taxes on the macro economy different sensitive degree The reason is explained, which is of great significance to control the fiscal deficit and to prevent the debt risk.

【学位授予单位】：中央财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F812.5
，

本文编号：1392532