双重股权结构下上市公司股东权利保护机制研究

发布时间：2018-06-25 19:41

本文选题：双重股权结构 + 一股一权　；参考：《海南大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：为了解决国内企业创始人对公司强烈的控制欲望和融资需求之间日益加剧的矛盾,国内如百度、京东、阿里巴巴等知名企业纷纷选择在美国证券交易所完成IPO,体现了同股同权已经无法满足我国部分企业的融资需求。然而双重股权结构下存在的复数表决权股与一般表决权股股东利益失衡问题可能导致股东权益受损,以及我国有待完善的公司治理配套制度,使得我国引入双重股权结构面临困难。本文为研究双重股权结构下存在的股东利益失衡问题,通过观察国外政府和上市公司的应对措施,即如何通过限制复数表决权股的发行方式和流转渠道、为复数表决权股所附着的表决权设定最高上限等手段来均衡不同类别股股东的利益,并结合我国已有法律规范和证券市场实践,最终为我国在引入双重股权结构时如何保护股东权益提出建议。本文分为四个部分,具体内容分述如下:第一部分阐述了双重股权结构的含义、特征及常见的表现形式,认定其本质是公司通过发行复数表决权股将表决权集中在特定股东手中,以达到控制公司的目的的工具。第二部分对我国引入双重股权结构进行利弊分析。引入双重股权结构对我国的有益性主要体现为:1.双重股权结构能够解决股东"异质化"现实与一股一权结构之间的供给错位;2.双重股权结构的引入能够更好的满足我国企业的融资需求;3.双重股权结构能够为企业家发挥创新精神保驾护航。而引入双重股权结构对我国可能造成的不利影响主要来源于该结构本身存在的股东利益失衡问题,主要包括:1.损害了一般表决权股持有人的表决能力;2.降低了控制股东的表决意愿;3.增加了股东的投资风险。第三部分通过观察双重股权结构的域外实践,陈述了美国、法国、日本和加拿大为保护股东权利免受双重股权结构弊端的侵害,通过立法、证券监管机构以及上市公司自身对复数表决权股的发行、流转和表决权倍数进行限制,希望对我国的制度建设有借鉴意义。第四部分阐述了我国引入双重股权结构时,应以有限授权为设计思路,以保护股东权益为目的,从制度设计和完善配套制度建设这两个角度对我国构建双重股权结构时如何保护股东权利提出建议。
[Abstract]:In order to solve the growing contradiction between the strong desire of the founders of domestic enterprises to control the company and the need for financing, domestic companies such as Baidu, JingDong, Alibaba and other well-known enterprises have chosen to complete IPOs on the American Stock Exchange, which shows that the same share and equal rights can no longer meet the financing needs of some enterprises in China. However, the imbalance between the interests of the multiple voting shares and that of the general voting shares under the dual ownership structure may lead to the loss of shareholders' rights and interests, as well as the system of corporate governance that needs to be improved in our country. It is difficult to introduce dual ownership structure into our country. In order to study the unbalance of shareholders' interests under the dual ownership structure, this paper observes the countermeasures of foreign governments and listed companies, that is, how to restrict the issuance and circulation channels of plural voting shares. Setting the highest upper limit for the voting rights attached to the plural voting shares to balance the interests of the shareholders of different classes of shares, and combining the existing legal norms and securities market practices in our country, Finally, the author puts forward some suggestions on how to protect shareholders' rights and interests when introducing dual ownership structure. This paper is divided into four parts, the specific contents are as follows: the first part describes the meaning, characteristics and common forms of dual ownership structure. The essence of it is that the company concentrates its voting rights in the hands of specific shareholders by issuing plural voting shares in order to achieve the purpose of controlling the company. The second part analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of introducing dual ownership structure in China. The beneficial effect of introducing dual ownership structure to our country is as follows: 1. Dual ownership structure can solve the "heterogeneity" reality of shareholders and the supply dislocation between one share and one right structure. The introduction of dual equity structure can better meet the financing needs of Chinese enterprises. Dual ownership structure can protect entrepreneurs to play innovative spirit. The possible adverse effects of the introduction of dual ownership structure on China are mainly due to the imbalance of shareholders' interests in the structure itself, mainly including 1: 1. Damage to the voting ability of the general voting share holders. Reduced the voting willingness of controlling shareholders. Increased investment risk for shareholders. The third part states that the United States, France, Japan and Canada adopt legislation to protect shareholders' rights from the abuse of dual equity structure by observing the extraterritorial practice of dual ownership structure. The securities regulatory bodies and listed companies themselves restrict the issuance, circulation and multiple of voting rights of the plural voting shares, hoping that they can be used for reference in the system construction of our country. The fourth part expounds that when introducing dual ownership structure in our country, we should take limited authorization as the design idea and protect the rights and interests of shareholders. This paper puts forward some suggestions on how to protect the rights of shareholders in the construction of dual ownership structure from the two angles of system design and perfect supporting system construction.
【学位授予单位】：海南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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