论我国上市公司独立董事独立性的法律规制

发布时间：2018-09-17 14:18

【摘要】：我国上市公司独立董事制度在我国已经确立了十几年之久,但该制度在十几年的发展过程中并没有像我们最初引进之一制度时预想的那样起到应有的作用,反而在双层监督机制下暴露了更多的问题。所以,制度本身虽然在发展过程中有积极的作用,但更多的是这一制度所表现出来的疲软状态。由此,在我国多年来一直受到学者孜孜不倦的研究与探讨,其目的就是为了让这一制度摆脱花瓶的宿命,发挥出应有的作用。而且,公司治理理论的不断完善公司发展的实践也要求我们必须对独立董事制度加以重视。近年来由于股市的动荡不安,对许多上市公司带来了很大的影响,不稳定因素的增多越来越呼吁要有一个强有力的监督机制从法律层面以及实践层面上加以运用。公司法明确规定上市公司必须设有独立董事。正如独立董事的名称一样,独立董事制度的基础就是“独立”二字,失去了独立性的独立董事就是无源之水、无本之木。实践中独立性因种种原因屡屡被破坏,本文试图从独立董事这一制度的本质出发,研究造成该制度在我国缺乏独立性的原因,而最为关键的是找出完善这一制度的良策,并对其可行性进行论证。本文主要由五部分构成。第一部分引言,介绍了选题背景以及选题的意义,同时简要概述了国内外的研究现状,最后介绍了本文的研究方法、研究思路及本文的创新点。第二部分主要是对独立董事一般理论的概述,分为三部分,第一,介绍了独立董事制度的概念、特征、发展历史、以及功能定位。这部分内容是研究的基础,相关概念的清晰可以为以后的研究打好基础。在这部分中独立董事的特征和功能定位是重点。独立董事的特征表现为独立性、兼职性、客观性和专业性。第二,介绍了独立董事独立性的重要意义,该意义又可以从两个角度来分析一是对内,二是对外。第三,介绍了独立董事缺乏独立性有哪些的影响。第三部分,介绍和分析国外主要国家对独立董事独立性的法律规制以及对我国有哪些启示。主要选取了两个有代表性的国家一个是作为独立董事制度创始国的美国,一个是与我国存在一些相似性的日本。通过对这两个国家独立董事独立性法律规制的研究得到了以下四方面的启示:第一,内部制衡与外部制衡相结合;第二,促进利益机制向多元化发展;第三,重视社会评价机制的有效运用;四是市场调节与法律规制互为补充。第四部分,介绍了我国上市公司独立董事独立性的现状、法律规制,以及独立董事缺乏独立性的具体原因。该部分内容从现实入手对独立董事独立性的实态进行了分析,选取典型案例作为引入,具体分析了独立性缺失的几个方面。接下来通过罗列具体的法律或规定对现有的具体法律规制予以分析。最后综合分析上市公司独立董事缺乏独立性的原因:既有法律规定过于笼统,同时也有现实的原因,例如:薪酬机制的不完善以及成本效益的不相对等。第五部分,是关于我国上市公司独立董事独立性法律规制的完善。首先,完善股权结构,通过法律的规定逐步向分散的股权结构转变,在股权结构逐步完善的基础上要抑制大股东对独立董事的控制,加强独立董事对中小股东的保护。其次,划分独立董事与监事会的职责,探讨独立董事制度永远绕不开监事会,要明确二者的职责分工,建立起双层的监督体系和有效的责任追究机制。再次,建立专门机构综合管理独立董事,也就是独立董事的备选机构。第四个方面,完善独立董事的聘用及罢免,关于选聘方面可以尝试引入市场化的竞争机制,而对于罢免程序要通过具体的规定使罢免程序规范有序。最后,关于独立董事薪酬的设想。
[Abstract]:Independent director system of Listed Companies in China has been established for more than ten years, but the system has not played its due role in the development process of more than ten years, as expected when we first introduced one system, but exposed more problems under the double-layer supervision mechanism. It has a positive effect, but more is the weak state of this system. Therefore, in our country for many years, scholars have been studying and discussing tirelessly, the purpose is to let this system get rid of the vase fate and play its due role. We must pay attention to the independent director system. In recent years, the stock market turmoil has brought great impact on many listed companies. The increase of unstable factors calls for a strong supervision mechanism from the legal level and practical level to be applied. The company law clearly stipulates that listed companies must. Just like the name of the independent director, the foundation of the independent director system is the word "independent". Independent directors who lose their independence are the water without source and the wood without foundation. Independence has been destroyed repeatedly in practice for various reasons. This paper attempts to study the nature of the independent director system and the reasons for its existence. This paper consists of five parts. The first part is the introduction, which introduces the background of the topic selection and the significance of the topic selection. At the same time, it briefly summarizes the research status at home and abroad. Finally, it introduces the research methods of this paper. The second part is an overview of the general theory of independent directors, which is divided into three parts. First, it introduces the concept, characteristics, development history and function orientation of the independent director system. The characteristics of independent directors are independence, part-time, objectivity and professionalism. Secondly, it introduces the important significance of independent directors'independence, which can be analyzed from two angles: internal and external. Thirdly, it introduces the impact of independent directors' lack of independence. In the third part, the author introduces and analyzes the legal regulation of independent director's independence in foreign countries and Its Enlightenment to our country. The research on sex legal regulation has four enlightenments: first, the combination of internal and external checks and balances; second, promoting the diversification of interest mechanism; third, attaching importance to the effective use of social evaluation mechanism; fourth, market regulation and legal regulation complement each other. This part analyzes the actual situation of independent director's independence from the reality, chooses typical cases as the introduction, and analyzes several aspects of the lack of independence. Next, it lists specific laws or regulations to the existing specific law. Finally, this paper analyzes the reasons for the lack of independence of independent directors in listed companies: the existing legal provisions are too general, but there are also practical reasons, such as: the imperfection of the compensation mechanism and the inequality of cost-effectiveness. Firstly, we should improve the ownership structure, gradually change to the decentralized ownership structure through the legal provisions, restrain the control of large shareholders over independent directors and strengthen the protection of independent directors to small and medium shareholders on the basis of the gradual improvement of the ownership structure. Secondly, we should divide the responsibilities of independent directors and the board of supervisors and discuss that the independent director system can never bypass the supervisors. Thirdly, we should establish a comprehensive management of independent directors in specialized agencies, that is, an alternative institution for independent directors. Fourthly, we should improve the employment and dismissal of independent directors, and try to introduce a market-oriented competition mechanism in the selection and appointment of independent directors. As for the recall procedure, it should be standardized and orderly through specific provisions. Finally, the salary of independent directors is assumed.
【学位授予单位】：河北经贸大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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