光大银行广州分行客户经理薪酬机制研究

发布时间：2018-07-29 13:33

【摘要】：在商业银行中,有效的薪酬激励能够改善银行的资本充足率,提高资产质量,增强盈利能力,也能为银行培育人力资源。同时达到提高银行现实竞争力和潜在竞争力的效果。薪酬激励是指通过薪酬制度的设计和实施对员工进行奖惩达到激励约束目标的一种激励方式。而薪酬设计如果科学合理,可以高效难调动员工工作热情,起到激励作用。客户经理的薪酬机制对商业银行而言意义深远,而设计客户经理的薪酬机制本质上是解决商业银行与客户经理之间的代理问题。相对于商业银行的其它基本活动,客户经理的工作有其内在的特殊性:一方面,客户经理并不在商业银行内部工作,而是在他们各自负责的区域内同客户接触。因而,除非花费奇高的观测成本,客户经理很难观测到客户经理的努力程度。另一方面,除客户经理的努力外,销售业绩还受诸多不确定的市场因素之影响,譬如区域的潜在需求、客户的心理因素、竞争者的战略,以及商业银行的广告策略等。因而,客户经理并不能直接根据销售业绩来推断客户经理的努力程度,这就给客户经理予机会主义行为之机,即出现败德行为(Moral Hazard)。本文首先对薪酬的相关理论进行了概述,对薪酬的构成与作用进行了探讨。然后主要分析了美国、德国和日本的薪酬体系,并对他们的先进经验进行了总结。随后,分析了中国光大银行广州分行客户经理薪酬机制的现状,对目前客户经理薪酬管理办法进行了详细介绍,在此基础上,实证分析了客户经理薪酬水平与我行相关业绩指标的关系,发现目前光大银行广州分行客户经理薪酬水平只同存贷款额的提高有联系,而同银行的其它业绩指标的关系不明显。进而我们认为中国光大银行客户经理薪酬机制安排中存在缺乏长期激励、考核体系不合理等问题。最后,我们设计出光大银行客户经理薪酬机制优化方案,对客户经理的基本工资、绩效工资与福利进行了优化设计,并提出了一些相关的配套措施。
[Abstract]:In commercial banks, effective compensation incentives can improve the capital adequacy ratio, improve the quality of assets, enhance profitability, and also cultivate human resources for banks. At the same time, to improve the bank's real competitiveness and potential competitiveness of the effect. Compensation incentive is an incentive way to achieve the goal of incentive and restraint through the design and implementation of compensation system. If the salary design is scientific and reasonable, it can be highly effective and difficult to mobilize the enthusiasm of the staff and play an incentive role. The compensation mechanism of the account manager is of great significance to the commercial bank, and the design of the compensation mechanism of the account manager is essentially to solve the agency problem between the commercial bank and the customer manager. Compared with other basic activities of commercial banks, the work of account managers has its own particularity: on the one hand, account managers do not work inside commercial banks, but contact with customers in their respective areas. As a result, it is difficult for account managers to see how hard the account manager works unless they spend extremely high observation costs. On the other hand, in addition to the efforts of account managers, sales performance is also affected by many uncertain market factors, such as regional potential demand, customer psychological factors, competitors' strategy, and commercial bank advertising strategy. Therefore, the account manager can not directly infer the degree of effort of the account manager based on the sales performance, which gives the account manager the opportunity of opportunistic behavior, that is, the emergence of moral behavior (Moral Hazard). This paper first summarizes the relevant theories of compensation, and probes into the composition and function of compensation. Then it analyzes the compensation system of the United States, Germany and Japan, and summarizes their advanced experience. Then, the paper analyzes the current situation of the compensation mechanism of customer manager in Guangzhou Branch of Everbright Bank of China, and introduces the current compensation management method of customer manager in detail. This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between the compensation level of customer manager and the related performance index of our bank, and finds that the compensation level of customer manager in Guangzhou Branch of Everbright Bank is only related to the increase of deposit and loan amount, but not to other performance indicators of the bank. Furthermore, we think that there are some problems in the arrangement of customer manager compensation mechanism of China Everbright Bank, such as lack of long-term incentive and unreasonable appraisal system. Finally, we design the optimized scheme of customer manager compensation mechanism of Everbright Bank, optimize the basic salary, performance salary and welfare of customer manager, and put forward some relevant supporting measures.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.3

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