分析句的分析性研究

发布时间：2018-07-01 09:25

本文选题：语言 + 意义　；参考：《山东大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：自康德以来,分析性就已经作为哲学中的核心概念之一被哲学家们广泛地使用。然而,自1951年以来,由蒯因引发的对分析性的批判使得原本似乎很自然合理的分析性概念变的千疮百孔。为了辩护分析性,哲学家们提出了各种方案,这也使得语言哲学在此取得了长足的发展。但是,到目前为止,似乎仍没有一种方案能令人满意地反驳蒯因式的批判。在此背景下,本文从众多辩护分析性的方案中选取了最有希望的基莲·罗素的多重意义方案,并对其进行进一步的批判和修正,以试图说明分析性问题的真正困难并不是因为我们缺少一种关于命题(proposition)的恰当理论,而是因为我们对词的作为特质(character)的意义知之甚少。因此,在语言哲学和认知科学可以使我们对词的特质有更进一步地了解之前,我们对分析性的具体细节只能暂时保持沉默。虽然本文没有给出分析性的具体定义,但是通过把分析性问题归结到词的作为特质的意义问题,使语言获得了相对于数学与逻辑以及经验事实的独立性。本文在结构上分为四章。第一章主要介绍哲学中讨论的分析性问题到底是什么,并对本文要具体讨论的问题做初步的介绍。第二章从思想发展的脉络上介绍基莲·罗素的多重意义理论,并对其理论本身的问题进行批判。第三章修正和重构了基莲·罗素的多重意义理论,并具体论证了在多重意义理论框架下,分析性的对象只可能是作为特质的意义。而且,因为对于特质的具体理解有待于语言哲学和认知科学的进一步发展,所以分析性问题应该暂时悬置。第四章简要讨论了多重意义理论框架下的分析性会导致的哲学后果,包括否认意义幻觉,否认分析性与同义性的等同,以及肯定分析性相对于数学与逻辑的独立性。
[Abstract]:Since Kant, analysis has been widely used by philosophers as one of the core concepts in philosophy. However, since 1951, Quine's criticism of the analytical nature has made the analytical concept, which seemed to be natural and reasonable, full of defects. In order to defend the analytical nature, philosophers put forward various schemes, which made the philosophy of language have made great progress. So far, however, there does not seem to be a satisfactory response to Quine's criticism. In this context, this paper selects the most promising multi-meaning scheme of Killian Russell from many analytical defense schemes, and further criticizes and modifies it. The real difficulty in trying to explain the analytical problem is not because we lack a proper theory about the proposition (proposition), but because we know little about the meaning of the word as a trait of (character). Therefore, until philosophy of language and cognitive science can give us a better understanding of the characteristics of words, we can only remain silent on the specific details of analysis for a while. Although this paper does not give a specific definition of analytical nature, it makes language independent of mathematics, logic and empirical facts by attributing the problem of analytic nature to the problem of meaning as a characteristic of words. The structure of this paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter mainly introduces what analytical problems are discussed in philosophy, and makes a preliminary introduction to the specific problems discussed in this paper. The second chapter introduces the theory of multiple meanings of Killian Russell in the context of ideological development, and criticizes the problems of the theory itself. Chapter three revises and reconstructs Killian Russell's theory of multiple meanings, and demonstrates that under the framework of multiple meanings theory, analytical objects can only be regarded as special meanings. Moreover, since the understanding of idiosyncrasy needs the further development of linguistic philosophy and cognitive science, the analytical problem should be suspended temporarily. The fourth chapter briefly discusses the philosophical consequences of analytic nature under the framework of multi-meaning theory, including the illusion of denying meaning, the equivalence between analytic and synonymous, and the independence of positive analyticism relative to mathematics and logic.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：H0-05

【参考文献】