媒体监督、行政机构介入与管理层在职消费

发布时间：2018-06-19 23:36

本文选题：在职消费 + 媒体监督　；参考：《重庆工商大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：在职消费作为隐性激励的一种方式,适度的在职消费是合理且必要的,例如给高管配备宽敞的办公室,专车等,给予高管一定的物质激励,可以提高高管的威望和工作效率,因此在一定范围里的在职消费可以承担润滑企业日常经营活动的角色。其次,职务消费不同于在职消费,它只是组成在职消费的一部分,本文的在职消费是指超额的管理费用,因为从会计处理角度看,管理人员的在职消费项目大部分都记在“管理费用”科目里,过多的管理费用意味着在职消费的存在。但是在职消费超过一定范围就会增加代理成本,损害股东及其他利益相关者,从而影响企业的业绩和竞争力,这主要是因为在职消费的内容非常繁复琐碎,而且当前会计准则没有出台相关的条例来明确定义在职消费,故对在职消费的会计处理上留有较大的操作空间,从而导致模糊了对在职消费的界定,使得管理者更有能力和动力为自己谋求过度的隐性福利而不是从股东的利益出发,进而公司的管理层在职消费行为往往都超过了适度的范围。此外,从在职消费披露情况看,有一小部分的上市公司披露了在职消费的情况,但是披露的内容都不相同且披露的金额也都有很大的出入。当前对在职消费的研究视角大多集中在公司内部治理机制和法律层面上,但是由于现有法律和制度的不完善,导致结果不是很乐观。因此,本文试图突破原有的研究视角,以媒体监督为视角,寻求外部治理方法对在职消费的影响,并进一步探讨媒体监督影响在职消费的中间路径。首先,本文整理归纳了中外学者相关的研究现状,并结合公司治理的相关理论,委托—代理理论,媒体的相关理论和政府规制理论,进而归纳出媒体监督、在职消费与行政机构介入的逻辑关系并基于三者的关系提出相关假设。其次,选取沪深两市A股上市公司,包括2011年至2015年5年的数据,经过对数据的筛选与整理,进行了回归分析。与此同时,验证了媒体监督对在职消费的影响及行政介入在监督作用中的传导机制。本文共分为六大部分:第一部分是绪论,主要阐述了研究背景与选题意义、研究内容与研究方法和创新点;第二部分为文献综述,主要整理和总结国内外在职消费和媒体监督的相关研究现状;第三部分为概念界定与理论基础,主要对相关概念进行了界定和分析了相关的理论;第四部分为研究设计部分,包括基于理论分析提出了相关4个假设,对变量进行设计和对模型进行构建;第五部分为实证检验,这一部分主要包括了在样本选择和数据来源整理的基础上对样本进行了描述性统计和对本文所提出的4个假设进行检验,并得出本文的主要结论;第六部分为本文结论与政策性建议,主要是针对实证结论提出的相应的政策建议和阐述论文的不足之处与未来展望。通过实证研究分析发现:当年的媒体能有效监督上市公司高管当年在职消费问题,并且上一年的媒体也能有效监督当年上市公司在职消费问题,但是当年的媒体监督较上一年媒体监督对当年公司高管在职消费水平的影响更大。此外,当年媒体监督对国有企业在职消费的影响更大。同时,实证检验了媒体对在职消费的监督作用是通过行政机构的介入实现的,而且国有企业受行政机构的影响强于非国有企业的。
[Abstract]:As a way of recessive incentive, the on-the-job consumption is reasonable and necessary, such as providing the senior executives with spacious offices, special trains and so on, giving the executives certain material incentives, which can improve the prestige and efficiency of the executives. Therefore, the on-the-job consumption in a certain range can be used to lubricate the daily business activities of the enterprises. Secondly, the job consumption is different from the on-the-job consumption. It is only a part of the on-the-job consumption. The on-the-job consumption in this article refers to the excess management cost, because from the perspective of accounting treatment, most of the management staff's on-the-job consumption items are recorded in the "management cost" section. Too much management costs mean the existence of on-the-job consumption. But it will increase the agency cost, damage the shareholders and other stakeholders, and affect the performance and competitiveness of the enterprise. This is mainly because the content of the incumbency consumption is very complicated and trivial, and the current accounting standards have not issued relevant regulations to define the on-the-job consumption. There is a larger operating space in the accounting treatment, which leads to the blurring of the definition of on-the-job consumption, which makes the managers more capable and motivated to seek excessive recessive welfare rather than from the interests of shareholders. In addition, the company's management on the job consumption behavior tends to exceed the appropriate scope. In addition, from the incumbency consumption. There is a small number of listed companies disclosing the situation of on-the-job consumption, but the contents of the disclosure are different and the amount of the disclosure is very different. The current research perspective on the on-the-job consumption is mostly focused on the internal governance mechanism and the legal level of the company, but it is due to the imperfect laws and systems. It is not very optimistic. Therefore, this article attempts to break through the original research perspective and take the media supervision as the angle of view, to seek the influence of external governance on on-the-job consumption, and to further explore the middle path of media supervision affecting on the job consumption. First, this paper collects and summarizes the related research status of Chinese and foreign scholars, and combines the relevant theory of corporate governance. On the basis of the principal-agent theory, the related theory of media and the theory of government regulation, then the logical relationship between the media supervision and the intervention of the on-the-job consumption and the administrative organization is summed up and the relevant assumptions are put forward based on the relationship between the three parties. Secondly, the A shares listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen two cities, including the data from 2011 to 2015, are selected and the data are screened and integrated. At the same time, it validates the influence of media supervision on on-the-job consumption and the transmission mechanism of administrative intervention in the supervisory role. This article is divided into six parts: the first part is the introduction, which mainly describes the background and significance of the research, the research content and research methods and innovation points; the second part is the literature review, the main part. We should collate and summarize the related research status of in-service consumption and media supervision at home and abroad; the third part is the definition and theoretical basis of the concept, the related concepts are defined and analyzed, the fourth part is the research design part, including 4 hypotheses based on the theoretical analysis, the design and the model of the variables. The fifth part is an empirical test. This part mainly includes the descriptive statistics of samples and the 4 hypotheses proposed in this paper on the basis of sample selection and data source sorting, and the main conclusions of this article are obtained. The sixth part is the conclusion and policy recommendations of this article, mainly for the demonstration. According to the empirical research, we find that the media can effectively supervise the incumbency consumption of the listed company executives in the year, and the media in the last year can also effectively monitor the problem of the listed companies in the same year, but the media supervision was more than that of the same year. In addition, media supervision has a greater impact on the on-the-job consumption of state-owned enterprises in the same year. At the same time, the effect of media supervision on the on-the-job consumption by the media is verified by the intervention of the administrative agencies, and the influence of the government is stronger than that of the non-state-owned enterprises. Industry.
【学位授予单位】：重庆工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：G206;F275

【参考文献】