道德规范：重检朱熹道德哲学定位的新视角

发布时间：2018-01-06 03:32

本文关键词：道德规范：重检朱熹道德哲学定位的新视角　出处：《华东师范大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：朱熹的心统性情是心性论的核心命题。他认为性、情是体用关系,心、性尽管在本体论上是截然二分的,但是在道德实践中心、性是不杂不离的关系。心作为道德实践的主体具有道德意义。然而,这种模糊的关系经常受到质疑,牟宗三等人认为这样框架下的行为并不具有道德意义,所以如何对心统性情有一个更为精辟的论证成为重检其定位的关键问题。本文跳出自律—他律的窠臼后,试图从作为内在论的道德规范出发认为,朱熹承认心有人心、道心的差别,我们之所以有不善的行为,乃是出于人心。但是,道心具有反省的功能,我们可以通过道心对性有清晰透彻、感同身受的理解,因为这就是我们先天所禀赋的本性。当我们在这个阶段,我们的实践行为就具有道德意义,并且完成了自身与价值的同一,更进一步讲,我们对自己的身份有着清晰透彻的认识。同时,本文会用格物致知的工夫论反向格义"反省"概念,在对其来源做出批评后,证明我们是可以通过现实实践证明心统性情的道德属性。
[Abstract]:Zhu Xi's mind and temperament is the core proposition of the theory of mind sex. He thinks that sex, emotion is the relationship between body and use, mind and sex are diametrically dichotomous in ontology, but they are in the center of moral practice. As the subject of moral practice, the mind has moral significance. However, this vague relationship is often questioned, Mou Zongsan and others think that the behavior under this framework does not have moral significance. Therefore, how to have a more incisive argument on mental integrity has become the key issue to re-examine its positioning. This paper tries to think of it as the moral norm of internalism after jumping out of the rut of self-discipline and heteronomy. Zhu Xi admitted that there is a difference between the mind and the mind. The reason for our misbehavior is the human heart. However, the Tao mind has the function of introspection, and we can have a clear understanding of sex through the Tao mind. Understanding empathy, because this is the nature of our innate gift. When we are at this stage, our practice is morally meaningful and accomplishes the identity of itself with value. We have a clear and thorough understanding of our own identity. At the same time, this paper will use the concept of "reflection" on the reverse meaning of "introspection", after making criticism of its source. It is proved that we can prove the moral attribute of mind through practical practice.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：B244.7

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