内在主义的认识论研究

发布时间：2018-04-05 01:14

本文选题：内在主义　切入点：认识论　出处：《社会科学家》2017年06期

【摘要】：内在主义的认识论认为认知者通过思考他自己的意识状态,就可以使他能够发现他所具有的可能的信念,并且可以使他的这个信念是正确的得到辨明。但是我们的内省能力是否与内在主义所认为的是同样可靠的是值得怀疑的,自我呈现的特征也是值得怀疑的。内在主义者的特定论方法也是矛盾的,它从假定我们最初认为是可以得到辨明的信念事实上是可以得到辨明的来开始的,但这个假定是不可靠的。知识的辩明概念既是主观的也是客观的,但主观上有说服力的并不一定是客观上可以保证的,恶魔假设和缸中之脑假设表明能满足我们自身最严格的认识论标准的认识事实上可能完全是错误的,知觉信念的这种错误表明真实的信念不能被看作是严格的知识。
[Abstract]:The theory of Inherent epistemology holds that by thinking about his own state of consciousness, the cognitive person can discover the possible beliefs he has, and that this belief can be correctly identified.But it is doubtful whether our introspection ability is as reliable as what is believed by internalism, and whether the characteristics of our self-presentation are dubious.The internalist approach to specificity is also contradictory, starting with the assumption that beliefs that we initially thought could be identified are in fact discernible, but this assumption is unreliable.The definition of knowledge is subjective as well as objective, but subjectively persuasive is not necessarily guaranteed objectively.The demonic hypothesis and the brain hypothesis in the tank show that the knowledge that meets our own most stringent epistemological criteria may in fact be completely wrong, and the error of perceptual belief suggests that the true belief cannot be regarded as strict knowledge.
【作者单位】：铜仁学院武陵民族文化研究中心;铜仁市文化科技产业创新研究中心博士后工作站;
【基金】：贵州省哲学社会科学规划2015年度一般项目“齐硕姆哲学思想研究”(15GZYB46) 中国博士后科学基金第59批面上资助项目“齐硕姆哲学思想研究”(2016M592893XB)
【分类号】：B712.59

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