科学客观性的分类学研究

发布时间：2018-06-06 17:33

  本文选题：科学客观性 + 不同用法　； 参考：《自然辩证法研究》2017年11期

【摘要】：人们对科学客观性有众多不同的用法和标准。作为科学哲学和科学史界定客观性概念的一种主要进路,对客观性不同用法的分类学研究面临着诸多困境。哈金和阿克斯特尔将这些困难解释为客观性可能是具有家族相似性的概念;并且哈金认为人们甚至完全可以在不提及客观性概念的情况下讨论科学客观性相关问题,客观性概念是多余的,"让我们别谈客观性了"。哈金和阿克斯特尔的观点是对分类学研究所面临困境的猜想性解释。不基于他们的猜测性解释,对客观性不同用法分类的完备性、不同用法间的对立性,以及不同用法间的选择的分析显示,分类学研究进路必然面临困境。通过分类学研究界定客观性是一条死胡同。
[Abstract]:There are many different uses and standards for scientific objectivity. As a main way to define the concept of objectivity in philosophy of science and history of science, the taxonomic study of different uses of objectivity faces many difficulties. Harkin and Axelter interpret these difficulties as the notion that objectivity may be a family similarity, and Harkin believes that people can even discuss scientific objectification-related issues without mentioning the concept of objectivity. The concept of objectivity is superfluous. "Let's not talk about objectivity." Harkin and Axel's view is a conjectural explanation of the dilemma facing taxonomic research. The analysis of the completeness of different categories of objective usages, the opposites between different usages, and the choice of different usages shows that the approach to taxonomic research is bound to face a dilemma, not based on their conjectural explanations. It is a dead end to define objectivity through taxonomic research.
【作者单位】： 华南理工大学科学技术哲学研究中心;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“当代物理学中的超验认识研究”(17YJC720018)
【分类号】：N02
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本文编号：1987546