席勒真理观研究

发布时间：2018-08-27 14:10

【摘要】：费迪南德·凯宁·思戈特·席勒作为实用主义在英国的传播者和捍卫者,在实用主义的发展中发挥着举足轻重的作用。然而除了他在世时闻名遐迩外,后世却几乎无人问津。这种对席勒的忽视不能不说是一种遗憾。本文以真理观为切入点,着重阐释席勒关于真理的思想,这也是实用主义影响最为深远的观点。席勒把实用主义真理观称为真理的人本主义定义,认为实用主义是人本主义在认识论上的应用,形成了自己独特的真理理论。本文开篇首先说明席勒真理观产生的背景。尼采的"唯意志论"、英国传统经验论以及詹姆斯的真理思想构成了席勒真理观最重要的理论背景。第二部分及第三部分说明席勒的真理思想。席勒认为一个断言的真假是由它的后果,由它与促使作出断言的兴趣的关系,由它对提出问题的目的的影响决定的。真理心理学地被定义为价值的一种形式。当价值被经验认可他就变成有用的。真理是以事实为基础的,但是关注事实的歧义非常重要,即广义的事实与狭义的事实。这两种事实,一是"第一实在",包括所有被经验到的东西,先于表象与实在的区分,并包括了二者。对"第一实在"的操作制造了严格意义上的事实。这个意义上的事实称做"第二实在",这不是一个我们的真理、知识必须与之符合的先验地独立的实在。"第二实在"是内在于认识过程的,真理与事实并没有根本的分开。席勒认为真理是我们"制造的"。因为人的兴趣和目的渗透在认识过程中,真理是人的真理,没有人的努力和主动无法生成。真理不是独立的,而是依赖于人的生活,满足生活的需要,由我们参照我们的经验而制造。个体制造真理是因为真理自始至终都与个人的目的、兴趣相关,并随着他们的变化而变化。若承认认识过程是从主观兴趣开始的,那么对我们来说是实在的东西必须已经是兴趣的对象,并且既然我们完全有能力制造兴趣的对象,那么发现这些对象就可以说是制造实在。因为一般来说向我们呈现的世界就是我们的兴趣的反映。不过席勒所说的实在的制造只涉及我们对实在的认识而不影响实在的实际存在,是认识论上的制造实在。无论是真理的制造还是实在的制造都必须以这样一个假设为前提,即自由的实在性或者说实在的可决定的非决定性,除非遍在于整个认识过程中的选择与抉择是实在的,否则就不可能有真正的制造真理或制造实在。对于"表象"与"实在"的关系,席勒认为我们可以开始的唯一实在就是我们自己的个人经验。另一方面,"表象与实在"的区别不是超越我们的经验,而是在我们的经验之列。它不构成我们的世界与另一个世界之间的关系,也不构成进入一个不可思议的绝对选择的领域。它始终与我们的知识相对,与我们的的世界相对。第四部分说明席勒真理观的意义。包括他对传统符合论、融贯论真理观的批判以及对詹姆斯、杜威真理观的发展与深化。席勒认为如果真理被设置为模仿一个超越经验的原件,就没法证实它与实在的符合,整个学说就是无意义的。对于融贯论真理观席勒认为它为怀疑主义提供了依据。席勒发展了詹姆斯"真理即效用"的观点,但是他认为反过来说"一切有用的就是真的"是错误的。对于杜威"工具主义真理观",席勒认为杜威所坚持的真理是一种工具,工具就是手段,手段服从于目的,既然目的得到满足,那真理就必然也是令人满意的,这种说法是有失偏颇的。最后是结论,旨在分析为什么席勒在他所处的时代被热烈的讨论,然而在去世之后却几乎被世人所遗忘。席勒之所以在他所处的时代很出名,一方面是因为他的"重复"的写作风格,另一方面是因为他积极地参与哲学讨论。而后世之所以被人遗忘主要有两个方面的原因,一是他的个性,席勒的个性比较张扬,对于其他哲学家的指责言辞过于犀利。二是受他所处的时代的局限。20世纪30年代,形式主义的崛起掩盖了实用主义的实质,而之后的30年是实用主义转向分析哲学的时代,席勒不会理会"时机"的局限性,因而,他被后世遗忘也是意料之中。
[Abstract]:Ferdinand Kening Scott Schiller, as the communicator and defender of pragmatism in Britain, plays an important role in the development of pragmatism. However, in addition to his fame in the world, there are few people to follow. This neglect of Schiller can not be said to be a pity. This paper takes the view of truth as the breakthrough point. Schiller regards pragmatism as the humanistic definition of truth, and holds that pragmatism is the application of humanism in epistemology, forming his own unique theory of truth. The first part of this paper explains the emergence of Schiller's view of truth. Background. Nietzsche's "volitionalism", British traditional empiricism and James'truth thought constitute the most important theoretical background of Schiller's view of truth. The second and third parts explain Schiller's truth thought. Schiller believes that the truth and falsehood of an assertion are its consequences, its relationship with the interest in making assertions, and its presentation. Truth is based on facts, but it is important to pay attention to the ambiguity of facts, that is, the broad sense of facts and the narrow sense of facts. The operation of "the first reality" creates a fact in the strict sense. The fact in this sense is called "the second reality", which is not a truth for us, but a priori independent reality with which knowledge must conform. There is no fundamental separation between truth and facts.Schiller believes that truth is "made" by us.Because human interest and purpose permeate in the process of cognition,truth is human truth,and no one can make efforts and initiative to produce it.Truth is not independent,but depends on human life to meet the needs of life.It is made by us referring to our experience. Individuals make truth because truth is always related to personal purposes, interests, and changes with them. If we admit that the process of cognition begins with subjective interests, then something that is real to us must already be the object of interest, and since we are perfectly capable of creating objects of interest, then it is. Realizing these objects can be said to be manufacturing realities, for the world presented to us in general is a reflection of our interest. But what Schiller says about the making of reality involves only our knowledge of reality without affecting it. It is epistemological manufacturing realities, whether it is the making of truth or the making of reality. It must be premised on the assumption that there is no real truth or reality to be made unless the choice and choice that pervades the whole process of cognition are real. On the other hand, the distinction between "appearance and reality" is not beyond our experience, but within our experience. It does not constitute the relationship between our world and the other world, nor does it constitute the entry into an incredible field of absolute choice. The fourth part explains the significance of Schiller's view of truth, including his criticism of traditional correspondence theory, coherence theory and the development and deepening of James and Dewey's view of truth. Schiller developed James's view that truth is utility, but he thought it was wrong to say that "everything that is useful is true" in turn. For Dewey's "instrumental view of truth", Schiller believed that Dewey's truth was a tool. It is biased to say that means are means, and means are subject to ends, and that truth is necessarily satisfactory, since ends are satisfied. Finally, it is concluded that Schiller was heatedly discussed in his time, but almost forgotten after his death. The age is famous for his "repetition" style of writing and for his active participation in philosophical discussions. There are two main reasons why later generations were forgotten: his personality, Schiller's more open personality, and his sharp criticism of other philosophers. The second reason is that he was in a time when he lived. In the 1930s, the rise of formalism obscured the essence of pragmatism, and in the following 30 years, when pragmatism turned to analytic philosophy, Schiller ignored the limitations of "timing" and was therefore expected to be forgotten by later generations.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：B561.59

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